Introduction
The Sahel region, comprising countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is grappling with escalating insecurity stemming from terrorism, violent extremism, state fragility, and socio-political unrest. Since 2012, the region has witnessed a surge in jihadist activity and communal violence, with implications extending into coastal West Africa. Understanding the genesis of this crisis requires examining the intersection of local dynamics, regional instability, international interventions, and structural weaknesses within Sahelian states.
The Libyan Fallout and Armed Group Proliferation
One of the most immediate triggers of Sahelian instability was the 2011 fall of Libya’s Gaddafi regime. The NATO-led intervention resulted in uncontrolled dispersal of arms and fighters across the region. Thousands of Tuareg mercenaries, previously enlisted in Gaddafi’s forces, returned to Mali heavily armed, contributing to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) (Lacher, 2012; Lecocq et al., 2013). This movement rapidly devolved as jihadist groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) capitalized on the chaos to seize northern Mali.
The Malian military, ill-equipped and under-resourced, failed to contain the insurgents, leading to a coup in March 2012 and a subsequent power vacuum. French military intervention under Operation Serval in 2013 temporarily recaptured key northern cities, but jihadist insurgency adapted through guerrilla tactics and expansion into central Mali and beyond (Wing, 2013).
In 2013, the UN Security Council noted that arms caches looted from Libyan stockpiles found their way into the hands of both state and non-state actors across Mali, Niger, and Chad. Some of these arms were traded through trans-Saharan smuggling networks long used for trafficking drugs, cigarettes, and migrants. As these networks expanded, they began to operate as logistical lifelines for jihadist groups, blurring the lines between organised crime and terrorism (Cockayne, 2016).
The Return of Tuareg Fighters
One of the most immediate consequences of Libya’s collapse was the mass return of heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries who had fought for Gaddafi’s regime. These fighters, drawn largely from northern Mali and Niger, had received military training and combat experience in Libya’s elite units. After Gaddafi’s fall, they returned with sophisticated weaponry, including light arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and even anti-aircraft systems.
In early 2012, these returnees coalesced under the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which launched an armed rebellion against the Malian government with the goal of establishing an independent Tuareg state. The rebellion quickly overran large parts of northern Mali. However, the MNLA was soon outmaneuvered by Islamist groups; Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), who had been operating in the region and seized the opportunity to impose their own form of governance based on extremist ideology.
Weak Governance and Security Vacuums
Structural state weaknesses across the Sahel have amplified the threat of violent extremism. Peripheral regions are often neglected by central governments, suffering from poor infrastructure, limited public services, and underdeveloped legal systems. These vacuums have been exploited by jihadist groups, who offer parallel governance systems enforcing their own interpretations of justice, resolving disputes, and collecting taxes (Thurston, 2020).
In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, state security forces are frequently under-trained and accused of human rights abuses, which alienate communities and further drive recruitment into extremist factions (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The collapse of trust in national institutions, including the judiciary and police, undermines counterterrorism efforts. According to the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS, 2022), more than 2,000 civilians were killed in Burkina Faso in 2021 alone due to insecurity and militia violence.
The Ethnicization of Conflict and Community Militias
The conflict in the Sahel has evolved from an ideological struggle into a complex web of intercommunal violence. In Mali and Burkina Faso, longstanding disputes between herders and farmers, particularly Fulani pastoralists and sedentary groups such as the Dogon, Mossi, and Bambara have been manipulated by jihadist groups for strategic recruitment (Benjaminsen & Ba, 2019). Fulani communities have often been scapegoated and subjected to retaliatory attacks, deepening societal cleavages.
For instance, the Ogossagou massacre in Mali in 2019 saw more than 150 Fulani civilians killed by a Dogon militia. Similar incidents in Burkina Faso, such as the Solhan massacre in June 2021, where over 130 people were killed, have reinforced the perception that communities must rely on ethnic militias or extremist groups for protection (International Crisis Group, 2023).
Socioeconomic Grievances and Radicalisation
The Sahel is marked by some of the highest poverty and illiteracy rates globally. Youth unemployment is rampant, especially in rural areas, where state presence is minimal. In many cases, young men are offered basic income, food, and social status by extremist groups in exchange for loyalty. A 2023 UNDP study revealed that financial incentives, not ideology, were the primary motivation for 25% of individuals who joined extremist organisations in Africa.
The humanitarian dimension also plays a role. The Sahel faces repeated climate shocks, land degradation, and food insecurity, all of which intensify competition over resources. These ecological stressors fuel local tensions and further complicate efforts to address root causes of violence.
Regional and International Responses
In response to the growing threat, multiple interventions have been launched. These include:
- France’s Operations Serval and Barkhane, which aimed to degrade jihadist capabilities.
- The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
- The G5 Sahel Joint Force, a regional military alliance.
- EU Training Missions and U.S. capacity-building programs.
- The Accra Initiative, involving Ghana, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin to counter Sahelian spillover.
However, the militarized approach has faced criticism. Despite these efforts, attacks have increased tenfold between 2016 and 2022, especially in Burkina Faso (Cold-Ravnkilde & Jacobsen, 2021). French forces were eventually expelled from Mali, and MINUSMA’s mandate ended in 2023 amid growing tensions with the transitional government. In the power vacuum left behind, Russian mercenaries such as the Wagner Group have entered the scene, raising further concerns about civilian protection and accountability (Amnesty International, 2022).
The Coup Wave and Its Impact
The deterioration of civilian trust in democratic institutions has been evident in the spate of coups: Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (twice in 2022), and Niger (2023). These transitions were justified as necessary to restore security and sovereignty. Yet, in most cases, military regimes have struggled to deliver results, with violence persisting or worsening.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, 2024), fatalities in Burkina Faso doubled within the first year after its second coup. In Niger, jihadist attacks along the Tillabéri and Diffa regions have escalated, even after the junta pledged a tougher security stance.
Spillover into Coastal West Africa
The deteriorating security in the Sahel has not remained geographically confined. Since 2019, the coastal states of West Africa; Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana, have witnessed growing signs of extremist encroachment, largely attributed to groups operating from southern Burkina Faso. This southward shift has challenged the assumption that these littoral states, with relatively stronger institutions and more robust economies, would remain insulated from the crisis (Eizenga & Williams, 2020).
The border zones between Burkina Faso and the coastal countries are characterised by porous frontiers, limited state presence, and complex terrain, making them ideal routes for extremist movements. Groups affiliated with Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have taken advantage of these vulnerabilities. Research by the Institute for Security Studies (2023) notes that militants often infiltrate border communities under the guise of traders, herders or religious leaders, gradually establishing influence through preaching, intimidation and eventually armed attacks.
These incursions are not random. They are part of a deliberate strategy to exploit under-governed spaces, win local sympathies by addressing grievances (such as land disputes or state neglect), and create operational safe havens in new environments. The initial phase often includes soft penetration, surveillance, recruitment, and ideological outreach, followed by low-level attacks, ambushes, or targeted assassinations.
Country-Specific Developments
- Benin: Since 2019, Benin’s Atacora and Alibori regions have experienced an uptick in militant attacks, particularly in and around Pendjari National Park. In February 2022, a deadly ambush killed eight park rangers and French security consultants. These attacks not only signal militant expansion but also threaten eco-tourism and conservation investments. Benin has since deployed over 3,000 troops to the north under Operation Mirador (ISS, 2023).
- Togo: Togo suffered its first major terrorist attack in May 2022, when suspected militants attacked a military outpost in Kpendjal prefecture, killing eight soldiers. Subsequent attacks have occurred near the border with Burkina Faso, prompting the Togolese government to declare a state of emergency in the Savanes Region. Togo’s approach has combined kinetic operations with civic engagement, including the deployment of mobile clinics and local peace-building efforts to address the drivers of radicalization.
- Côte d’Ivoire: Côte d’Ivoire experienced major attacks earlier in 2016 (Grand-Bassam) and again in 2020 and 2021 in the northeastern regions of Kafolo and Tehini, both near the Burkina Faso border. Militants reportedly established temporary bases in forested areas, using them to ambush Ivorian security forces. The Ivorian government has since launched Operation Koundanlgou, a joint security effort with Burkina Faso, while also enhancing surveillance infrastructure and fortifying military posts in border areas.
- Ghana: Though Ghana has not experienced a direct attack on its soil, security analysts agree that it is high-risk due to proximity, shared ethnic ties, and the growing presence of radical preachers in northern communities. The Ghanaian government has initiated multiple Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategies, including:
- The “See Something, Say Something” national awareness campaign;
- The Accra Initiative, which facilitates security coordination among coastal and Sahelian states;
- The integration of local chiefs and religious leaders in early warning systems and peace education in the Upper East, North East, and Savannah regions (Korah & Kuusaana, 2023).
The Role of Local Grievances
Local discontent is a significant vulnerability. In many of these border regions, residents report land disputes, ethnic marginalization, limited state services, and security force abuses, which extremist groups exploit to build support. A 2022 Afrobarometer survey in Ghana showed that only 28% of northern respondents felt safe from violent conflict, and nearly half reported low trust in security institutions.
In Benin and Togo, Fulani herders, similar to their counterparts in the Sahel, face stigmatisation and pressure from both local militias and formal security agencies, making them more susceptible to jihadist influence. This replicates the ethno-political dynamics seen in Mali and Burkina Faso and signals the need for nuanced approaches that avoid broad-brush criminalization of entire communities.
Regional Coordination and Limitations
The Accra Initiative, established in 2017, aims to improve intelligence-sharing, border surveillance, and joint operations among member states, including Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger. However, differences in capacity, political will, and civilian-military relations hinder coordination. While some states emphasise kinetic responses, others prioritize deradicalisation and development programs, resulting in strategic dissonance.
Additionally, limited funding and weak institutional capacity challenge the sustainability of current efforts. International partners like the EU, UNDP, and GIZ are supporting community resilience programs and capacity-building initiatives, but the risk of dependency and donor fatigue remains high if national governments do not institutionalize long-term, inclusive governance reforms.
Toward a Holistic Solution
A purely military approach is insufficient. Long-term stability in the Sahel depends on rebuilding governance, promoting inclusive development, ensuring justice, and creating economic opportunities. Interventions must prioritize community engagement, conflict mediation, and local development.
For instance, in Niger’s Tillabéri region, community-led early warning systems and dialogue platforms have reduced tensions and improved resilience (OECD, 2022). These programs demonstrate the effectiveness of integrating local voices into national and international strategies.
Conclusion
The security crisis in the Sahel is rooted in a combination of historical, geopolitical, social, and environmental factors. These factors have created a vicious cycle of instability, making the region one of the world’s most acute security crises. Weak governance, identity-based tensions, economic exclusion, ineffective foreign intervention and socio-economic hardship have collectively created a volatile environment. Without a shift toward people-centered, development-oriented, and regionally coordinated responses, the Sahel risks remaining a hotspot for conflict and instability. A multidimensional strategy that balances security with state legitimacy and grassroots engagement is vital for reversing this trajectory. The situation has been made even more difficult with the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali from Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES). Togo seems to be leaning towards joining the AES, making situation more difficult to manage. However, in the interest of peace and regional security and integration, renewed efforts must be made not only to bring the AES states back to the Ecowas fold but also to ensure joint security initiatives such as the Accra Initiative more effective.
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