Civil-Military Relations I: Democratic Roots of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

Introduction

Defining Civilian Control and its Foundational Principles

The principle of civilian control over the military stands as a cornerstone of democratic governance, universally accepted as absolute and all-encompassing.¹ Under this framework, the military’s authority is not inherent but expressly or implicitly delegated to it by civilian leaders.¹ This subordination is vital to ensure that the armed forces serve the broader interests of the state and its populace, rather than evolving into an independent political entity or a threat to civil liberties.² The very design of constitutional systems, such as that of the United States, deliberately divides military power between legislative and executive branches to prevent abuses of authority and maintain this civilian supremacy.²

However, the practical application of civilian control is not a static state but rather exists along a dynamic continuum.¹ Its effectiveness and the balance of influence between military and civilian officials can fluctuate significantly, influenced by variables such as prevailing circumstances, the personalities involved, the political ambitions of senior officers and politicians, and the overall prestige and perceived mission risk of the military.¹ Even in well-established democracies, this balance is subject to continuous negotiation and adaptation.

The Core Hypothesis: Challenges to Unquestioning Civilian Supremacy

While civilian control is an undeniable democratic ideal, this article asserts that its unquestioning application can become problematic, particularly when civilian leaders exhibit a profound lack of military knowledge, pursue narrow political agendas, or come to power with limited electoral mandates. Such circumstances risk leading to ineffective military policy, a decline in military morale and trust, and, in extreme cases, contribute to political instability. The argument presented here is that for civilian control to be truly effective and robust in the 21st century, it must be predicated on a more informed and nuanced understanding of military affairs by those at the helm of the state.

The inherent tension between the military’s institutional nature and the values of democratic society is a critical underlying factor in these challenges. The military, by its very design, is among the least democratic institutions, characterized by authoritarian structures and procedures that inherently clash with the individual freedoms and civil liberties prized in democratic societies.¹ This fundamental divergence means that simply asserting civilian control, without adequate mechanisms for mutual understanding and bridging these cultural divides, results in an “uneasy partnership” rather than seamless cooperation.¹ This is not merely a philosophical point of friction but a practical vulnerability. When civilian leaders lack a deep appreciation for military culture, operational realities, or the human element of warfare, this institutional clash can be severely exacerbated, potentially leading to a breakdown in effective civil-military relations beyond simple policy disagreements. The absence of such understanding can transform an uneasy partnership into a dysfunctional one, with profound implications for national security.

The Perils of Civilian Inexperience and Politicised Leadership

The “Civil-Military Gap”: When Civilian Knowledge Falls Short

A persistent challenge in the academic study of civil-military relations is the “civil-military gap”.⁴ This gap highlights the significant obstacles civilians can face in effectively exercising their authority, especially when the military enjoys high prestige, possesses advanced bureaucratic skills, perceives its mission to be at risk, or begins to doubt the civilian leadership.¹ A core aspect of this challenge stems from the increasing complexity of modern warfare. Preparations for conflict are elaborate, weaponry is sophisticated, command is arduous, and operations are intricate—factors that collectively make the waging of combat ill-suited for “amateurs or part-time practitioners”.¹

This growing complexity creates a critical knowledge asymmetry between civilian leaders and military professionals. Military expertise uniquely positions the armed forces to assess the feasibility of various operational options.⁴ When civilian leaders lack a comparable depth of understanding, the practical exercise of civilian control becomes problematic, even if the principle remains constitutionally enshrined. In such scenarios, civilians may either defer excessively to military advice, leading to a paradoxical situation where greater military autonomy results in less actual civilian control, as suggested by Huntington.¹ Alternatively, they may make ill-informed decisions that disregard sound military counsel.² This is not necessarily an overt military power grab, but rather a consequence of the civilian side’s potential inability to fully comprehend, critically evaluate, or effectively challenge military recommendations. The result is a diminished quality of civilian control, where decisions may be made without a full appreciation of their military implications, potentially compromising strategic effectiveness and the well-being of service members.

Political Agendas and Slim Mandates: Undermining Trust and Effectiveness

Political agendas can profoundly strain civil-military relations, particularly when civilian leaders prioritize unwavering loyalty over critical thinking and objective military advice.² Historical instances demonstrate how civilian leadership has marginalized military counsel, leading to recommendations that become “politicized and ineffective”.² The case of Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki, who was reportedly sidelined for voicing dissent, illustrates the severe career-ending risks associated with challenging the political line.² Such actions cultivate an environment where military leaders learn to “toe the party line and not voice dissent”.²

The marginalization of military advice due to political agendas creates a dangerous feedback loop within the civil-military dynamic. When military officers who speak out are sidelined or removed, it sends a clear message that dissenting professional opinions are not welcome.² This active suppression of candid advice leads to military recommendations becoming “politicized and ineffective,” as loyalty to the administration begins to “cloud the ability to provide critical thinking”.² The ultimate consequence is a “blind dedication to a faulty strategy” ², which can severely compromise national security. This situation reveals a systemic problem where the very mechanisms designed to ensure informed civilian control—the provision of expert military advice—are corrupted by political pressure, leading to suboptimal outcomes and increased risks for service members. This also contributes to concerns that civilian control may have diminished to a point where the military can exert undue influence or impose its own perspective on policies, not necessarily through a coup, but through subtle means of shaping the policy discourse.⁵

The Military’s Dilemma: Advising vs. Obeying “Unwise” Orders

Military professionals often find themselves in an exceedingly difficult position when civilian leadership disregards their expert advice or issues orders that are perceived as “unwise”.² While the military’s responsibility is centred on providing technical expertise and advising on how to employ armed forces to achieve policymakers’ goals, it does not determine the necessity of operations or make political decisions.⁶ The ultimate decision-making authority, in principle, rests firmly in the hands of the civilian head of state.¹

When confronted with orders they strongly oppose or deem imprudent, military officers face a complex set of options: complying with the order, attempting to “slow-roll” or shirking its execution, or outright refusing to follow it.⁶ However, the military’s culture of obedience and subordination often inhibits officers from rejecting orders, even those they deem unwise.⁶ Furthermore, resignation in protest is generally not considered an acceptable option within the US military tradition, as it can be perceived as a political act that undermines civil authority and the fundamental principle of military obedience.⁶

The constitutional framework that grants civilians the “right to be wrong” ⁶, when combined with the military’s deep-seated culture of obedience and the significant career risks associated with dissent ², creates a profound moral hazard for military leaders. This dynamic can force them to choose between maintaining their professional integrity—by providing unvarnished advice and acting on their informed judgment—and upholding institutional loyalty by complying with directives they believe are flawed. This situation extends beyond mere hierarchical compliance; it places an immense ethical burden on professionals who are acutely aware of the potential human and strategic costs of ill-conceived decisions but are constrained from effectively preventing them. Over time, this can lead to internal disillusionment within the officer corps and a long-term weakening of the military’s capacity for critical, independent thought, ultimately impacting its effectiveness and the quality of its advice.

Historical Counterpoints: Military Experience in Exceptional Civilian Commanders-in-Chief

The argument that civilian leaders benefit from military experience or exposure is often supported by examining the careers of historically exceptional commanders-in-chief, such as Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln. While both are celebrated as civilian leaders, their effectiveness during wartime was arguably bolstered by their direct or indirect engagement with military life.

Winston Churchill: Soldier and Statesman

Winston Churchill’s early life was marked by significant military exposure before his illustrious political career. He gained admission to the British military academy at Sandhurst in 1893 after two attempts and entered the army as a cavalry officer in 1895.⁷ His military service, though brief, was intense and varied. He actively sought out dangerous assignments, observing fighting in Cuba, participating in campaigns in India (including with the Malakand Field Force), and surviving a notable cavalry charge at Omdurman in Sudan with the 21st Lancers.⁷ His experiences also included escaping from Boer captivity in South Africa, which garnered him significant public attention.⁸

Churchill’s military background, though not that of a lifelong professional, provided him with a practical, visceral understanding of the realities of combat and military operations. His direct experience of being “shot at” and participating in a “cavalry charge” ⁸ would have instilled a profound appreciation for the stakes, logistics, and human costs of war. This personal understanding likely enhanced his credibility and effectiveness as a civilian commander-in-chief during World War II.⁷ His ability to engage with military leaders on a more informed basis, ask pertinent questions, and better evaluate strategic and tactical advice would have strengthened his civilian control through informed leadership rather than merely positional authority.

Abraham Lincoln: Early Military Exposure and Wartime Leadership

Abraham Lincoln’s military experience was considerably more limited than Churchill’s, yet it played a formative role in his understanding of command. He served as a volunteer in the Illinois Militia from April to July 1832 during the Black Hawk War, where he was notably elected captain of his first company.⁹ Although he never saw combat, Lincoln was present in the aftermath of battles, where he assisted in burying the militia dead.⁹ This exposure to the grim realities and human cost of conflict, even without direct engagement, would have provided him with a profound understanding of “what is at stake” in warfare.

Despite his brief and non-combat military background, Lincoln is generally regarded as an “able and competent leader” who “learned quickly to understand military matters” as President.⁹ His “single-mindedness of purpose” in preserving the Union became one of his greatest assets as a wartime leader.¹⁰ Lincoln’s early, albeit limited, exposure to military life and its consequences likely contributed to his rapid assimilation of military concepts and his resolute wartime leadership. This demonstrates that even a brief, formative experience can build crucial empathy, strategic insight, and a practical appreciation for the challenges faced by military personnel, all of which are invaluable for a civilian Commander-in-Chief.

Exploring Alternative Frameworks for Civil-Military Relations

The traditional models of civil-military relations, while foundational, have faced increasing scrutiny in light of contemporary challenges. Exploring alternative theoretical perspectives can offer pathways to more effective and resilient partnerships between civilian leadership and the military.

Beyond Traditional Models: Concordance and Fusionist Views

Samuel Huntington’s “objective control” theory has long been a dominant paradigm, advocating for a clear distinction between military and civilian spheres, with the military focusing on its professional duties and largely avoiding political involvement.¹¹ The aim of this model is to minimize military intervention in politics. However, Huntington himself identified a paradox: the greater the military’s autonomy, the less actual control civilians may exercise over military affairs.¹ This inherent tension in the “separation” model has led to a growing academic recognition that a strict separation may be an insufficient or even detrimental approach in the complex modern security environment.

In response, alternative models have emerged. Rebecca L. Schiff’s “concordance model,” for instance, proposes a high level of integration between the military and other parts of society, based on a consensus among three social partners: the military, the political elite, and the citizenry.¹² This model emphasizes shared values and mutual understanding rather than strict institutional separation. Similarly, the “fusionist” or “soldier-statesman” view argues that direct participation by military leaders in defence policy is not only permissible but necessary due to their unique technical knowledge, operational insight, and experience.³ This perspective directly contrasts with the “separatist” view, which holds that military officers are not equipped by their background or training for policy-making roles.³ This shift in academic thought implies that traditional models may be inadequate for ensuring effective civilian control in a world where warfare is increasingly complex and destructive.¹ A more nuanced, collaborative approach that actively bridges the “civil-military gap” ⁴ is increasingly seen as essential for informed governance and national defence.

Enhancing Civilian Understanding of Military Affairs

Recognizing the critical importance of civilian comprehension of military operations and culture, various programs have been established within defence establishments to educate and develop career civilian leaders. For example, the Civilian Education System (CES) for Army Civilians provides a progressive and sequential leader development program, offering enhanced educational opportunities throughout their careers.¹³ Similarly, the Department of Defence (DoD) offers a range of leadership programs, such as the Defence Civilian Emerging Leader Program (DCELP), Defence Senior Leader Development Program (DSLDP), and Executive Leadership Development Program (ELDP), all designed to cultivate civilian leaders with the technical and leadership competence required for national security roles.¹⁴

A more recent initiative, the Defence Civilian Training Corps (DCTC), aims to prepare future DoD civilians with the readiness to support the war fighter through a multidisciplinary, active-learning curriculum and summer internships.¹⁵ These programs underscore a clear institutional acknowledgment within the military that civilian understanding of military affairs is crucial for effective functioning within the defence apparatus. However, a critical gap persists: these robust educational and developmental programs are typically designed for career civilian employees within the defence establishment, not for elected officials or heads of state. The absence of similar mandatory or highly encouraged programs for the ultimate civilian decision-makers—such as presidents, cabinet members, or key congressional committee chairs—reveals a systemic oversight in preparing them for their profound military oversight responsibilities. If such training is deemed essential for career civilian staff, its importance for the individuals making life-and-death decisions for the nation and its armed forces is arguably even greater.

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