Introduction
In the past decades, Ghana has made an impressive progress in digitalisation, financial inclusion and innovation (Adu et al., 2013; Adzakor, 2024). With the convergence of mobile technology and banking services, Mobile Money (MoMo) has changed how citizens access; store and transfer money (Ocansey et al., 2024; Seidu et al., 2025). It was first received with a lot of skepticism when it was introduced. However, with education and funny advertisements like “me nsa aka” (I have got it) by MTN among others, the response to the innovation in transfer gained interest from the populace, particularly the unbanked . As a result, interest in MoMo has leapfrogged traditional banking, connecting older and lower income individuals who never had bank accounts to the financial grid and facilitating rapid transactions across all income brackets. According to new data from the Bank of Ghana, mobile money transactions surpassed GHC 3.3 trillion in 2024, surpassing the previous record of GHC 1.9 trillion in 2023. This tremendous growth reflects a dynamic shift toward digital finance, underscoring the centrality of mobile platforms to Ghana’s evolving economy. For the ordinary Ghanaian, mobile wallet is not just an alternative to banks but a primary means of receiving salaries, paying bills, saving and investing, buying food and managing daily life.
In addition to its impact on financial inclusion and economic efficiency, the mobile money revolution in Ghana has also created thousands of jobs, particularly for the youth and informal workers. For instance, in 2023, there were 609,000 active mobile money agents in Ghana, increasing from from 5,900 in 2012 to around 505,100 in 2022.. The proliferation of mobile money agents across the country has opened up new livelihood avenues in both urban and rural communities. These agents, often stationed in kiosks or small shops, serve as the physical interface between users and the mobile financial ecosystem. They help customers register wallets, load or withdraw funds as well as navigate digital platforms, thereby acting as crucial facilitators of digital access.
However, this revolution has come with its own vulnerabilities. While mobile money has enhanced inclusion and efficiency, it has also created fertile ground for online scams, financial fraud and insecurity, leading to what scholars now call “security contagion”, a viral spread of insecurity facilitated by technological growth and social mimicry. This article seeks to expose the nature of mobile money frauds, insecurity emerging as a result of mobile money operation and provides strategies and solutions.
2. The Rise and Drivers of Mobile Money Fraud in Ghana
Mobile money fraud in Ghana has escalated both in volume and complexity. Fraudsters are exploiting the very infrastructure designed to democratise finance. As mobile money becomes more embedded in everyday life, cybercriminals have grown more organised and technically skilled, taking advantage of both human error and systemic weaknesses. In 2023 alone, the Cybercrime Unit of the Ghana Police Service recorded 7,250 cases of mobile money fraud, a 32% increase from 2022 (Afenyadzu, 2025). The Ghana Chamber of Telecommunications estimates that GHS 346 million (approximately $28.5 million USD) was lost to such scams that year. A broader picture is revealed by the E-Crime Bureau’s 2024 Digital Fraud Analysis, which found that 65% of mobile money users have either fallen victim to or been targeted by fraud, a clear indication that this problem is no longer marginal, but mainstream. These figures reveal a sobering truth: while the infrastructure has expanded, digital literacy and security systems have lagged, leaving millions of Ghanaians exposed.
The rise of MoMo fraud can be attributed to several reasons. First, digital illiteracy and human factors are one of the underlying drivers of MoMo fraud. Despite the rise in the use of smartphones, many Ghanaians still lack foundational knowledge about digital safety (Oteng et al., 2024). Concepts like phishing and two-factor authentication are unfamiliar to the large segment of the population. Fraudsters exploit this gap especially among the elderly, rural dwellers and first-time mobile money users. In addition, Ghana’s regulatory frameworks have not kept pace with the speed of digital financial growth. Telecom companies are often slow to block fraud-prone numbers or report scams to authorities. The Cybersecurity Act is under-enforced, and there has been very little publication of successful prosecutions of mobile money fraud cases. Some scams also rely on insiders within telecom companies or mobile money vendor networks. These individuals leak SIM registration data, override verification processes, or assist with fraudulent SIM swaps, making it harder to detect and prevent fraud. Finally, victims of fraud often do not know where or how to report incidents. Whether to the telco, the bank, the police, or the NCA remains unclear. This lack of coordination delays response time and discourages reporting altogether.
3. Anatomy of a Scam: How Fraudsters Operate
Mobile money fraud in Ghana has evolved from rudimentary schemes into highly sophisticated scams. In this section, we analyse and discuss some of the methods used by these MoMo fraudsters.
- The “Mistaken Transfer” and Fake Alert Scheme: This early scam relies on social engineering. A fraudster sends a fake alert to a target, making it appear as though money has been mistakenly deposited into the victim’s account. The scammer follows up with a phone call, pretending to be the sender and pleading for the money to be returned. Next, the target receives another call from someone impersonating an MTN or Telecel customer care agent, often using caller ID spoofing. The fake agent tells the user that to reverse the transaction, they must verify their PIN or approve a refund using a code. Once the scammer gets access to the PIN or uses the code, the user’s wallet is drained.
- WhatsApp Hijacking and Social Impersonation: More recently, fraudsters have hacked WhatsApp accounts to impersonate friends, family members, or trusted contacts. Using cloned numbers or hijacked profiles, they send distress messages or requests for quick mobile money transfers. These messages often sound urgent, invoking emotional triggers such as a medical emergency, transport fare, or a lost phone. The scam is effective because it exploits existing trust relationships. Victims are more likely to send money when the request comes from someone familiar. Once the transaction is done, the fraudster disappears, leaving the victim in shock.
- Phishing Links and Malware: Scammers now deploy malicious links in WhatsApp groups or text messages, often disguised as job opportunities, giveaways, or free data bundles. Clicking these links installs malware or redirects users to phishing websites that capture login credentials, OTPs (One-Time Passwords), or wallet information. Some malware remains dormant on the phone, collecting data and silently transmitting it to fraudsters who later make unauthorized transactions.
- SIM Swap Fraud: A more advanced technique is SIM swap fraud, where scammers trick telecom providers into issuing a new SIM card with a victim’s number. Once successful, they can receive all OTPs and access linked accounts, including mobile money wallets. This type of fraud often involves insider collaboration within telecom companies.
Security Contagion: The Viral Spread of Insecurity
What makes mobile money fraud particularly dangerous is not just its volume, but its contagious nature. Much like a virus, the tactics and techniques used by scammers spread from person to person and community to community. This phenomenon, termed security contagion, refers to how insecurity replicates itself through imitation, adaptation, and normalisation.
Fraud techniques are shared within scammer networks, refined through trial and error, and quickly adjusted to counter new security measures. Scam scripts circulate online, and social media becomes a vehicle for both recruitment and replication. Just as mobile money grew rapidly through social learning, fraud too spreads through social mimicry and digital osmosis.
Moreover, fraud thrives in informal digital economies, where regulation is weak, and verification protocols are easily bypassed. This creates an ecosystem where crime mutates quickly, where each new awareness campaign is met with an even more innovative scam. Moreover, mobile money agents face significant risks in the line of duty. Many have become victims of fraud through fake transaction alerts, counterfeit currency, or violent crimes such as armed robberies. For example, in March and April 2025, two mobile money vendors were tragically killed in separate incidents in Kumasi and Aflao. These attacks have instilled fear among agents and disrupted their businesses. While mobile money has undoubtedly served as a powerful engine for job creation, the safety and security of agents must be urgently prioritised within Ghana’s national digital finance agenda.
Recommendations: Towards a More Secure Digital Future
This article argues that combating mobile money related frauds requires a multiple and prolonged approach involving all stakeholders. To begin, there is the urgent need for strengthening regulatory frameworks by fully implementing and enforcing the Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Acts 1038), establishing a centralised fraud report system which will be accessible through a single short code and mandating telcos to compensate users in fraud cases that are verified. Additionally, there is the need for additional investment in cyber policing equippment, particularly expanding cyber crime units with further digital forensic tools. Training of additional police personnel in emerging scam trends and reporting protocols should be an imperative.
Moreover, public digital literacy must be actively promoted. This includes launching localized digital safety campaigns in indigenous languages to ensure broad public understanding. Furthermore, digital literacy education should be integrated into the school curriculum at all levels, equipping young people with the skills to navigate digital spaces safely and responsibly.
To ensure the sustainability of mobile money as a livelihood source, the safety of agents must be treated as a national priority. The government, in collaboration with the Ghana Police Service, telcos, and fintech companies, should establish a dedicated Agent Protection Framework. This should include regular police patrols around high-risk vending areas, especially during peak hours, and the installation of CCTV surveillance systems at mobile money kiosks. Agents should also be trained in basic security protocols, such as verifying alerts and safely handling cash. A national mobile money emergency hotline should be established to enable swift reporting and response to threats. Finally, stakeholders should explore the establishment of a risk insurance fund to compensate agents who suffer losses due to fraud or armed attacks. These measures will help build confidence among agents and sustain the growth of Ghana’s digital finance ecosystem.
Finally, there is a pressing need for greater responsibility from telecom companies and fintech firms in safeguarding users. This can be achieved through several key measures. First, biometric verification should be strictly enforced for all SIM card replacements to prevent identity theft. Second, artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms must be deployed to detect suspicious transaction patterns in real time, enabling swift intervention. Third, fraud insurance schemes should be introduced to protect mobile money users from financial losses, thereby enhancing trust and resilience in the digital finance ecosystem.
8. Conclusion: Protecting Trust in a Digital Ghana
Ghana’s mobile money revolution is one of the most successful financial inclusion stories in Africa. But the gains of this revolution are under threat from an expanding underworld of digital fraudsters. As scammers evolve, so too must our systems, institutions, and public awareness.
Mobile money fraud is not just a technical or legal issue, it is a social crisis of trust, a test of the resilience of our digital transformation. Addressing this requires a proactive, united front that balances innovation with security, inclusion with protection, and convenience with caution. If Ghana is to build a truly inclusive and secure digital economy, trust must be as valued as technology, and safety must be as accessible as service.
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