The security landscape in the Sahel continues to deteriorate amid an increasingly complex interaction between local governance challenges, regional instability, and global geopolitical rivalries. Since the crisis began in Mali in 2012, terrorism and efforts to counter it have become deeply entangled with shifting alliances, post-colonial resentments, and new power projections, particularly from Russia and China (Institute for Economics and Peace [IEP], 2025). The 2025 Global Terrorism Index reveals how these factors are reshaping the region’s security order, often to the detriment of stability.
Mali: Sovereignty, Sentiment, and the End of Western Partnerships
Mali remains the epicentre of the Sahel’s security crisis. French-led efforts, including Operation Serval, Barkhane, and MINUSMA, were initially aimed at quelling jihadist threats and supporting state institutions. Yet these missions increasingly came under criticism for failing to produce lasting security gains. Many Malians, especially younger generations, began viewing France’s actions as self-serving (Foreign Policy, 2024).
The 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali marked a turning point. Under Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali adopted a “sovereigntist” stance, rejecting foreign military presence and embracing new allies like Russia. The withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and the UN’s MINUSMA peacekeepers left a critical vacuum (UN Security Council, 2023). This was rapidly filled by jihadist groups such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-Sahel), as well as by armed Tuareg factions (IEP, 2025).
The deterioration was evident by late 2023, with violent clashes erupting around former UN bases and the collapse of the Algiers Peace Agreement in early 2024. Notably, JNIM expanded operations and launched bold attacks, including a September 2024 strike on a military academy and air base in Bamako (BBC News Africa, 2024).
While Russia, through its rebranded Africa Corps, stepped in as Mali’s primary security partner, its effectiveness has been questionable. Initially welcomed for its aggressive counterinsurgency tactics, the Corps has since scaled back operations due to high casualties and growing reluctance among Russian personnel (Reuters, 2024). Despite a positive public image in early 2024, their long-term impact remains uncertain (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024).
Burkina Faso: The Epicenter of Terrorism
In 2024, Burkina Faso was the second most impacted by terrorism in the world for the second year running (IEP, 2025). With over 1,000 deaths and numerous large-scale attacks—most notably JNIM’s massacre of up to 600 civilians and soldiers—the country’s northern and central eastern regions have become epicentres of insurgent violence (BBC News Africa, 2024).
Captain Ibrahim Traoré’s junta, following its 2022 coup, distanced itself from France and embraced Russian security assistance. Yet Russian involvement in Burkina Faso remains limited, with troops primarily focused on protecting the regime rather than active combat (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Influence operations, however, have been robust. Russia has deployed a massive disinformation and propaganda apparatus, shaping pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives through social media and local partners (Carnegie Endowment, 2024).
China’s role is more economically driven but increasingly security conscious. Since Burkina Faso severed ties with Taiwan in 2019, China has gained exploration rights for strategic minerals and pledged military aid under its Global Security Initiative (China Daily, 2023).
Niger: A Post-Coup Surge in Terrorism and Strategic Realignment
Niger’s relative stability collapsed after the July 2023 coup. Following the military takeover by General Abdourahmane Tchiani, the country terminated military ties with both France and the United States (U.S. Department of Defense – AFRICOM, 2024). The removal of Western forces, including the closure of U.S. Airbases 101 and 201, marked a strategic turning point.
Terror attacks surged in the aftermath. By 2024, Niger saw a record 930 deaths, with military fatalities topping global figures (IEP, 2025). JNIM expanded rapidly, while IS-Sahel remained active. The instability allowed jihadists to establish territorial control, especially in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions (International Crisis Group, 2023).
Russia has moved quickly to fill the void, delivering weapons and instructors (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Though diplomatic ties with Russia were non-existent before the coup, they are now deepening rapidly. China, meanwhile, is expanding its footprint in the uranium sector, taking advantage of the revocation of Western mining licenses (China Daily, 2023).
The Rise of Anti-Colonial Populism and Shifting Alliances
Throughout the Sahel, negative sentiment toward France has soared. In Mali and Burkina Faso, this shift has been most dramatic, fuelled by perceptions of exploitation and failed interventions (Foreign Policy, 2024). These sentiments have been skilfully harnessed by military leaders who position themselves as anti-colonial protectors of national sovereignty.
Russian and Chinese influence has risen accordingly. Russian media operations and the Africa Corps have successfully recast Moscow as a champion of sovereignty and anti-imperialism (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). Simultaneously, Gallup polling indicates a decline in U.S. and French approval ratings in key states, although support for the U.S. remains strong in non-coup-affected countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Benin (Gallup, 2024).
The Fragmentation of Counterterrorism and the Road Ahead
The withdrawal of Western forces and the fragmentation of the G5 Sahel alliance (with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger withdrawing) has left counterterrorism efforts splintered (IEP, 2025). In response, the three countries have formed a new joint military force of 5,000 troops. However, the regional challenge is transnational, and effective counterterrorism requires collaboration that transcends the Sahelian alliance.
External actors like Nigeria, Algeria, and Libya, along with the U.S. and EU, will remain critical players in countering financing networks, arms flows, and regional jihadist movements (Carnegie Endowment, 2024). While Russia and China are increasing their engagement, their focus appears more aligned with geopolitical positioning and resource access than sustained civilian protection or state-building (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024).
Conclusion: A Bleak Outlook Amid a Multipolar Struggle
The Sahel’s security crisis is no longer just a local or regional issue—it is a microcosm of broader global power rivalries. With declining Western influence, rising Russian and Chinese involvement, and persistent jihadist expansion, the future of the region remains highly uncertain. Unless regional and international actors can find a way to overcome ideological and strategic divides, terrorism in the Sahel is likely to intensify, fuelled by a volatile blend of fractured governance, great power competition, and disillusioned populations (IEP, 2025).
References
- Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). (2025). Global Terrorism Index 2025: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney: IEP.
- Primary source for terrorism statistics, regional trends, and the geopolitical context in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
- United Nations Security Council. (2023). Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Mali established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2374 (2017).
- Source of details on the rise of IS-Sahel and the withdrawal of MINUSMA.
- Gallup, Inc. (2024). Global Opinion Polling: Perceptions of Major Powers in the Sahel.
- Provides data on shifting public sentiment toward France, Russia, and the US in the region.
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2024). Russian Influence and Military Engagement in Africa: A Strategic Assessment.
- Analysis of Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) activities in Mali and Burkina Faso.
- International Crisis Group. (2023). The Risk of Escalation in Post-Coup Niger.
- Contextual information on the aftermath of the 2023 coup in Niger and its impact on terrorism.
- U.S. Department of Defense – AFRICOM. (2024). Strategic Posture Changes in the Sahel Region.
- Details on the US military withdrawal from Niger and subsequent strategic adjustments.
- United Nations Peacekeeping. (2023). MINUSMA Facts and Figures.
- Provides background on the MINUSMA mission in Mali and its challenges.
- Reuters. (2024). “Russia’s Africa Corps Faces Setbacks in Mali as Troops Withdraw to Bases.” Reuters Africa Desk, July 2024.
- Coverage of troop losses and operational issues facing Russian forces in Mali.
- Foreign Policy. (2024). “France’s Diminishing Role in West Africa: From Ally to Adversary.” Foreign Policy Magazine, August 2024.
- Analytical piece on France’s declining influence and rising anti-colonial sentiment in the Sahel.
- China Daily. (2023). “Beijing’s Security Commitment to Africa Under Global Security Initiative.” China Daily, December 2023.
- Outlines China’s pledge of military support to African countries including Burkina Faso.
- BBC News Africa. (2024). “Burkina Faso’s Deadliest Attack in 2024: JNIM Claims Responsibility.” BBC Africa Service, March 2024.
- Reporting on the mass casualty terrorist attack in Burkina Faso.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024). Post-Coup Alliances and Influence in the Sahel.
- Contextualizes the realignment of alliances in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.
- Al Jazeera. (2023–2024). Coverage on West Africa coups, Russian military involvement, and UN peacekeeping withdrawal.
