Introduction
The persistent and growing strength of violent extremist organisations in the Sahel threatens to worsen the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa, posing significant security and risks to the coastal countries of West Africa – Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, The Gambia and Senegal. The continuing collapse of international counterterrorism support, as well as weakening leadership in regional efforts, has created a vacuum in which violent extremism can expand.
Organisations including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Boko Haram, Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), and others have already taken advantage of that vacuum, using countries in the region as platforms to launch indiscriminate attacks on government forces and civilians alike. The possible convergence of security threats, including increased cooperation among terrorist organisations, and between terrorist and criminal organisations, could intensify the danger those groups pose in the region and beyond.
A spike in militant Islamist group attacks in coastal West Africa is validating long-held fears that unmitigated extremist violence in the Sahel will spill over into its neighbours. The border areas of Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania are all facing greater strains from various militant groups attempting to enflame tensions within and between communities as a means of gaining access and influence. The annual number of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in and within 50 km of the borders of the Sahel’s coastal West African neighbours keeps on increasing. With Togo and Benin facing significant attacks in their northern regions especially around the WAP (W, Arli and Pendjari) reserve parks serving as a tri-border zone across Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. Due to increasing attacks in Togo, the authorities have extended the state of emergency in the Savane regions for another year, making it three years consecutive.
The Coastal West African states are at a critical if not eminent threat level of these terrorist groups. Without drilling into the whole year of 2024, just a snapshot of the first quarter of 2025 will buttress the speculation made before this.
For 2025 Q1 these were the total number of attacks and fatalities associated to them across Africa by terrorist groups.
The above shows the terrorist groups primary targets and their various ways of carrying out attacks.
This also shows for the whole continent the distribution of attacks and its associated fatalities per region. West Africa as seen, is a hotbed.
This shows for the whole continent the distribution of fatalities among the military and security officials followed by civilians then the terrorists killed during those attacks. West Africa again shown to lead the chart.
This shows for West Africa (both central Sahel and three coastal countries) the distribution of attacks and their fatalities among the military and security officials followed by civilians then the terrorists killed during those attacks. The last column shows the number of terrorists neutralised during counter-terrorism operations by security agencies of respective countries.
With Burkina Faso leading the chart which is a neighbouring state to Ghana, this calls for immediate concern. The songs of possible expansions are no longer in the realms of “how probable” but “when” as Togo and Benin have had in recent months frequent deadly attacks.
What should a country like Ghana do in the face of these threats.
Policy Recommendations
Policy Recommendation 1: REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
Reviving the Accra Initiative as a Unified Coastal–Sahelian Response to Violent Extremism, with Inclusion of AES Members
As the threat of extremist violence intensifies in the Sahel and spills into the Gulf of Guinea, coastal West African states must urgently enhance regional security coordination. The Accra Initiative—initially created by Ghana, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso—provides a homegrown foundation for such collaboration. While it has lost momentum in recent years, current realities demand its revival or the creation of a similar security mechanism using the Accra Initiative model. Crucially, this effort must include members of theAlliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—to foster a pragmatic, non-ideological alliance against violent extremism, despite their current political distance from ECOWAS and the AU. A joint security structure would allow for cross-border coordination, real-time intelligence sharing, and synchronised operations in border zones where terrorist mobility is highest.
The feasibility of this proposal is moderate, owing to the pre-existing diplomatic architecture of the Accra Initiative and the shared security interests among coastal and Sahelian states. While political tensions remain—especially due to the AES members’ recent departure from ECOWAS—a narrowly focused, security-driven mechanism could bypass broader political disputes and concentrate on common threats. The successful execution of joint operations like Koudanlgou I–III shows that tactical cooperation is achievable even amid differing governance systems, provided there is clear command structure and mutual respect for sovereignty.
In terms of sustainability, the proposal is medium—its longevity will depend on institutionalising a permanent secretariat, depoliticizing security collaboration, and securing funding from both member states and strategic partners. The impact of such a coalition would be high, as it could deny terrorist groups sanctuary and freedom of movement across Sahel–coastal corridors, while also enabling early-warning and community resilience strategies. The urgency is very high, as extremists continue to exploit governance vacuums in the Sahel and porous borders to establish logistical and ideological footholds in northern Ghana, Benin, and Togo. Reviving or remodelling the Accra Initiative—with AES inclusion—may represent one of the few viable options to close these security gaps before they widen into regional destabilisation.
Policy Recommendation 2: RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
Promoting Moderate Islamic Teaching to Pre‑empt Extremist Radicalisation in Northern Ghana
Northern Ghana’s sizeable Muslim population makes it a prime target for Sahel‑based jihadist groups seeking recruits and logistical depth. Adapting Morocco’s celebrated model—anchored in the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, which has already graduated hundreds of clerics from across Africa in a curriculum that couples classical theology with civic values—Ghana can launch a state‑endorsed imam‑training and certification programme that equips local religious leaders to rebut violent interpretations while preserving cultural authenticity. Partnerships with Morocco’s Ministry of Endowments, its Foundation for African Ulema, and Ghana’s existing Islamic councils would ensure doctrinal credibility and rapid rollout.
Feasibility is high: Ghana enjoys a long record of inter‑faith tolerance and has well‑organised Muslim leadership structures willing to collaborate. A modest start‑up budget—covering curriculum design, scholarships for trainee imams, and a media unit to broadcast peace‑oriented sermons—makes initial costs manageable. Embedding the syllabus in mosque schools, community radio, and preacher‑licensing rules renders the approach sustainable; once institutionalised, it self‑propagates with only periodic refresher courses and a small endowment fund for quality control.
The projected impact is high because extremist recruiters thrive on theological vacuums and grievance narratives; credible, home‑grown clerics delivering a doctrine of non‑violence, social justice, and democratic coexistence directly undercut that appeal. Recent intelligence indicates Sahel militants are already using northern Ghana as a medical and supply rear‑base—an early warning that ideological infiltration could follow if left unchecked. That makes the urgency, moderate‑to‑high: acting now, while radicalisation is still in its early stages, is far cheaper—and far safer—than trying to de‑radicalise communities once violent ideology has taken hold.
Policy Recommendation 3: COMMUNITY-LED SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Integrating Traditional Leadership into Ghana’s National Security Architecture
Ghana’s traditional leadership structure—ranging from sub-chiefs to paramount chiefs—remains deeply embedded in rural governance and community trust. In areas where the state’s presence is limited, these leaders serve as the first line of authority and influence. By formally integrating traditional rulers into Ghana’s national security architecture, the country can create grassroots, culturally embedded early-warning and intelligence network capable of detecting extremist movements and suspicious activity before they escalate. Each sub-chief would oversee locally appointed community security agents, whose reports would feed into a layered communication pipeline—reaching from the village to the National Security Council Secretariat via the Regional Security Councils. This bottom-up approach would complement state-led counter-terrorism efforts by ensuring hyper-local situational awareness across rural Ghana.
The feasibility of this policy is moderate to high. Traditional authorities already play key roles in land administration, dispute resolution, and community development, and their inclusion in security structures would be a logical and culturally coherent expansion. Potential resistance due to politicisation or concerns over overstepping customary mandates could be mitigated through dialogue, legal clarity, and targeted incentives—such as state-supported training and logistical resources for selected chiefs and their security liaisons. Once trust is built, the sustainability of the model is strong, as chieftaincy institutions are among Ghana’s most enduring and community-anchored frameworks. Once institutionalised, their participation in early warning becomes part of traditional leadership’s social contract.
The impact would be high, especially in rural and peri-urban areas where extremists could otherwise move undetected. By empowering chiefs to act as both cultural custodians and security actors, Ghana gains a force multiplier for national vigilance—built on social trust, local knowledge, and legitimacy. Moreover, the urgency is moderate to high: extremist groups have already exploited governance gaps and rural alienation in neighbouring states. By acting now, Ghana can close its intelligence gap at the periphery, build community resilience, and avoid the dangerous disconnect between central authorities and local populations that has fuelled extremism elsewhere.
Conclusion and Recommendation
The evolving threat of violent extremism from the Sahel into coastal West Africa requires urgent, pragmatic, and culturally embedded responses. Ghana, although not yet experiencing large-scale extremist violence, is vulnerable to radicalisation, infiltration, and destabilisation, especially in underserved rural communities. While regional military coordination and ideological counter-narratives remain critical, Ghana’s most effective and sustainable national response lies in institutionalising its traditional leadership within the security architecture.
Chiefs and traditional authorities, already central to rural governance and dispute resolution, possess unmatched social legitimacy and community insight. Integrating them into a formal, multi-tiered intelligence pipeline—from sub-chiefs through paramount chiefs to the National Security Council—would transform local knowledge into actionable early-warning signals. This community-based security framework ensures that threats are identified before escalation and that intelligence flows are grounded in local context and trust.
Such a model strengthens local ownership, builds state legitimacy, and enables a pre-emptive security posture—far more cost-effective and socially resilient than reactive counter-terrorism operations. Moreover, it aligns with Ghana’s longstanding values of decentralised governance and cultural cohesion. In view of growing threats from across the northern borders, the recommendation is clear:
- Institutionalise a decentralised intelligence structure through traditional leadership,
- Provide training and support for chiefs and designated village security agents,
- Ensure formal channels between traditional councils and security institutions, and
- Establish monitoring, review, and incentive mechanisms to sustain participation.
By acting now, Ghana can reinforce its national cohesion and create a locally owned security solution that not only protects its citizens but also serves as a replicable model for other coastal states confronting the Sahelian spillover.
References
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130432 “Terrorism intensifying across Africa, exploiting instability and conflict | UN “
https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/it-time-rethink-us-strategy-sahel “It Is Time to Rethink U.S. Strategy in the Sahel | USIP”
https://africacenter.org/publication/asb43en-recalibrating-multitiered-stabilization-strategy- coastal-west-africa-response-violent-extremism/#_edn1 “Recalibrating Coastal West Africa’s Response to Violent Extremism | Africa Center”
https://ecfr.eu/publication/the_southern_front_line_eu_counter_terrorism_cooperation/ “The southern front line: EU counter-terrorism cooperation with Tunisia and Morocco | ECFR”
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/moroccos-approach-countering-violent-extremism “Morocco’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism | The Washington Institute”
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ghana-sahel-jihadis-find-refuge-supplies-sources-say-2024-10-24 “In Ghana, Sahel jihadis find refuge and supplies, sources say”https://www.republicoftogo.com/toutes-les-rubriques/politique/vers-une-nouvelle-prolongation-de-l-etat-d-urgence-dans-la-region-des-savanes “Vers une nouvelle prolongation de l’état d’urgence dans la région des Savanes | Republic of Togo”
