1. Introduction

In recent years, Russia has rekindled its relationship and engagement across Africa. This time around, the country has moved beyond the symbolic ties of the Cold era to pursuing a multi-pronged strategy that blends security cooperation, mineral and energy deals, diplomatic outreach, as information operations (Ferragamo, 2023). Unlike earlier periods which was dominated mostly by state-to-state aid coupled with ideological alignment, today’s approach can be likened to a mosaic: official diplomacy sits alongside private military contractors like the Wagner Group; state-linked media as well as dense online networks (The Conversation; 2022; Vorobyov, 2023). Embedded in this new approach is misinformation and disinformation which have become central tools and just peripheral tactics for shaping narratives about governance, security partnerships, Western influence and regime legitimacy. These operations are circulated through broadcast outlets, social platforms and encrypted channels, amplifying pro-Russia frames, exploiting local grievances, and muddying the information environment in ways that can recalibrate public opinion and elite decision-making.

In this article, CISA analysts map out the historical arc of Russia-Africa relations, identifies how contemporary information operations extend and depart from earlier conflict practices and assess their implication for development and governance in Africa by using a process tracing methodology. In this article, CISA analysts treat “disinformation” as intentionally false or misleading content deployed to achieve strategic aims. We argue that Russia’s renewed presence cannot be fully understood through material transactions alone; it also operates in the symbolic arena where perceptions of sovereignty, security, and partnership are contested. By centering information operations within the political economy of external influence, the article speaks to broader debates on digital geopolitics, media capture, and the governance of development.

2. Theoretical Frameworks

The theoretical framework of this article integrates insights from soft power and sharp power debates, postcolonial theory, information warfare, and critical reflections on dependency and neo-imperialism to build a comprehensive lens for analysing Russia’s engagement in Africa. At its core, the framework recognises that Russia seeks to project influence not primarily through the attraction associated with soft power^[1], but through sharp power^[2], deploying manipulative tools such as disinformation to penetrate political and civic spaces (Nye, 2008; Walker et al., 2022). This suggests that contemporary influence is less about cultural appeal and more about controlling narratives, shaping perceptions, and undermining democratic processes (Touseef et al., 2023; Walter et al., 2017). Yet, the use of sharp power is often cloaked in the language of solidarity and partnership, which resonates with Africa’s postcolonial experience. Here, postcolonial theory provides critical traction, revealing how Russia’s appeals to anti-imperial sentiment and sovereignty echo historical struggles against Western domination, while also exposing how such narratives may mask new forms of external control.

Information warfare theory then sharpens this understanding by showing that disinformation is not incidental but rather a deliberate geopolitical weapon. Russia’s strategic use of state-linked media, online amplification networks, and digital propaganda campaigns exemplifies how the information environment has become a battleground as significant as physical territory (Marigliano et al., 2024; Singh & Voo, 2025). This creates a contradiction where disinformation, while framed as support for African autonomy, simultaneously deepens informational dependency by shaping the very conditions under which governance and development decisions are made. This is where critical reflections on dependency theory and neo-imperialism become indispensable. Dependency theory’s structural insights highlight how external actors sustain asymmetrical relations that limit Africa’s developmental sovereignty (Frank, 1967), while neo-imperialism draws attention to the ways contemporary engagements, whether in resource extraction, security cooperation, or information manipulation reproduce hierarchies under the guise of partnership (Rodney, 1972; Nkrumah, 1965). When combined with postcolonial analysis, these perspectives remind us that African agency persists; states and societies negotiate, appropriate, and sometimes resist external influence.

Taken together, this integrated framework posits that Russia’s Africa strategy operates simultaneously in the symbolic, informational, and structural domains. Disinformation emerges as both the instrument of sharp power and the mechanism through which dependency and neo-imperial dynamics are reinforced, all while being justified through postcolonial rhetoric of solidarity. This model thus enables us to trace how narratives, Structures, and power strategies intersect to shape Africa’s development and governance trajectories under Russia’s renewed engagement.

3. Historical and contemporary engagement with Africa

The historical trajectory of Russia’s engagement in Africa can be meaningfully understood through the lens of soft power and its shifting configurations (Walter et al., 2017). During the Cold War era, the Soviet Union wielded ideological and military support for African liberation movements as a form of soft power, projecting itself as a champion of anti-colonial struggle and solidarity with newly independent states.^[3] This influence was not limited to arms and military training; it also extended to education, cultural exchanges, and the promotion of socialist ideals, all of which sought to create affinity with African societies and align them with the Soviet bloc (Matusevich, 2019). The appeal of the Soviet model, even if contested, was central to the USSR’s claim to legitimacy as an alternative to Western colonial and capitalist domination (Duursma & Masuhr, 2022).

In the post-Cold War period, however, Russia’s soft power receded sharply. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic turmoil of the 1990s led to a near-total retreat from Africa (Shubin, 2008). Furthermore, the neoliberal policies that were rolled out to African countries by the West in the 1980s further resulted in the decline of Russian influence (King, 2025). Moscow closed embassies, reduced cultural exchanges, and abandoned many of the ideological commitments that had previously underpinned its ties with the continent (BBC, 2023). In this vacuum, African states reoriented toward Western institutions, Asian powers, and emerging markets, leaving Russia with limited influence and diminished symbolic capital. The absence of sustained cultural or educational diplomacy meant that Russia’s soft power legacy from the Cold War rapidly eroded.

From the 2000s onward, Moscow re-entered Africa with a strategy that blends soft power rhetoric with sharp power practices (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024). Strategic entry points have included security partnerships with fragile states, lucrative mining contracts in resource-rich countries, and the active promotion of anti-Western narratives that resonate with postcolonial grievances (CISA, 2025). These moves were justified in the language of sovereignty, equality, and non-interference, appeals designed to revive memories of Soviet solidarity and thus tap into Africa’s postcolonial consciousness. However, unlike the Soviet era, where education and ideology functioned as genuine attractions, contemporary Russian engagement relies heavily on coercive or manipulative forms of influence. Disinformation and state-controlled media outlets such as RT and Sputnik amplify anti-Western sentiments, delegitimise democratic opposition and manufacture legitimacy for regimes aligned with Moscow.

Case studies particularly in the Sahel illustrate this hybrid approach. In Mali, Russian influence has grown through the provision of security assistance and narratives framing Russia as a more reliable partner than France. In the Central African Republic, Wagner Group operations combine military support with propaganda campaigns that portray Moscow as a guarantor of sovereignty. In Sudan, ties to military elites are reinforced through disinformation targeting pro-democracy activists. At the continental scale, Russia leverages African Union summits to position itself as a global partner opposed to Western hegemony, using soft power language while advancing sharp power tactics.

Taken together, the historical arc shows a clear transition: from the Soviet Union’s ideological soft power during the Cold War, to post-Cold War decline, and finally to a 21st-century re-engagement where soft power rhetoric is mobilised but often masks sharp power practices. Russia’s Africa strategy thus demonstrates how attraction, solidarity, and cultural affinity can be strategically reconfigured into tools of manipulation and disinformation, reshaping both development and governance outcomes across the continent.

4. Motivation and disinformation as a tool

Russia’s renewed presence in Africa is motivated by a combination of geopolitical, economic, and diplomatic imperatives, all of which are closely tied to its strategic deployment of disinformation. At the geopolitical level, Africa has become an arena for competition with the West, particularly as Moscow seeks to counter U.S. and European influence and present itself as a more reliable partner to African states. Access to natural resources including oil, gold, and rare earth minerals provides a second driver, as these commodities are essential both for Russia’s domestic economy and for sustaining its leverage in global markets. The need to expand influence has intensified since the imposition of Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In this context of isolation, Africa offers Moscow opportunities to build new economic partnerships, diversify diplomatic ties, and secure supportive voices in multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, BRICS, and the African Union.

Disinformation is central to how these motivations are pursued. Fake news, propaganda, cyber campaigns, and manipulation of local media function are mechanisms through which Russia advances its geopolitical and economic interests. Narratives promoting anti-colonial solidarity and anti-Western sentiment resonate strongly within Africa’s postcolonial context, enabling Moscow to frame itself as a partner that respects sovereignty and resists neo-colonial domination. By positioning Russia as a defender of African independence and an alternative to Western conditionalities, such narratives cultivate goodwill while obscuring the transactional nature of arms deals, mining contracts, and security arrangements. At the same time, these information operations strengthen the legitimacy of regimes aligned with Moscow, providing them with discursive tools to delegitimise opposition and deflect domestic criticism. The net effect is an information environment in which Russia’s pursuit of resources, alliances, and global influence is normalised, even celebrated, while Western actors are cast as exploitative and destabilising.

The case of the Central African Republic (CAR) illustrates this convergence of motivations and disinformation. Through the Wagner Group, Russia secured lucrative mining concessions and provided military assistance to the government in Bangui. Parallel to this material involvement, Russian operatives launched coordinated disinformation campaigns on social media and in local outlets, portraying Russia as a steadfast ally defending CAR’s sovereignty against French exploitation. These narratives not only justified Moscow’s presence but also bolstered the legitimacy of the Touadéra government, which relied on Russian support to maintain power. In this way, disinformation became both a shield against Western criticism and a tool for embedding Russia’s economic and political interests within CAR’s domestic landscape.

5. Implication for Africa

Russia’s strategy of influence in Africa carries complex implications for development and growth. Politically, the spread of disinformation fosters instability by polarising societies, undermining trust in democratic institutions, and weakening civic oversight. This creates fertile ground for the entrenchment of authoritarian regimes, which are often bolstered by Russian support and legitimised through narratives of sovereignty and resistance to Western interference. Economically, resource contracts signed under opaque conditions frequently serve elite interests while leaving host communities with little benefit. Such arrangements deepen dependency on extractive industries and limit the diversification of African economies, reinforcing cycles of underdevelopment.

The social consequences are equally significant. For Africa’s rapidly growing youth population, disinformation reshapes perceptions of democracy, governance, and opportunity. Propaganda that glorifies strongman leadership or discredits democratic opposition can diminish aspirations for inclusive governance and civic participation. At the same time, disinformation risks obscuring the structural drivers of unemployment, inequality, and migration, leaving young people vulnerable to disillusionment and manipulation. Yet, amidst these risks, opportunities exist. If African states and regional bodies assert agency, they can reframe relations with Russia as part of a broader South-South cooperation agenda, leveraging partnerships for infrastructure, education, and technology rather than succumbing to extractive dependencies.

6. Conclusion

Russia’s re-engagement in Africa illustrates how old forms of external influence are being reconfigured through new instruments of power. What began as Soviet-era soft power rooted in ideological solidarity has evolved into a hybrid strategy where sharp power manifested most clearly in disinformation plays a central role. While Moscow gains strategic depth, resources, and diplomatic allies, the costs for Africa are borne in weakened governance, economic dependency, and compromised democratic trajectories. Nonetheless, Africa is not merely a passive recipient of these influences. The continent’s future development and governance outcomes will depend on the capacity of African states, institutions, and societies to critically engage with external partners, assert sovereignty in practice rather than rhetoric, and transform external engagements into opportunities for sustainable growth. In this light, the contest over information in Africa is not simply about Russia versus the West; it is also about Africa’s struggle to define its own developmental path in a multipolar world.

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^[1] Soft power was coined by Joseph Nye in 1990 to describe the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome one wants through attraction. Nye points out that the United States and the Soviet Union resorted to such methods during the Cold War.

^[2] Sharp power is not principally about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation. It is sometimes referred to as hard power. Sharp power actions may seek to devalue or damage the legitimacy and integrity of the independent institutions of a target state.

^[3] A detailed account of the Cold war and ideological strategy can be found in Fukuyama’s “End of History”

Source: CISA ANALYST

Via: CISA GHANA