Across West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, violent extremism is no longer just a problem of conflict zones, it is a looming threat in areas that have not yet experienced large-scale terrorism but are increasingly vulnerable. While policy conversations often focus on extremist actors and events, a quieter and more dangerous process is unfolding: the recruitment of youth through psychological manipulation, both via traditional in-person methods and increasingly, through digital platforms like social media and encrypted messaging apps.
This article explores the psychological underpinnings of violent extremist recruitment, comparing traditional face-to-face methods with modern digital strategies, and examines their implications for youth in non-conflict West African regions that may soon become the next battleground.
Traditional Recruitment versus the digital shift
Historically, violent extremist groups in the Sahel and broader West Africa relied on interpersonal recruitment strategies rooted in religious preaching, kinship ties, and community-based grievances according to delegates at the high level security conference organised by the Centre for Intelligence and Security Analysis in November, 2024. In addition, the delegates added that these processes often involved charismatic preachers or community leaders who exploited local injustices, poverty and political exclusion to lure young men offering them a sense of belonging, purpose, and spiritual justification for violence.
The psychological strategy here is deeply relational: recruiters build trust and emotional connection with recruits, gradually shaping their worldview through repetition, peer pressure and isolation from dissenting voices. This grooming often occurred in madrassas, mosques, and informal community gatherings, where ideological narratives were layered with personal support and economic promises. Such methods remain active in parts of Mali, Burkina Faso, and northern Nigeria, where state presence is weak, and faith-based institutions are more trusted than government (see Omenma et al., 2020; Okech, 2021; Osisanwo et al., 2024)
In recent years, however, violent extremist recruitment has expanded into cyberspace, transforming from sermons to memes, livestreams, and encrypted messages (Lakhani & CIVIPOL, 2021). After the late 1990s, the internet’s rapid growth allowed the dissemination of propaganda, communication with supporters, and planning operations (Shah, 2024). Social media platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and TikTok are now used to target, groom, and radicalise youth, even in regions that have not yet experienced violence (Sharma, 2023). The modern strategy relies less on physical proximity and more on psychological vulnerability and digital immersion (Asthana, 2020; Vermeersch et al., 2020). Recruiters use algorithms and hashtags to identify youth who express disillusionment, anger, or identity confusion online. Platforms like Telegram, known for its end-to-end encryption and loose moderation have become safe havens for extremist propaganda networks, including jihadist and white supremacist groups. For example, the Australian government listed Terrogram, a network of violent extremist chatroom-like channels on telegram as an official terrorist organisation as it has been linked to lone-actor attacks in Slovakia, Turkey, Brazil and the United States (see Campell, 2025). In 2015, Nazir Nortei Alema, a Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology graduate who had done his national service at the Ghana Statistical Service was part of a WhatsApp group called “Sadaqa Train.” Within this online feedback space, they shared and discussed extremist views of Islam, which led him to join ISIS. These recruiters deploy slick videos, persuasive storytelling, and gamified content to manipulate emotions (Shah, 2024). A young person in northern Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, or Senegal might scroll through content promising spiritual redemption, global brotherhood, or heroic martyrdom. Over time, the constant exposure normalises violence and makes radical action appear not only justified but necessary.
The Psychology of Recruitment: What Drives Vulnerable Youth?
Violent extremist recruitment, whether executed through traditional in-person methods or via digital platforms, operates by exploiting core psychological vulnerabilities, especially among marginalized youth. These vulnerabilities are not random but they align closely with established psychological theories that help us understand why some individuals are more susceptible than others. In this section, CISA analysts delve into the psychology of recruitment through the lens of established theories.
1. Identity and Belonging
Many West African youth grow up facing social exclusion, chronic unemployment, and weakened communal ties, which contribute to identity crises (see Fox et al., 2016; Kelly et al., 2025). Extremist recruiters offer an alternative community, one that appears to provide meaning, purpose, and a strong sense of belonging. This process resonates strongly with Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, where love and belonging is foundational. When these social needs are unmet, individuals are more likely to seek acceptance elsewhere, including from extremist groups. Similarly, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) explains how individuals derive part of their self-concept from the groups to which they belong. Extremist organisations offer a clear in-group identity (“we, the believers”) and position outsiders as enemies, reinforcing a binary view of the world and offering identity stability where societal chaos prevails.
2. Need for Certainty
In an environment of moral ambiguity, political corruption, and socio-economic precarity, many youth long for psychological closure.. For example, in the case of Nazir Nortei Alema, he complained bitterly about social injustice and exclusion in the country and referred to Ghana as a “corrupt democratic state” in a WhatsApp message he sent to his family before leaving to join ISIS. Extremist ideologies offer black-and-white worldviews, with simple answers to complex societal problems. This tendency is illuminated by Need for Cognitive Closure Theory (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), which posits that some individuals, especially under uncertainty or stress, desire firm answers and are uncomfortable with ambiguity. Extremist ideologies satisfy this need by offering rigid belief systems, clear moral dichotomies, and an absolutist narrative about who is right or wrong. Moreover, such closure can prevent critical thinking, making recruits more accepting of violence as a justified solution.
3. Perceived Injustice and Collective Grievance
A key psychological trigger for radicalisation is the internalisation of real or perceived injustice, whether it stems from historical marginalisation, ethnic exclusion, or the fallout of global geopolitics. Extremist groups frame these grievances into collective victimhood narratives, enhancing emotional resonance. This aligns with Relative Deprivation Theory developed by Gurr, (1970) in his book “Why Men Rebel”. The theory suggests that individuals who perceive a gap between their expectations and their reality (especially when they feel others are treated more fairly) are more likely to experience anger and support radical change. Further, Moral Disengagement Theory (Bandura, 1990) explains how perceived injustice enables people to justify violence. Once convinced that the system is evil or corrupt, individuals become more willing to dehumanise others and legitimise violence as retaliation. These two theories provide an explanation to the reasons why the Fulani are easily susceptible to recruitment by terrorist groups in the sahel. This is due to factors such as stereotypes, marginalisation, stigmatisation and exclusion.
4. Online Echo Chambers and Radical Reinforcement
The digital environment plays a unique psychological role in intensifying and sustaining radical beliefs. Once a youth begins engaging with extremist content, social media algorithms push them into echo chambers where similar content is amplified, dissent is filtered out, and violent ideologies are normalised. This aligns with Confirmation Bias Theory, where individuals tend to seek, interpret, and remember information that confirms their existing beliefs (Van den Brand et al., 2023). Additionally, Group Polarisation Theory suggests that discussions within ideologically homogeneous groups lead individuals to adopt more extreme positions over time (see Campell, 2025). The anonymity and social validation mechanisms on platforms like Telegram, TikTok, or YouTube further reduce inhibitions and bolster commitment to radical causes.
Why “Terror-Free” Zones Should Worry
Regions in West Africa currently free from terrorist attacks are not immune. In fact, they are at risk precisely because they lack awareness or preparedness. Recruiters target youth in these areas before violence arrives, aiming to build ideological networks and sleeper cells. In these zones, the false sense of security means schools, communities, and governments often neglect psychological and digital resilience programs. The result? A fertile ground for invisible radicalisation, until it is too late. Preventing violent extremist recruitment requires a multi-layered approach that addresses both psychological drivers and digital vulnerabilities:
- Strengthen Identity Formation: Schools, faith groups, and families must foster inclusive, pluralistic identities that inoculate youth against polarising ideologies.
- Digital Literacy Campaigns: Teach youth how to spot propaganda, challenge misinformation, and navigate digital spaces safely.
- Mental Health Support: Many at-risk youth suffer from trauma, isolation, or depression. Community-based counselling and peer support can close the emotional gaps extremists exploit. In addition, youth should be given employment and be given the chance to participate in governance so as to make them develop the spirit of patriotism.
- Alternative Narratives: Governments and civil society must counter extremist messaging with compelling, locally relevant stories of peace, resilience, and hope, delivered on the same platforms extremists use.
- Community Monitoring and Early Warning: Establish trusted networks that can detect early signs of radicalisation, not through surveillance, but through community engagement and dialogue.
Conclusion
The fight against violent extremism is not just about guns and geopolitics. It is a psychological battle for the hearts and minds of youth, increasingly waged through smartphones and sermons. Understanding the psychological foundations of extremist recruitment is crucial for crafting effective counter-radicalisation strategies in West Africa. These strategies must go beyond securitised responses to address youth identity formation, emotional resilience, and digital media literacy. By grounding our responses in psychological theory, we can better design interventions that inoculate vulnerable youth against both traditional ideological grooming and modern digital manipulation, thereby building long-term resilience in regions not yet consumed by violent extremism. If West Africa wants to stay ahead of the curve, it must begin by recognising the early signs of radicalisation, whether whispered in a madrassa or posted on Telegram.The time to act is before the violence starts, while minds are still open, and futures still unwritten. We are not fire services and must not wait for the fire before we struggle to quench it.
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