Introduction
The current security crisis in the Sahel – which is now the most terrorist region in the world for the second consecutive year – according to the Global Terrorism Index 2025 report, has been driven by several factors, including ecological degradation, poor governance, ethnic polarisation, state security abuses, pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam ideology, disputes over natural resource extraction such as gold, and the involvement of external actors – France and Russia.
Historical antecedent of Sahelian terrorism
The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011, precipitated a chain of events throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qaddafi’s violent removal, after 42 years, empowered the Malian Tuareg separatist movement. Ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had been part of the Libyan army returned to Mali. Salafi-jihadis then joined them to play an important role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, which eventually led this group to capture Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were ultimately defeated, and the Tuareg-Salafi Islamic Emirate of Azawad split and lasted about one year.
The failure by the Malian government and the international community to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali, by addressing its root causes, only increased tensions. It gave rise to political, social and economic problems that spread from the north, causing intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ségou regions between Dogon and Fulani.
This also exacerbated instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger increasing intercommunal violence and jihadi activity. Transnational Salafi Jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, established local affiliates in the region by leveraging existing ethnic tensions and resource conflicts. These groups have used their ideology as a tool to mobilise support, overlaying it onto pre-existing divisions and disputes ((GTI, 2025)
There has been a significant increase in deaths from conflict across the Sahel from 2011 up to today. This is likely driven by the onset and increasing severity of conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Niger, Cameroon and Burkina Faso.
In 2024, conflict deaths in the Sahel exceeded 25,000 for the first time. Groups such as Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina initially focused on local issues, framing their actions through an ethnic-nationalist-religious lens. However, these groups are no longer active, having been absorbed into transnational jihadist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed when Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front merged with the al Qaeda Saharan branch, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2017. No deaths have been attributed to al-Qaeda since 2017.
With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices and porous borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy. They operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated decisions as to where to operate, how, and against whom. They exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances (GTI, 2025).
The implications for the security environment are substantial, as the head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to the transnational jihadi networks. This varied operating context raises the prospect of a larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking. Historically, jihadis’ commitment to ideological purity weakened their ability to build and hold a state, but this pragmatic shift raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity conflict that may facilitate a future takeover (GTI, 2025).
Weak governance is at the core of the persistent inability by successive Malian governments to resolve differences amicably; and gave rise to the emergence of the Dogon, Fulani and Bambara militia. Communities were compelled to arm themselves to ensure their safety, as the government could not protect them. Similar developments occurred in Burkina Faso, between the Mossi and the Fulani, leading to several clashes. Increased intercommunal violence has led to further recruitment by jihadi groups, particularly IS and JNIM.
Terrorism Contagion
Terrorism continues to affect the periphery regions of bordering states like Togo and Benin, countries that had been previously unaffected; although the number of terrorism deaths were relatively small when compared to neighbouring countries in the Sahel. Togo recorded ten attacks and 52 deaths in 2024, the most attacks and deaths since the inception of the Index. Attacks were largely concentrated along the country’s border with Burkina Faso, with JNIM claiming four of the attacks and likely being responsible for the remaining six (GTI, 2025).
The report indicates that this marks the further transnationalisation of terrorism across the Sahel, noting that groups like IS and JNIM are also seeking safe havens and new theatres of operations.
The report observes that many of these new areas like northern periphery areas of Togo and Benin are demographically, economically and ecologically similar to regions in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and elsewhere, from which jihadi groups initially emerged over a decade ago. This trend is not uniform, however, other Sahelian states such as Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia continue to experience little-to-no terrorism.
Terrorism Financing
Terrorism financing remains one of the most persistent threats to peace and stability in West Africa. It is both a symptom and a driver of the broader insecurity that destabilises the Sahel and adjacent regions. Over the past two decades, terrorist groups have built complex financial networks, relying on a blend of licit and illicit sources to fund operations, recruit members, and maintain influence in areas where state authority is weak or absent (GIABA & FATF, Terrorism Financing in West Africa).
Financing Mechanisms
Terrorist groups in West Africa, particularly in the Central Sahel, derive funding from diverse and evolving revenue streams. A dominant strategy used by groups like Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is imposing taxes and providing protection services, mimicking governance structures in areas they control or contest. This model allows these groups to extract revenue while embedding themselves in local socio-political and economic networks (GTI, 2025).
Cattle rustling has become particularly lucrative. Armed groups often seize livestock or levy taxes along trade routes, exacerbating pastoral-farming community tensions and reinforcing their power through economic and physical coercion (GTI, 2025).
Additionally, artisanal gold mining has emerged as a critical source of financing. Terrorist groups often control or tax mining operations in resource-rich areas, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, to fund their operations. In some regions, terrorists control oil and gas resources, diverting revenue for their purposes. They may also exploit livestock, fishing and agricultural resources in areas where they have influence or control (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024).
Also, drug trafficking plays a central role in the financial architecture of Sahelian terrorist groups. Although they rarely control the production or global trafficking networks directly, groups like ISGS and JNIM provide protection for traffickers and charge tolls on shipments of South American cocaine en route to Europe through the Sahel (GTI, 2025). This strategy has allowed groups to earn substantial sums without assuming the risks of direct involvement in transnational criminal markets.
Kidnapping for ransom remains one of the most profitable and enduring funding strategies. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a forerunner to JNIM, built a formidable revenue stream from abducting foreign nationals and local political actors. JNIM has since adopted and expanded this tactic. Kidnappings tend to spike in regions where groups are expanding their influence, as observed in Burkina Faso in 2023, before declining once territorial control is consolidated (GTI, 2025).
Arms and human trafficking, illegal logging, and smuggling of goods and people also feature prominently in the financial operations of terrorist networks. These activities are facilitated by porous borders and limited state presence in peripheral regions (International Anti-Counter Terrorism Report, 2024; Vision of Humanity, 2024).
Financial System Exploitation
Beyond physical assets and illicit trades, terrorist groups exploit formal and informal financial systems. The hawala banking system, widely used in West Africa for informal money transfers, provides anonymity and reduces the risk of detection. Terrorists also utilise cash couriers, shell companies, cryptocurrencies, and mobile money platforms to transfer and store funds (IEEE, 2024). These methods make tracking financial flows extremely challenging for under-resourced state institutions.
Moreover, NGOs and charities—especially those operating in conflict zones—have occasionally been infiltrated or exploited by terrorist financiers. While most NGOs operate lawfully, some have unknowingly facilitated fundraising or provided logistical cover for extremist groups (GIABA & FATF, Terrorism Financing in West Africa).
Enabling Factors
Numerous systemic weaknesses enable the flourishing of terrorist financing in the region. These include weak governance structures, a predominance of informal and cash-based economies, porous borders, and limited interagency and international cooperation. Many financial intelligence units (FIUs) lack the tools or training to detect suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing. Furthermore, border patrols are undermanned and underfunded, allowing the free flow of arms, personnel, and money (GIABA & FATF, 2024).
Corruption within security and intelligence services also severely hampers efforts to counteract terrorist financing. The inability of countries in the region to harmonise legislation, enforce anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures, or share critical intelligence in real time further complicates enforcement (GIABA & FATF, 2024).
Regional and International Recommendations
To effectively break the financial backbone of terrorist groups, a series of coordinated measures have been recommended. These include full implementation of UN and FATF standards on terrorist financing, enhancing border surveillance, increasing transparency in NGO operations, and improving AML/CFT monitoring in both formal and informal sectors (GIABA & FATF, 2024).
Additionally, the ECOWAS Convention on Police Cooperation and the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) must be strengthened and fully operationalised. Regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms, early warning systems, and joint investigation frameworks must be expanded to keep pace with the transnational nature of these threats.
There is also a critical need to educate notaries and financial institutions on terrorism financing red flags, improve regulatory oversight of donations and charitable activities, and adopt digital, traceable payment systems to reduce the use of unregulated cash (GIABA & FATF, 2024).
Finally, long-term efforts must include initiatives to reduce community vulnerabilities through socioeconomic development, education, and the building of resilient institutions. The support of civil society, the private sector, and religious leaders is essential to preventing terrorist groups from exploiting marginalised populations.
Conclusion
The terrorist groups have intricately woven their financial systems into the very lives and situations of the environment in which they operate, such that tearing down those systems may mean disrupting, to some extent, some very licit and normal economic activities as well as the normal daily lives of the communities within which they operate. Tackling the problem, therefore, requires very surgical and highly targeted responses that would not create collateral crises which the same terrorist groups may leverage for their sustenance and continuity.
References
• GTI 2025 Report. Global Terrorism Index. Institute for Economics and Peace.
• GIABA & FATF (2024). Terrorism Financing in West Africa Report.
• Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2024). Illicit Resource Control and Insecurity in the Sahel.
• IEEE (2024). Trends in Terrorist Use of Financial Technologies.
• Vision of Humanity (2024). Environmental Crime and Armed Groups.
• International Anti-Counter Terrorism Report (2024).
• ECOWAS Regional Counter Terrorism Action Plan (2024).
