Created on 16 September 2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), made up of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, has no intention to end its union after it slammed the door on ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) on 28 January 2024. The three countries now face their own destiny, with enormous challenges. However, they have fashioned out initiatives to strengthen their cooperation in order to proclaim their ‘sovereignty’.
The fight against terrorism
The main challenge facing the AES countries is security. The three current leaders of these countries are military officers who came to power through coups d’état with the aim of restoring peace. Insecurity remains a real problem to be solved.
To combat terrorism, the confederation of Sahel states plans to set up ‘a unified force of 5,000 men’ as announced by Niger’s defence minister, Lieutenant General Salifou Mody, in an interview broadcast on Niger’s public television network on Tuesday 21 January 2025. ‘In this common space, our forces will now be able to intervene together with this unified force, which is practically ready, with a strength of 5,000 men. It will have not only its own personnel, but also its own air, land and intelligence resources and, of course, its own coordination system. It is a matter of weeks before it is operational’, he declared.
It is a project which, in its form, is to be welcomed because it should bring deliverance to the peoples scarred by terrorism over the last ten years. But there are questions to be asked. Who will lead this unified force? How will it be funded? How can its effectiveness be guaranteed? How will it innovate, lest we make the same mistakes again? Could Russia, which is increasingly present in the AES, be called upon? Could Turkey, which is stepping up its defence agreements with Sahelian countries, play a role? For the moment, no source of sustainable funding has been officially announced.
In Africa, there has been no shortage of mixed or multinational forces. Often announced with great fanfare, they have ended up showing their limitations. The most recent to date is the G5 Sahel, made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. France, which was the G5 Sahel’s main partner, has been militarily rejected by all four countries (except Mauritania).
If the unified force does not learn from its mistakes to restore the presence of the State, provide basic services to the population and rebuild a social fabric destroyed by years of war, it will be just another case of starting all over again.
Economy
In economic terms, the consequences are difficult to estimate in advance, but it should be noted that the three countries in the Confederation have the lowest GDP per capita*: USD 882 for Burkina Faso, USD 877 for Mali and USD 629 for Niger. These figures are sometimes seen as meaningless, but they are significant in terms of regional imbalance when compared with those for Côte d’Ivoire (USD 2,630), Ghana (USD 2,331), Nigeria (USD 2,316) and Senegal (USD 1,695).
Clearly, the signing of the treaty creating the Confederation Alliance of Sahel States (6 July 2024) will weaken Ecowas. Firstly, because it loses a piece of territory covering 2,758,000 km2, or almost half the surface area of Ecowas (6.1 million km2), and with a population of just over 70 million, or only a third of the population of the West African community (210 million). The map clearly shows the scale of this amputation.
These three countries must now focus on bilateral cooperation with certain ECOWAS member countries. Ghana and Togo appear to be interested in strengthening their cooperation with the AES. Thanks to their ports, the AES countries, which are all landlocked, can strengthen their trade links with Ghana and Togo. While there is interest in bilateral cooperation with individual states within ECOWAS, challenges remain. Would the citizens of these three countries need visas to traverse a region which allowed free movement? ECOWAS provided financial, trade and movement benefits and unless the proposed bilateral agreements are consolidated, supply chains, investment flows and overall economic growth would be disrupted or at best stunted. In addition to this, there could be challenges with existing trade agreements which cover regional trade. Developing new trade systems and taking out current partners within Ecowas could be problematic. Withdrawal could also mean a loss of direct support and assistance from Ecowas. The status of the proposed highways cutting through Burkina Faso and Niger and the railway project linking Northern Ghana to Ouagadougou is now uncertain.
Culture
On 4 February 2024 in Mali, the ministers for culture of the three member countries of the Confederation of Sahel States signed a memorandum of understanding on the validation of the AES’s Common Cultural Policy and Common Crafts Strategy.
The signing is in line with the desire of the heads of state of the member countries to strengthen cultural unity and make culture a lever for development in the region. ‘Our peoples, although divided by borders inherited from colonisation, share a common history, similar social practices and a rich cultural heritage. Culture is the foundation on which we must build our unity’, said Burkina Faso’s Minister for Culture and the Arts, Gilbert Ouédraogo.
Diplomatic Isolation
As outlined earlier, the AES states may find themselves diplomatically isolated as they struggle to gain international recognition. ECOWAS has indicated that it would want a return to democratic rule – a situation where the leaders are chosen by the people in a free and fair manner. Without the support of the ECOWAS block, it would be difficult to make inroads into the African Union and other international organisations with strong ties to the ECOWAS.
Vulnerability to External Influence
The withdrawal has been seen by CISA analysts as particularly challenging. While the Ecowas approach could have been better, the kneejerk reaction to the regional block makes the AES states vulnerable to external powers, such as China and Russia. There is no doubt that France has lost significant control and soft power, and the tide of opinion in three countries is against them. However, a coup against the current leaders could see a situation where there could be a reversal of whatever gains may have been made, as a new leader might seek to build a relationship with the colonial powers. For the moment, a country with global significance might seek to exert influence in the absence of ECOWAS’ regional oversight. The three countries are more vulnerable now without the union within Ecowas.
Humanitarian Concerns
There are concerns around the humanitarian impact of the ongoing battle with Islamists in the region. Due to the war with insurgents, there are challenges with internal displacement. Usually, civilians fleeing the conflict would be welcome in other Ecowas countries. Their withdrawal makes it more difficult for acceptance as cooperation would no longer be based on common understanding and integration of immigration information. Additionally, should there be any challenges with an outbreak of meningitis, Ebola, COVID and other highly transmittable disease, they would not be able to benefit from ECOWAS.
Conclusion
Developing and growing nations is similar to developing and growing businesses. The challenge is in the scale and the model for doing business. No nation is an Island and the decision by the AES states to leave Ecowas, though popular with their citizens remains a challenge. This is because their current successes and popularity could be short lived, given the interconnectedness of African countries with one another.
The decision could significantly hamper their political, economic, and security dynamics, leaving them more vulnerable to internal and external pressures. This is largely due to the fact that they would be left out of Ecowas-wide infrastructure programmes in rail, road, energy and telecommunications projects expected to be undertaken. Furthermore, the key Ecowas integration projects expected to build more opportunities for all citizens would leave out the AES states. More importantly, the expected benefits of the Africa Continental Free Trade area would be severely limited or curtailed altogether.
