Following World War II, the Soviet Union (USSR) emerged as a new rival to the United States as the dominant force on the global scene. The Cold War began as a political and ideological confrontation between the USSR and the US after the Axis powers were defeated (Schulz, 2008). The ensuing struggle for military supremacy led to a period of espionage, conflicts over the expansion of communism, and a nuclear arms buildup that threatened to wipe out humanity (Ojserkis, 2003). Relations with the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin’s leadership hindered President Roosevelt’s goal of an enduring peace emerging in the postwar world order (Office of the Historian, n.d). Throughout the twentieth century, the threat of communism spreading outside of Russia persisted since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, when Soviet forces overthrew the Russian monarchy (Morgan, 2015). This anxiety was justified because Soviet officials actively worked to target or infiltrate countries in order to increase the USSR’s influence throughout the world.
Soviet attempts to assert their territorial claims in Europe after Germany’s surrender, fueled the notion that the USSR wanted to spread communism throughout the continent (Naimark, 2004). Following Roosevelt’s death, his successor, Harry S. Truman took a bold stance, announcing that the United States would offer military and diplomatic support to any democratic country threatened by the spread of Soviet authoritarianism or internal communist parties (Coffey, 1985). The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a military alliance involving the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and several Western European countries, was established in 1949 as a result of the Truman Doctrine (Koenig, 1969; McGhee, 1990). NATO members pledged to defend any member state under assault from any other force, a commitment strengthened by the Marshall Plan’s implementation throughout Western Europe (Stromseth, 1991).
Since the 15th century till date, Africa has been an intense battlefield for the world’s superpowers and has embodied the proverb: when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. Initially, Africa was solely a battlefield for resource exploitation to aid in the growth of capitalism and development of the Western world (Rodney, 1972). However, after the end of World War II (from 1945 to 1970), the resource battle significantly changed to an ideological (democracy vs communism) battle as the wind of independence began to blow across the colonies (Myrice, 2015; Macharia, Olewe Nyunya, & Adar, 1993). The United States sympathised with the burgeoning continent of Africa, reflecting its own anti-colonial past. However, Africa also reflected the history of the Soviet Union (Mackintosh, 1960). In reaction to imperialism, nascent socialist revolutions were emerging throughout Africa; the 1948 riot and Nkrumah’s positive action declaration in Ghana in 1950 are two examples. Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, promised to assist national liberation movements worldwide (Kanet, 1988; Guan-fu, 1983). Thus, the USSR had empathy for Africa’s revolution (Pajak, 2022). In many ways because the Soviet Union and the United States wanted their own influence in Africa there was a second scramble for the continent.
On December 26th 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved with political scientist Francis Fukuyama publishing, The End of History and the Last Man, a year later, where he famously argued that liberal democracy of the United States of America had emerged as the final form of human government following the Cold War. At the heart of Fukuyama’s argument was the idea that liberal democracy, as practiced in Western nations, represents the peak of political development. The end of the Cold War, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, suggested that there was no viable alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. Fukuyama saw this not just as a political victory for the West but as a victory of ideas of individual freedom, political participation, and market-driven economies. The “end of history” signified, in his view, that the ideological contest for the best form of government was over.
However, nearly three decades later, the global landscape has shifted dramatically, and questions have arisen about whether Fukuyama’s thesis still holds. In this article, CISA analysts argue that Russia’s growing influence in Africa, especially in the Sahel region, challenges the notion that liberal democracy is the undisputed victor on the world stage.
Russia’s Strategic Expansion into Africa
The rise of Russia as a global power in the 21st century and its subsequent influence especially in Africa, raises very pertinent questions about the universality of liberal democracy. The Sahel region of Africa offers an example of how Russia’s growing influence is reshaping political dynamics. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, military juntas have overthrown democratically elected governments in recent years. These new governments have increasingly sought the backing of Russia, evicting the Western allies who would have previously represented them in places like the UN and have embraced Moscow as the leading partner instead. The Wagner Group, a private Russian paramilitary organization with several ground deployments on the African continent, is the active representative of Russia, providing support through military training, provision of security, and combat engagement. The Wagner Group was even invited by the government of Mali to offer military expertise despite its long relations with the West. Russia, in turn, has capitalized on such opportunities, offering military support without the political conditionality that Western nations typically attach to their overtures, including respect for human rights and democratic reforms. This model of cooperation based on pragmatic, realpolitik approaches rather than liberal ideals appeal to such governments, who may feel their sovereignty is best preserved through such partnerships.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s government has also forged key partnerships with African regimes, offering alternative governance models that are often more aligned with communist practices rather than the democratic principles that Fukuyama championed. For example, in February 2024, Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture announced that it had shipped 200,000 tonnes of grain in humanitarian aid to six African nations. This gesture fulfilled the Kremlin’s pledge to the continent last July, Russia’s state news agency TASS reported. Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev said that Burkina Faso, Mali, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe each received 25,000 tonnes of grain while the Central African Republic and Somalia got 50,000 tonnes each.
This expansion is framed as a challenge to the Western-led international order who are constantly countering the efforts of Russia in the region by framing everything from the communist country as disinformation/misinformation. Countries in the Sahel, like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, have increasingly turned to Russia as a reliable partner, often in direct opposition to Western powers. The attraction lies in Russia’s offer of pragmatic, often less conditional support compared to the West, which frequently ties its assistance to demands for democratic reforms and human rights protections.
The Challenge to Liberal Democracy
Russia’s increasing presence in the Sahel, and in Africa generally, poses an ideological challenge to the liberal democratic model. States that have grappled with governance, insurgency, and economic volatility are searching for alternatives to the liberal democratic values of the West. Russia, through its strongman leadership and authoritarian history, offers an attractive alternative, one that doesn’t necessarily demand political liberalization or democratizing reforms. In this context, Russia’s growing presence in Africa appears to challenge Fukuyama’s thesis of liberal democracy as the end point of political development. Authoritarian systems such as Russia’s, and China’s ascendance with its own brand of “authoritarian capitalism,” would seem to present credible alternatives to liberal democracy. These regimes frequently present stability, economic development (if at a price), and an alternative to the political instability that can come with democratization.
Whereas Fukuyama had posited that the attraction of liberal democracy was universal and would extend throughout the world, the emergence of such authoritarian powers indicates that there are still numerous countries, especially in regions such as Africa that might not view liberal democracy as the most desirable system of government. Actually, they might see the West’s insistence on democratic principles as cultural imperialism and would rather follow a more state-led, communalism-based approach that guarantees stability without political liberties which is thought to be the authentic African personality.
Conclusion
In the decades that have passed since Fukuyama’s announcement of the End of History, the world has, instead of his clear victory of liberal democracy, seen an increase in the pace of complexity as well as ideological rivalry. The increasing presence of Russia in the Sahel region and Africa attests to the persistent struggle for political legitimacy and power worldwide. While Fukuyama’s thesis is a valuable contribution to political theory, it now appears more a mirror of a specific historical moment than an absolute truth. Its predicted ideological “end of history” has been put off, perhaps indefinitely, by the advent of authoritarian alternatives that continually challenge the claim of liberal democracy’s universality.
The future of global governance is very much in doubt. As nations such as Russia and China strive for dominance, the battle among political systems will continue. The fight for the future of democratic rule and the required knowledge of history is far from over. Furthermore, Fukuyama’s suggestion failed to adequately consider the intricate dynamics of globalization, where multiple ideologies can coexist at the same time, frequently through economic or military measures but not necessarily through democracy’s persuasive mechanisms. Consequently, we are witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world order in which liberal democracy, authoritarianism, and other political orders exist side by side, competing for influence in various regions.
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