Introduction
The West African landscape, relative to succession and leadership, is slowly changing and assuming a worrying trend. The election of former President of Benin, Patrice Talon as President of the country’s newly established Senate on 6 August 2026 is more than an institutional development in Benin. It is an event with potentially important implications for the future of democracy in West Africa.
Talon was elected President of the Senate with 24 of the 25 votes cast, only a few months after completing two presidential terms and handing over to his former finance Minister Romuald Wadagni. It is interesting to note that Wadagni won the April 2026 presidential election with 94.27 percent of the vote (Abatan, 2026).
If Talon had sought to extend his presidential term, that would have been problematic. While this is significant, this ‘comeback strategy’ has been seen in Togo and Cote d’voire lending credence to the view that political instability and democratic regression are possible.
West Africa, particularly the former colonies of France are caught in this web where military coups and weak institutions make it possible for former presidents to retain power. Quite clearly, what has happened in Benin while formally constitutional, has weakened political competition, manipulated institutional rules and seems to concentrate political authority around incumbents and governing parties (Arthur, 2025).
The Côte d’Ivoire & Togo Examples
The recent experiences in Côte d’Ivoire and Togo provide important contexts to the current discussion. In October 2025, President Alassane Ouattara won a fourth presidential term with 89.77 percent of the vote. Major opposition figures, including former President Laurent Gbagbo and former Crédit Suisse executive Tidjane Thiam, were excluded from the contest. The election consequently took place in an environment in which meaningful opposition competition was significantly constrained (Associated Press, 2025; Reuters, 2025).
In Togo, Faure never really left office, but fundamentally changed the constitutional system from a presidential to a parliamentary model. The presidency became largely ceremonial, while the new office of President of the Council of Ministers became the centre of executive power, with Faure moving into that position in May 2025. Under Article 50 of the new constitution, the President of the Council is head of government, chairs the Council of Ministers, commands the armed forces and security services. Additionally, he determines national policy, conducts foreign policy and exercises significant appointment and regulatory powers.
Why Strong Institutions and Presidential Term Limits Matter
Presidential term limits matter, and moreso the institutions that ensure the effective functioning of the state. Presidential term limits are not merely constitutional provisions. They create institutional opportunities for leadership renewal, reduce the incentives for incumbents to manipulate the political system and increase the possibility of peaceful political alternation (Cassani, 2021; Reyntjens, 2020).
Political alternation is considerably more likely when incumbent presidents do not contest elections. Cheeseman (2010), for example, found that opposition parties are substantially more likely to win elections when a sitting president is not on the ballot. Ghana’s example in 2000, 2009 and 2024 lend credence to this view. When an incumbent president remains politically dominant for an extended period, the political system may become increasingly personalised. The governing party becomes associated with the individual leader, state institutions become increasingly intertwined with the ruling political network, and political competition becomes progressively asymmetric. When this happens, democracy may survive formally while becoming progressively less competitive substantively.
The Challenge of West African democracy
ECOWAS and the entire West Africa sub-region faces a profound democratic challenge. On the one hand, the Alliance of West African States have broken away and formed a new union. Nothing concrete has been done to reverse the trend. Ecowas countries are still working with them. Their citizens cross borders without the requirement for visas. The ECOWAS protocols still extend to them while their ports are used for trade. Democratic legitimacy is becoming fragile in the face of unresponsive governments, corruption and political entrenchment and entitlement. The youth in particular, want action that engenders development and wonder whether elections provide this outcome. Traore of Burkina Faso is increasingly admired across Africa and presents a clearly dangerous alternative for young persons dissatisfied with civilian governments.
Opalo (2024) has argued that Africa’s recent coups therefore should not simply be interpreted as evidence of popular enthusiasm for military rule. Rather, they reflect deeper failures of political institutions and electoral systems, including the inability of governments to improve citizens’ material conditions. At the same time, public dissatisfaction with civilian politics can create dangerous openness to military intervention.
These actions undermine the authority of Ecowas and its overall long term legitimacy, relative to democracy, peace and security. It could lead to instability as citizens move in significant numbers in search of peace. ECOWAS must oppose coups without becoming a defender of governments simply because they possess formal electoral legitimacy.
Otherwise, the region risks creating a dangerous contradiction. Military governments are condemned for overthrowing elected governments, while elected governments are tolerated when they gradually weaken the conditions necessary for genuine democratic competition.
That contradiction can ultimately undermine the legitimacy of democratic governance itself.
Lessons for West Africa
The Benin experience, based on Talon’s Senate presidency calls for neither celebration nor condemnation. Rather, it requires ECOWAS to be particularly vigilant and scrutinize events happening there. The lessons from Talon’s senate presidency includes the following;
- Term limits are necessary but insufficient. Term limits remain essential safeguards against personal rule. But they are effective only when accompanied by genuine political competition and institutional independence (Reyntjens, 2020; Tull & Simons, 2017).
- Political / leadership succession must involve more than a change of individual. The transfer from Talon to Wadagni represents presidential succession. The deeper test is whether it represents genuine political alternation.
- Former presidents should not become permanent political centres. Former leaders can contribute to national life. But democratic institutions must prevent the emergence of informal systems in which former presidents retain decisive influence over their successors.
- Constitutional reform requires broad consensus. Constitutional architecture should strengthen institutions rather than protect political incumbents.
5. ECOWAS must defend democratic substance. Ecowas should oppose both military coups and civilian practices that progressively water down democratic competition. The choice should not be between military authoritarianism and electoral authoritarianism. West Africans deserve genuine constitutional democracy.
Conclusion
The experience of Côte d’Ivoire and Togo demonstrates the dangers of weakening the principle of presidential alternation. What Benin has done has created a test for Ecowas’ efforts at deepening democracy. Democracy is not simply about how presidents enter office. It is about whether they can leave office—and whether political power genuinely moves with them.
Côte d’Ivoire and Togo have demonstrated the dangers associated with extending presidential tenure. Benin now offers West Africa another test, as to whether a president can leave the presidential palace and genuinely let power go? The answer will determine whether Patrice Talon’s Senate presidency becomes an example of successful democratic institutionalisation—or an illustration of a new form of political continuity. Ecowas and West African institutions need to decide.
References
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