For the second consecutive year, the Sahel region has been ranked as the most terrorised area in the world, accounting for over half of all global terrorism deaths in 2024. The latest Global Terrorism Index (GTI) highlights the alarming trend of escalating violence driven by weak governance, ethnic tensions, ecological degradation, and geopolitical shifts. Five of the ten most impacted countries by terrorism are in the Sahel, with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger at the heart of the crisis. The other two Sahelian countries prominently featured in the report are Cameroon and Nigeria. Together with Somalia, six African countries are among the top ten most terrorised countries in the world.
Explosive Spike in Sahelian Terrorism
Terrorism-related deaths in the Sahel have surged almost tenfold since 2019, reaching unprecedented levels in 2024, the GTI 2025 report noted. The region recorded over 3,885 terrorism deaths last year, with overall conflict-related deaths surpassing 25,000. This marks the highest level since the inception of the GTI. Burkina Faso remains the most affected country, responsible for a fifth of all terrorism-related deaths globally, despite a decline in attacks by 57% and fatalities by 21%. Meanwhile, Niger saw the largest increase in terrorism deaths worldwide, with fatalities rising by 94% to 930, illustrating how fragile any progress can be.
The Role Of Weak Governance And Ethnic Tensions
The GTI attributes the Sahel’s security crisis to fragile state institutions that fail to provide adequate governance, creating a vacuum for terrorist groups to exploit. Ethnic tensions further compound the problem, as jihadist groups manipulate local disputes to gain recruits and establish territorial control. These dynamics have allowed groups like Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to expand their influence across the region.
Geopolitical Shifts And Their Consequences
The security landscape in the Sahel is also being shaped by major geopolitical realignments. The formation of the Alliance of Sahelian States—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—has led to a decisive shift away from Western influence in favour of partnerships with Russia and China. This realignment, along with the bloc’s withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has created opportunities for jihadist groups to expand their operations, particularly into coastal West Africa. Togo, for instance, recorded its worst year for terrorism in 2024.
At the same time, France has continued its military withdrawal from the region, leaving a security vacuum that Russia has attempted to fill through influence campaigns and security partnerships. Russia’s involvement, however, has been strained by its war in Ukraine, which has forced it to divert military resources, highlighting the delicate balance Moscow must maintain in its African operations.
Terrorist Groups Exploit Natural Resources
Competition over the region’s mineral wealth, especially gold and uranium, has fuelled instability. Gold mining in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger has become a major source of financing for both state and non-state actors. Niger, as the seventh-largest uranium producer in the world, has also drawn heightened geopolitical interest, particularly from China, which seeks to expand its nuclear energy capabilities. The presence of terrorist groups in resource-rich areas further complicates the security landscape, as they leverage illicit mining and smuggling operations to fund their activities.
The Growing Influence of Islamic State and JNIM
Despite an overall global decline in deaths attributed to Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates, the group remains the deadliest terrorist organisation, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries. In West Africa, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) has faced setbacks, with a 46% decline in deaths attributed to the group. However, JNIM has taken advantage of the situation, becoming the dominant force in parts of the Sahel and coastal West Africa. JNIM recorded a 46% increase in terrorism deaths, with an average of ten fatalities per attack, making it one of the deadliest jihadist groups globally.
Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK) has expanded beyond Afghanistan, conducting major attacks in Iran and Russia. ISK’s increasing influence demonstrates how jihadist networks are evolving, using sophisticated multilingual propaganda to recruit members from across South and Central Asia. Globally, the four major terrorist organisations, IS, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Shabaab continued to increase their activity, with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 4,204.
A Worsening Security Landscape
The GTI 2025 report also mentioned that the collapse of the 2015 Algiers Peace Agreement has further destabilised Mali, with JNIM exploiting the power vacuum to launch attacks on government targets in Bamako. The security situation in the region has reached a critical point, with geopolitical rivalries, resource competition, and weak governance converging to fuel further violence.
The Sahel is predominantly plagued by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM)(Al-Qaeda affiliate) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-Sahel), which dominate Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, engaging in massacres, kidnappings, and attacks on security forces. ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) operates in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region but has weakened in recent years. Boko Haram, once dominant, has declined due to clashes with ISWAP but remains a threat. Katiba Macina, a JNIM faction, enforces Sharia in central Mali and Burkina Faso.
Weakened Counter-terrorism Efforts
The coups and political instability in the Sahel have significantly weakened counterterrorism efforts by disrupting security partnerships, creating governance vacuums, and shifting military priorities toward regime survival rather than sustained anti-terror operations. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, successive military takeovers have led to the expulsion of Western security forces, particularly French troops and the Barkhane operation, which had been central to counterterrorism operations in the region (Thurston, 2023). The withdrawal of MINUSMA from Mali further exacerbated the security vacuum, allowing jihadist groups like JNIM and IS-Sahel to expand their territorial control (UN Security Council, 2023).
Additionally, the new military regimes have deprioritised regional cooperation, withdrawing from ECOWAS and forming the Alliance of Sahelian States (ASS), which focuses more on political survival than coordinated counterterrorism (International Crisis Group, 2024). The shift toward Russia and Wagner-backed military support has also changed counterterrorism dynamics, as these actors prioritise direct military engagements over governance-driven approaches that address the root causes of extremism (Strazzari, 2023). Without stable governance and coordinated security efforts, jihadist groups have exploited these disruptions to intensify attacks, spread into coastal West Africa, and strengthen recruitment efforts among marginalised populations (OECD, 2024).
Tackling the Situation
The Sahel’s status as the global epicentre of terrorism underscores the urgent need for a coordinated international response. Mitigating terrorism in the region requires a multi-dimensional approach that balances military action with governance reforms, economic development, and regional cooperation. Strengthening local governance and addressing grievances—such as marginalisation and lack of economic opportunities—can reduce recruitment by extremist groups (OECD, 2024). Enhancing regional cooperation through organisations like the G5 Sahel Joint Force and revitalising ties with ECOWAS could improve intelligence sharing and coordinated military responses (International Crisis Group, 2024). Furthermore, counterterrorism strategies should integrate community-based approaches and dialogue initiatives with local actors to undermine jihadist narratives (Thurston, 2023). While military operations remain crucial, they should prioritise human rights compliance to prevent alienating local populations and fuelling radicalisation (UN Security Council, 2023). Additionally, fostering international partnerships—whether with France, the U.S., the EU, or Russia—must be balanced to ensure long-term stability rather than dependency on foreign interventions (Strazzari, 2023). Economic investments in agriculture, education, and infrastructure, particularly in jihadist-affected areas, can provide alternatives to extremist ideologies (OECD, 2024).
Conclusion
In this era of security contagion, it is extremely important for the West African sub-region to be highly concerned about the two-year-old infamous status of the Sahel as the most terrorised region on the surface of the earth. The GTI report amply demonstrates that the situation is not getting any better; otherwise, Burkina Faso, specifically, and the region, generally, would not have retained that title. It is a clear threat to countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, as well as the few others in the sub-region, who have made modest progress in entrenching political stability, peace and democracy. Despite the split from ECOWAS, the three junta-led AES countries must realise that it is in their utmost interest to mend the broken counter-terrorism ties with the regional bloc they once belonged to, and march with a united front against terrorism before the canker engulfs the entire region like an uncontrollable forest fire. They must realise that when things get out of hand, their new-found allies – Russia and China – might just pack out, leaving them behind to face the music all alone. This is why we, as Africans, must lead the counter-terrorism with a united rather than a divided front because, at the end of the day, when the entire continent catches the contagion, it is the African – irrespective of whether we see ourselves as AES or ECOWAS – that suffers. It is also important for ECOWAS to continue to make overtures to the AES to come back into their fold to devise joint strategies to develop the region together. They must condemn in the strongest terms possible the attempts by Togo to join the AES as it would incentivise them and provide a direct access to the sea, thus entrenching their links to the outside world and separation from ECOWAS.
References:
Institute for Economics & Peace. (2025). Global Terrorism Index 2025: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism.
International Crisis Group. (2024). The Sahel After the Coups: Counterterrorism in Transition.
OECD. (2024). Terrorism and Regional Instability in West Africa: Policy Responses and Gaps.
Strazzari, F. (2023). Wagner’s Influence in Africa and Its Implications for Counterterrorism.
Thurston, A. (2023). France’s Withdrawal from the Sahel: Consequences for Security.
UN Security Council. (2023). Security Developments Following MINUSMA’s Exit from Mali.
