The Sahel has cemented its status as the epicentre of global terrorism, and at the heart of this crisis lies Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM). With its roots as a coalition of Al-Qaeda-aligned jihadist groups, JNIM has evolved into the most lethal and territorially entrenched insurgent force in the region. Despite a slight overall decline in terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel in 2024, JNIM’s role in escalating violence underscores the group’s growing dominance.
According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), the Sahel accounted for a staggering 51% of all global terrorism deaths in 2024—up from 48% in 2023 and just 1% in 2007. The exponential growth in violence is largely driven by groups like JNIM and the Islamic State (IS), with JNIM playing a particularly aggressive role across Mali, Burkina Faso, and increasingly into coastal West Africa. Although countries like Burkina Faso and Mali recorded slight declines in deaths, the Sahel still experienced the second-highest toll since the inception of the Index.
This article focuses on JNIM’s activities in the Sahel and why it is a threat to the peace, security and stability of the entire region.
JNIM: A Force on the Rise
Formed in 2017 from a merger of several Salafi-jihadist groups, including Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and Al-Mourabitoun, JNIM has rapidly entrenched itself across the Central Sahel. The group portrays itself as a defender of Muslims against foreign occupation, particularly targeting France and its allies. However, its actions—characterised by mass killings and destruction—paint a more violent and opportunistic picture.
In 2024, JNIM was the second-deadliest terrorist organisation worldwide, responsible for 1,454 deaths across 146 attacks. This marks a 46% increase in fatalities and a 25% rise in attacks compared to 2023, setting a new record for the group since its formation. With an average of 10 deaths per attack, JNIM also became the most lethal terror group globally last year.
JNIM’s operations have significantly intensified in Burkina Faso, ranked the most terrorism-impacted country for the second consecutive year, where it caused 67% of its total deaths in 2024. The Centre-Nord region alone experienced 327 deaths from 12 attacks, doubling its death toll from the previous year. The group is also expanding into the Sahel and Centre-Est regions, with civilian casualties soaring from 38% to 67% year-on-year.
JNIM was responsible for nearly half of all attacks in that country, with both attacks and deaths attributable to the group increasing by over 50%. While overall terrorism deaths in the country fell by 20% (1,532 deaths in 2024, down from 1,935 in 2023), JNIM carried out the deadliest attack of the year in Centre-Nord, killing an estimated 200–600 people. The victims—soldiers and members of the pro-government civilian militia VDP—were digging defensive trenches when the militants struck. JNIM’s escalating campaign was focused around the northern and eastern border regions with Niger and Mali, where most of the violence occurred.
In Mali, which ranked fourth globally, JNIM maintained its status as the dominant terrorist actor, despite a slight 3% decline in both attacks and deaths compared to 2023. The group carried out 77 attacks, causing 322 deaths, marking its second-highest death toll in Mali since its founding in 2017. JNIM’s most devastating assault occurred in Bamako, where concurrent attacks on a school and military airbase killed 60 people—the highest ever recorded toll in the capital. While extremist activity decreased in many regions such as Gao and Timbuktu, the tri-border area (shared with Niger and Burkina Faso) remained the hotspot. Mali’s political instability, including the ousting of Prime Minister Maïga and the stalled transition to civilian rule, has created fertile ground for JNIM’s ongoing operations. JNIM remains entrenched in the Mopti, Segou, and Timbuktu regions, exploiting weak governance and porous borders. Although activity in Koulikoro declined, the region saw an increase in deaths, suggesting more targeted and deadly assaults.
In Niger, ranked fifth, JNIM significantly expanded its footprint. The group conducted 13 attacks leading to 109 deaths, marking a nearly fourteen-fold increase in fatalities and the highest level of JNIM activity in the country to date. Most of the violence occurred in Tillabéri and Tahoua, near the Malian border. The deteriorating security environment—exacerbated by the July 2023 coup, the withdrawal of Western forces, and the arrival of Russian instructors in 2024—created a strategic vacuum exploited by JNIM. Although most attacks (66%) and deaths (75%) were unclaimed, many are suspected to have been carried out by JNIM or affiliated jihadist elements.
Throughout the region, JNIM has proven both resilient and adaptive, capitalising on governance vacuums, military juntas, and the decline of international counterterrorism support, especially in the wake of France and UN troop withdrawals. While tactical gains have been made by some governments, the proliferation of unclaimed attacks and the continued strength of JNIM indicate a persistent and evolving threat across the Sahel.
Coastal states are increasingly in JNIM’s crosshairs. Togo recorded its deadliest year yet, with 41 deaths from four attacks—up from 12 in 2023—while Benin suffered three attacks. This expansion into West Africa’s littoral states raises alarm bells about regional contagion beyond the traditional Sahelian battlegrounds.
Tactics and Targets
JNIM’s preferred method of attack is armed assault, responsible for 98% of deaths and 82% of attacks in 2024. Civilian fatalities more than doubled, from 343 in 2023 to 761 in 2024, making civilians the group’s primary victims. The military accounted for less than a third of all deaths, despite being the most frequently targeted group.
The group’s deadliest act came in August 2024, when an assault on a town in Burkina Faso—allegedly aimed at militia forces—left between 200 and 600 people dead, many of them women and children. Such attacks underscore JNIM’s capacity for mass violence and its willingness to target soft civilian populations to spread fear and destabilise state authority.
A Strategic Challenge for Regional Stability
Despite numerous counterterrorism efforts—including operations by Malian forces backed by the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group)—JNIM continues to hold and expand its territorial influence, particularly in remote and poorly governed regions. Its ability to embed within local communities and exploit long-standing grievances allows it to maintain operational freedom and legitimacy among certain segments of the population.
International and regional actors now face a dual challenge: to militarily degrade JNIM’s capabilities and to address the socio-economic and governance failures that allow it to thrive. Without such a comprehensive approach, the group’s influence is likely to grow, further destabilising not just the Sahel but broader West Africa.
Counter-terrorism options
An article titled: ‘Rethinking military strategy in the Sahel: the case for counterinsurgency,’ suggests implementing a Population-Centric Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategy as one of the ways to fight off JNIM and other jihadist groups in the Sahel. It argues that traditional military operations have often been counterproductive, leading to civilian casualties and eroding public trust, and therefore, a COIN approach, which emphasises protecting civilians, building trust with local communities, and restoring essential government services, could do the trick. This involves reorganising military forces into mobile, combined-arms units that integrate police and civilian elements, focusing on human intelligence, and investing in logistics and sustainment capacities.
Additionally, a paper titled, ‘The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel’ co-authored by Daniel Eizenga and Wendy Williams and published on the website of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies proposed a deconstruction of JNIM’s Coalition structure as a counter-terrorism arsenal. The paper argues that since JNIM is not a monolithic entity but a coalition of groups like Ansar Dine and Katiba Macina. understanding and targeting these individual components can disrupt their operations. It notes that enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing are essential to identify and isolate these groups effectively.
The Crisis Group also proposes engaging in political dialogue as part of the solution. It acknowledges that while it may seem challenging, initiating dialogue with JNIM factions can be a step towards conflict resolution, noting that local dialogue initiatives have shown potential in stemming violence and building peace from the ground up.
Additionally, the Africa Center believes addressing economic and social grievances could help the situation as poverty, unemployment, and marginalisation fuel insurgency; thus, investing in economic development, education, and infrastructure can address these root causes.
Furthermore, strengthening Sahelian cooperation through the formation of the recently-announced 5,000-strong joint forces by Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali could be helpful. However, these efforts require coordination, adequate resources, and a focus on human rights to be effective. As acknowledged by Niger’s defence minister Salifou Mody in January this year, “We [the three countries] are in the same space. We face the same types of threats, particularly this threat from criminal groups. We had to pool our efforts.”
Conclusion
JNIM’s trajectory over the past year reveals a group that is not only surviving but expanding in scope, influence, and brutality. As the most lethal and effective insurgent organisation in the Sahel in 2024, JNIM’s rise presents an urgent security and humanitarian challenge. With its expansion into new territories and increasing focus on civilian targets, the group represents a major destabilising force—one that demands immediate and coordinated international response.
Source: CISA Analyst
References
- Institute for Economics & Peace. (2025). Global Terrorism Index 2025. Sydney, Australia. Retrieved from https://visionofhumanity.org
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2024). The Puzzle of JNIM and Militant Islamist Groups in the Sahel. Eizenga, D., & Williams, W. Retrieved from https://africacenter.org
- International Crisis Group. (2023). Speaking with the “Bad Guys”: Dialogue and Mediation with Violent Extremists in the Sahel. Retrieved from https://crisisgroup.org
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2023). Rethinking Military Strategy in the Sahel: The Case for Counterinsurgency. Retrieved from https://africacenter.org
- Al Jazeera. (2024, January 30). Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso Launch Joint Military Force. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com
- United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). (2024). Report on the Security Situation in the Sahel Region. Retrieved from https://unowas.unmissions.org
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2024). Sahel Region: Overview of Conflict Trends. Retrieved from https://acleddata.com
