The visit of the Nigerian Prime Minister, Ali Lamine Zeine to Burkina Faso on 7th October 2023, to discuss issues on the strengthening of cooperation between Burkina Faso, Niger and the recent formation of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) involving Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, raises the question of sustainability of the AES, its implication on Sub-Regional body and other existing initiatives.
Background Information
The governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger on 16th September 2023, signed a pact to establish an Alliance of Sahel States (AES), aimed at forming a collective structural defence and mutual assistance for the member states as well as confronting their common crisis, which is terrorism in the tri-border areas. The member countries are also poised to prevent, manage and resolve any armed rebellion or threat affecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each of the member states of the alliance, with priority given to peaceful and diplomatic channels. However, in the event of disruption of peace and stability of a member state, force would be applied to resolve the issue.
The charter also states that an act of aggression against one of the member states counts as an act of aggression against the others and thus, allows for all three countries to intervene. It also becomes an economic platform for the three countries to exploit among themselves.
Sustainability of the Alliance
The alliance of the three states signifies a new development in sub-regional political and defence cooperation, independent of the ECOWAS regional bloc and other instruments of Western powers’ influence, including the G5 Sahel. The alliance thus, appears to represent an effort to uphold the demands of sovereignty and the right to self-determination. Thus, members of the alliance have whipped up public and nationalistic sentiments among their citizens culminating in street protests and the denouncing of ECOWAS and other Western countries.
Consequently, analysts opined that the birth of the alliance is a sign of the continued deterioration of French influence in West Africa as well as the diminishing impact of ECOWAS in the region while Russia and other non-traditional partners appear to fill the gap. The Russia-Africa Summit held in July 2023, revealed new opportunities to boost cooperation in terms of security, economic, political and technological. This effort by Russia is very much a work in progress to confidently engage Africa in a new direction. So far, the presence of Russia in the three countries has been visible particularly, providing security directions, and technical know-how, in addition to a pledge of economic empowerment to consolidate power.
However, there seem to be major challenges ahead. There are speculations of a looming possibility of a regime change championed by pro-Western elements, especially if any of the member states could change the security architecture and dynamics of the alliance. On the other hand, it is predicted that the alliance could be tempted by further enlargement due to the possibility of instigating coup d’états in coastal countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Benin, Senegal and Togo. It is observed that the Burkinabe and Malian putchists’ solidarity inspired and allegedly orchestrated the regime change in Niger.
conomically, the continuous imposition of sanctions by ECOWAS as well as other state and non-state actors on the member states have the potential to cripple their economies. A significant characteristic of all the member states is that they are landlocked countries, and as such they need a bilateral agreement with other coastal countries within the region to import and export their essential goods if they exit ECOWAS. For instance, a few days after ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Niger, the country reported a severe shortage of medical and food supplies that were a result of the ECOWAS sanctions. Much of the country’s medical supplies transit through the neighbouring country of Benin, but about sixty containers of essential supplies were blocked in Benin. Equally, Mali also suffered a similar challenge when ECOWAS imposed sanctions on the country following the deposition of former president Bah Ndaw, after the 2021 Malian coup d’état.
Moreover, the charter has indicated the financial arrangements of the activities of the alliance which will be borne by the member states themselves without any external financial assistance. This arrangement raises the question of the financial sustainability of the alliance on account of the current security situation of the countries, of which the majority of their budget is spent on security. Issues of physical development continue to arise in these countries, which makes it impracticable to dedicate additional funding to this course. Already, some elite members within some member states’ armies have shown their disapproval of the government to dedicate troops and resources to this course given their current debilitating internal security situation.
Some experts have argued that the AES appears to be an alliance for juntas backed by Russia to support themselves and protect their regimes, hence the robust influence of Russia in all the member states. However, any contrary action that seeks to depose any of the current juntas from office could break the alliance as the new government that would be formed is likely to withdraw from the pact due to the sanctions of ECOWAS.
Implication on the Sub-Regional Body and Other Existing Initiatives
The creation of the alliance appears to be a parallel body to the ECOWAS which could polarise the sub-region, given the fact that all three states emerged from military coups. With the recent wave of coup d’états in the sub-region, any other country within the sub region that would be taken over by the military is likely to join the new alliance, thereby creating two blocs. In this case, there may appear a new sub regional bloc of AES alliance as opposed to the existing ECOWAS group. The alliance could, therefore, pose an existential threat to ECOWAS as it has opened its doors to any other country whose views are aligned with it. A possible worst-case scenario would be the rivalry intensifying to an extent where the members of the alliance would gravitate towards Russia and or its alliance.
Additionally, the creation of the alliance seems to confirm that the member states do not accept the concept of ECOWAS as a sub-regional body to be involved in managing their security crises to usher them towards constitutional rule.
Curiously, all the member states of the alliance are members of the Accra Initiative, and their current reticent posture, especially on joint counter-terrorism operations could negatively affect the intelligence-sharing pact. The three Sahel states, due to their current peculiar state, appear to be losing trust in the other member states of the Accra Initiative. Burkina Faso specifically, has cited Côte d’Ivoire for being involved in an attempted destabilisation of the transitional government. Also, Benin closed its borders to Niger, both are member states of the Accra Initiative, following the sanctions of ECOWAS, disallowing the entry of essential items to the latter.
Following these developments, the member states of the AES are likely to withdraw their membership from the Accra Initiative or perhaps reduce their level of commitment to allow them concentrate on the new alliance, which bode well for them. It is expected that they would be more inward looking in their intelligence sharing, largely limited to the AES member states rather than hitherto commitment to the Accra Initiative. Already, all the three members have pulled out of the G5 Sahel. The impetus of the member countries towards the creation of a federation as a long-term goal to unite the three neighbouring countries is far more enduring.
Conclusion
The alliance of the three Sahel states in the last few years has seen a wave of new military governments that appear to be pursuing a reorientation from their former colonial power, France and a posture of anti-imperialism against Western powers’ domination in their nation-building.
However, as military juntas, they seem to lean more on Russia and denounce Western states and all pro-Western institutions which could bite them in the near future, as they perceive these actors as key stakeholders in all the disturbances in the Sahel region.
The common denominator among all the member states is terrorism, which needs a transnational approach to combat. However, the posture of the alliance for isolating themselves without regard to working with other comity of nations, or forging a partnership with a regional bloc such as ECOWAS could be a recipe for disaster. While the situation remains fluid, it is imperative that, the non-member coastal countries consider country-specific strategies to enhance security information-sharing.
Source: CISA Analyst
