In recent years, West Africa has been at the centre of international attention due to rising instability across the Sahelian belt. Countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have become flashpoints for terrorism, insurgency, and military coups. While much analysis has focused on how these threats affect neighbouring states through cross-border attacks, refugee flows, and the spread of radical ideologies, another trend deserves equal attention: the rise of conflict dynamics within individual West African states. This occurrence, which can be described as intra-state contagion, involves the replication of regional security patterns in local conflicts that are not necessarily driven by the same actors or ideologies but resemble broader regional crises in form, intensity and consequence.
One example is the ongoing conflict in Bawku, a town in the Upper East Region of Ghana. Historically characterised by ethnic tensions between the Mamprusi and Kusasi ethnic groups, the conflict is intermittent, often flaring up around the issue of who has the right to enskin a chief. Though it is essentially a chieftaincy conflict, it often becomes ethnic and escalates into violent clashes, leading to loss of lives, destruction of property, and militarisation of the area. Firearms are commonly used in the Bawku conflict, despite national bans and the strong presence of security forces in the area to contain the violence.
The nature of the conflict has vast similarities to insurgencies in the Sahel. Armed confrontations, breakdowns in state authority and the militarisation of youth are increasingly prevalent. Despite the absence of known terrorist groups, the conflict has led to a securitised environment where state forces are viewed with suspicion and civilians rely on informal security arrangements. In recent years, Bawku has remained tense and occasionally violent. On 9th April 2025, tensions flared when members of one faction demanded that women from the opposing group vacate a local market. This escalated into a full-blown violence when some youths allegedly opened fire on security officers, leading to an exchange of gunfire which resulted in several injuries and one death. Police barracks were set on fire by angry youth, which caused the police to evacuate their barracks.
The parallels between Bawku and conflict-affected regions in Burkina Faso extend beyond violence. In both contexts, the state is seen as partisan, deepening mistrust between security forces and civilians. In Burkina Faso, government withdrawal from rural areas has led to self-defence militias filling the void, some becoming perpetrators of violence. Similarly, in Bawku, the police’s retreat and military deployment have not calmed tensions but have instead contributed to the perception of a militarised response to a socio-political problem, leading to informal security arrangements by communities which rely heavily on ethnic solidarity, further fueling divisions.
The involvement of marginalised and unemployed youth in violence is a common thread, driven by socio-economic conditions. The way young people are easily mobilised to participate in armed confrontations suggests that underlying socio-economic conditions make such contagion possible. These patterns show how internal conflicts can adopt the structure and dynamics of broader regional instability, particularly when governance fails to address root causes (International Crisis Group, 2023).
In Nigeria, farmer-herder conflicts, particularly in the Middle Belt region, illustrate another instance of intra-state contagion. What initially began as a dispute over grazing land and agricultural space has transformed into a cycle of reprisal killings, ethnic polarisation and organised banditry. Armed groups in the northwest exploit grievances between communities, mirroring tactics used by insurgents in the northeast. According to the Global Terrorism Index (2023), some of these groups have developed rudimentary command structures, used improvised explosive devices and extorted local populations. These developments suggest that localised violence is adopting insurgent characteristics, even if the ideological motives differ.
A key driver of intra-state contagion is the erosion of state legitimacy in peripheral regions. When local populations perceive the central government as indifferent or repressive, they are more likely to tolerate or even support non-state actors (including extremist groups). In Bawku, for instance, persistent curfews, military deployments, and lack of mediation have reinforced a sense of alienation among residents. Similarly, the failure to resolve land disputes or prosecute offenders has contributed to a justice vacuum in parts of Nigeria. In both cases, weak institutional responses allow local conflicts to escalate in both intensity and scale, resembling broader regional crises.
The spread of conflict dynamics is also facilitated by shared socio-economic conditions across regions. High youth unemployment, porous borders, and arms proliferation provide fertile ground for the escalation of local disputes. In Ghana, northern border communities face rising threats from illicit trade and arms smuggling, creating conditions that could enable the transformation of identity-based conflicts into armed rebellions. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the flow of weapons and fighters from conflict zones in Chad and Niger has intensified the capacity of local militias (Okoli & Nnamdi, 2021).
Importantly, the internal spread of conflict patterns challenges traditional security models that prioritise international borders. Policymakers must acknowledge that the same dynamics that make regional contagion possible weak institutions, marginalisation, and identity politics also function within states. This recognition should inform national security strategies that focus not only on external threats but also on internal fault lines.
Efforts to address intra-state contagion must begin with reinvestment in presence and legitimacy in vulnerable areas. This includes equitable development, accountable local governance, and culturally sensitive conflict resolution mechanisms. Additionally, early warning systems should be expanded to monitor changes in local conflicts that indicate shifts toward more organised or militarised forms of violence. Civil society organisations, particularly those with deep community ties, can serve as critical partners in these efforts.
In conclusion, intra-state contagion in West Africa reflects a deeper regional crisis of governance and identity. As local conflicts increasingly adopt the characteristics of regional instability, national governments and other stakeholders must adapt their approaches. Preventing the internal spread of insecurity is as urgent as containing its cross-border diffusion.
References
Global Terrorism Index. (2023). Measuring the impact of terrorism. Institute for Economics and Peace. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/reports/global-terrorism-index/
International Crisis Group. (2023). Saving Bawku: Ghana’s volatile border conflict. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/ghana/saving-bawku-ghanas-volatile-border-conflict
Kwame, C. S. (2025, April 10). Bawku: One killed, 2 injured in clashes as police commander’s house burned. Pulse Ghana. https://www.pulse.com.gh/articles/news/bawku-violence-1-killed-2-injured-police-commander-house-burned-2025040919444797202
Okoli, A. C., & Nnamdi, I. (2021). Farmer-herder conflict and state responses in Nigeria: Rethinking the protection of human security. African Security Review, 30(2), 123–139. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2021.1909280
