Russia has very much become ensconced in Africa through many ways – defence, trade, agriculture, and diplomacy. To the uninitiated, this may seem recent. However, Russia’s engagement with Africa is deeply rooted in Soviet-era alliances, particularly with socialist and anti-colonial movements. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided military, economic, and ideological support to liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and beyond (Shubin, 2008). However, after the USSR’s collapse in 1991, Russia largely withdrew from the continent, focusing on internal restructuring (Blank, 2019). The 2010s marked a strategic pivot back to Africa, largely driven by geopolitical necessity, economic ambitions, and a growing confrontation with the West (Stronski, 2019).
The 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent Western sanctions forced Moscow to diversify its partnerships, particularly in regions where Western influence was weaker (Kaczmarski, 2020). Africa emerged as an ideal partner due to its wealth of natural resources, non-aligned foreign policies, and a history of Soviet-era collaboration. This pivot intensified with the inaugural Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, co-hosted by Moscow and Egypt, which signalled a renewed commitment to diplomatic and economic expansion on the continent (Ramani, 2021).
RUSSIA’S MULTI-DIMENSIONAL STRATEGY
- Resources and energy dominance
While Russia is not a dominant economic player in Africa, its strategic focus is on securing access to key resources. Russia has aggressively pursued mining contracts in gold, diamonds, and uranium-rich nations such as Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali. The Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked paramilitary force, has often facilitated these deals by providing security to governments in exchange for resource concessions (Jones et al., 2022).
Russia’s Rosatom is at the forefront of its economic expansion, securing deals for nuclear power plants in Egypt and planning similar projects in South Africa and other nations (Zogg, 2020).
With the Black Sea grain deal’s collapse, Moscow has positioned itself as Africa’s primary grain supplier, deepening reliance on Russian wheat exports. This is a tool of economic leverage, particularly in food-insecure nations (Hedenskog, 2022).
Despite these initiatives, Russia’s total trade with Africa ($18 billion) remains dwarfed by China’s ($254 billion) and the EU’s ($295 billion) (World Bank, 2023). Its strategy is not about replacing these powers but rather securing key economic footholds through high-value, low-cost investments in extractive industries (Korybko, 2021).
- Military-security influence
Russia is Africa’s largest arms supplier, accounting for 40% of the continent’s weapons imports between 2018 and 2022 (SIPRI, 2023). Unlike Western arms deals, Russian weapon sales come with fewer political conditions, no human rights oversight, and are often paired with military training and advisory services.
The Wagner Group and its successor entities operate in Mali, Sudan, CAR, and Libya, offering regime protection, counterinsurgency operations, and ensuring Russian control over resource extraction sites (Martinez, 2023).
Russia has pursued naval access agreements, including a stalled plan for a naval base in Sudan, which would grant Moscow strategic leverage over the Red Sea—a vital global shipping corridor (Faleg, 2022).
In regions where Western influence is declining, particularly in the Sahel, Moscow has successfully positioned itself as a reliable security partner. This is evident in Mali and Burkina Faso, where the military juntas expelled French forces in favour of Russian military assistance (Akonor, 2023).
- Diplomatic & soft power influence
Moscow’s diplomatic offensive in Africa aims to secure allies in its broader anti-Western geopolitical narrative. African nations have been key to Russia’s diplomatic strategies at the United Nations, often abstaining or voting against Western-led resolutions condemning Russia’s actions in Ukraine (Gadzala, 2022).
Russia taps into Africa’s anti-colonial sentiment, framing itself as a friend of African liberation movements and the West as a neo-imperialist force. Disinformation campaigns reinforce these narratives, portraying Russia as a trustworthy partner compared to “exploitative” Western nations (Dahir, 2022). Sergey Lavrov’s 2022 and 2023 tours across Africa emphasized “equal partnership” and promises of debt relief, further reinforcing Moscow’s commitment to the continent (Bordachev, 2023).
Apart from filling security vacuums in Africa and exploiting fractured Western engagements with the continent, Russia also uses low-cost military assistance to weave itself into African affairs.
Unlike China, which invests heavily in infrastructure, Russia achieves significant influence through low-cost military aid, disinformation campaigns, and strategic resource acquisitions (Korybko, 2021). The withdrawal of French and U.S. forces from parts of Africa, particularly the Sahel, has created openings for Russian military engagement (Akonor, 2023). Western policies toward Africa often come with strict governance and human rights conditions, whereas Russia’s “no-strings-attached” approach appeals to authoritarian and transitional governments (Hedenskog, 2022).
Unlike China or the EU, however, Russia lacks the financial capacity to be a dominant trade or infrastructure player in Africa (World Bank, 2023). Russia’s influence heavily depends on mercenaries and illicit networks, making its engagements vulnerable to instability or leadership changes (Martinez, 2023). Russia’s war in Ukraine has diverted resources away from Africa and caused diplomatic strain, as some African nations remain wary of aligning too closely with Moscow (Gadzala, 2022).
- Sharing space technology know-how
Ogunnoiki, Ani, and Iwediba (2021) observe that since Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term in 2000, Russia has expanded cooperation with Africa in space technology and education. Nigeria launched its first satellite, NigeriaSat-1, from Russia’s Plesetsk spaceport, followed by NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X in 2011. Angola’s AngoSat-2, developed by Russia’s Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems, is set to replace AngoSat-1.
- Education & scholarships
Education remains a strategic tool for Russian influence, with over 17,000 African students enrolled in Russian universities (Ogunnoiki et al., 2021). As in the Soviet era, Moscow uses scholarships and training programs as soft power instruments to strengthen ties. Compared to some African states, the study noted that Russia’s education sector remains attractive to a good number of young adults in Africa who seek a bachelor’s or postgraduate degree. As President Putin stated at the maiden Russia-Africa Summit: “Let me repeat that education and training are also an important area of cooperation. At present, over 17,000 Africans are studying in Russia. The annual quota for state-financed openings increases this number” (President of Russia, 2019, as cited in Ogunnoiki et al., 2021).
Despite growing engagement, Ogunnoiki et al. (2021) argue that Africa is not a top foreign policy priority for Russia compared to Europe or the Middle East. They cite, for example, that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia provided minimal assistance to African states, unlike China’s proactive vaccine diplomacy.
Moscow also supports authoritarian leaders, exemplified by its backing of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Russia’s military exports to Africa, often free of human rights conditions, have made it a key supplier of arms (Ogunnoiki et al., 2021). Nigeria, for instance, turned to Russia in 2014 when the U.S. hesitated to provide military aid against Boko Haram.
Additionally, Russia’s interference in African elections, including alleged meddling in Madagascar (2018), raises concerns about its impact on democracy. Furthermore, secretive deals, such as the scrapped $76 billion nuclear agreement between Russia and South Africa under Jacob Zuma, highlight transparency issues in economic cooperation (Ogunnoiki et al., 2021).
They conclude that Russia-Africa relations are shaped by national interests. Africa serves as a market for Russian exports, a resource hub, and a diplomatic ally. In return, Moscow provides military assistance and energy partnerships. While security and infrastructure cooperation offer tangible benefits, issues like political interference and opaque deals raise concerns about whether the relationship is truly symbiotic or increasingly exploitative (Ogunnoiki et al., 2021).
Conclusion
Russia’s engagement with Africa, for now, appears to be on a mutual-interests level. While Russia exploits anti-neo-colonial and anti-Western sentiments of Africa to forge stronger ties with the continent, Africans also appear to see this as an opportunity to tell off the West and break free from their decades-long economic and diplomatic stranglehold. The brazen breaking of ties with France by Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali re-emphasises that sense of freedom.
Unlike the West, Russia is not judgmental of which characters lead Africa. They find solace in characters that reflect the Kremlin’s authoritarian style of governance. While that suppresses Western-style democracy in the eyes of the world, these African leaders with close ties to Russia see such leadership as necessary to decolonise the continent and advance its development without the constraints of democracy’s red tape. They see Africa as being freer and taking ownership of its long-restrained and enslaved sovereignty. For some, having an apparent no-strings-attached alternative “helper” is a bonus. While the West may see Africa as a mere pawn in Russia’s geo-political and geo-economic chess game, the continent’s leaders and people who may be savouring the ever-growing Russo-African ties could also accuse the West of hypocrisy since, with all their democratic principles, they nonetheless interfered in Africa’s internal political affairs. Indeed, Russia may be doing the same thing through modern-day disinformation campaigns, but the sense of freedom enjoyed by pro-Russian African leaders may have blinded them, in the interim, to the potential consequences of the Kremlin’s disinformation onslaught.
Through it all, Russia is securing much needed and scarce natural resources to keep powering its nuclear arsenal, building networks to whittle down Western influence on the geopolitical stage and selling itself to the world as an alternative super-power no matter how much the West downplays its global dominance. But will the end game still be one of mutual interests or will Russia ditch Africa when push comes to shove?
References
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