The Fourth Industrial Revolution, “characterised by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres,” has seen an explosion in information communication technology, which has revolutionised global affairs (Schwab, 2016) in virtually all spheres across the world and Africa isn’t being left out. The rapid expansion of digital communications on the continent has provided new opportunities for engagement, economic growth, and knowledge-sharing (Mutsvairo, 2018).
However, it has also opened the door for sophisticated vices such as disinformation campaigns, many of which are foreign state-sponsored (Africa Center for Strategic Studies [ACSS], 2023). Among the most prolific foreign actors shaping Africa’s media landscape, for instance, are China and Russia. Though disinformation in Africa has become synonymous with Russia, other players like China are prominent in the game, using it as a tool for geopolitical influence (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019).
This article focuses on China’s disinformation onslaught in Africa and the strategies the Communist nation employs in weaving its narratives into African affairs and what it seeks to achieve.
China’s Disinformation Strategy in Africa
China’s Africa-focused disinformation campaigns are not purely reactive but part of a broader geostrategic initiative (Shen & Breslin, 2021). By leveraging its vast media infrastructure and close ties with African media organisations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has crafted an image of China as a benevolent global power while simultaneously undermining the influence of the United States and other Western democracies (ACSS, 2023).
A key element of China’s disinformation playbook involves controlling the dissemination of information through ownership, partnerships, and training programmes. The CCP offers African media outlets access to cheap or free content that aligns with Beijing’s narratives, subtly embedding propaganda within seemingly neutral news coverage (Wekesa, 2020). This strategy allows China to launder its messages under the guise of African grassroots reporting, lending them an air of legitimacy.
China’s approach is deeply institutionalised, operating through entities such as the United Front and China Media Group (Brady, 2017). It invests in Africa’s ICT infrastructure, which grants it significant control over digital communications (Gagliardone, 2019). Licensing agreements, content-sharing partnerships, and training programmes for African journalists further entrench CCP narratives within local media ecosystems (Wu, 2021). Before the COVID-19 pandemic, China hosted and trained scores of African media professionals, shaping their perspectives to favour China’s interests.
Chinese embassies across Africa work closely with state-run media outlets to reinforce CCP propaganda while also pressuring African journalists to avoid negative coverage (ACSS, 2023). This often involves intimidation tactics, economic incentives, and discrediting unfavourable reporting (Nyabola, 2018). As a result, African audiences are increasingly exposed to sanitised versions of China’s activities on the continent, while critical perspectives remain suppressed.
Media Control and Expansion
China’s state-controlled media outlets, particularly Xinhua, have a vast presence in Africa, with 37 bureaus—far surpassing any other news agency (Shen, 2021). StarTimes, China’s leading digital TV provider in Africa, is further entrenching its influence by installing satellite dishes in thousands of rural homes (Gagliardone, 2019). Additionally, China has embedded itself in African journalism by training and employing local journalists, ensuring its narratives are disseminated through African media ecosystems (Brady, 2017).
Strategic Narratives and Censorship
The CCP views media as a battlefield for shaping public opinion (Shen, 2021). It promotes China’s economic partnerships while silencing criticism of its activities (Nyabola, 2018). African media outlets that report negatively on Chinese projects—such as Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway corruption scandal—have faced advertisement cancellations and financial pressure from Chinese entities (ACSS, 2023). This suppresses investigative journalism and limits critical coverage of China’s role in Africa (Gagliardone, 2019).
Financial Leverage and Media Partnerships
China exploits financial struggles among African media houses by offering content-sharing agreements, modern equipment, and funding in exchange for favourable reporting (Wekesa, 2020). For instance, Xinhua’s deal with Kenya’s Nation Media Group grants China access to millions of radio, TV, and social media audiences across East and Central Africa (ACSS, 2023).
Training and Influence Operations
Thousands of African journalists receive training in China through exchange programmes and media cooperation forums (Shen, 2021). These initiatives, often coordinated by the CCP’s United Front Work Department, create an “African face” for Chinese narratives, making propaganda appear home-grown (Brady, 2017). Chinese-run programmes such as Africa Live and Faces of Africa on CGTN tailor content to African audiences, subtly reinforcing pro-China perspectives (Wu, 2021).
Unlike Russia, China’s approach is long-term, institutional, and economically driven (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019). Russia’s tactics, on the other hand, are more immediate, disruptive, and focused on political instability (ACSS, 2023).
Russian disinformation campaigns often operate through shadowy networks, including the Wagner Group and state-controlled media outlets such as Russia Today and Sputnik. These campaigns focus on amplifying anti-Western sentiment, supporting authoritarian leaders, and destabilising democratic movements (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019). Unlike China, which seeks to create a positive image of itself, Russia aims to foment chaos and distrust in established institutions, often leveraging conspiracy theories and divisive narratives (Gagliardone, 2019).
Russia’s digital influence operations are highly flexible, adapting quickly to local contexts. Russian-backed disinformation campaigns have played a role in influencing elections, promoting military coups, and inciting violence. Moscow has also been known to collaborate with other state actors, including China, to amplify misleading narratives that serve mutual geopolitical interests.
The Broader Impact of Disinformation on African Societies
Disinformation campaigns do not operate in isolation. They intersect with broader trends in digital propaganda, where multiple state actors manipulate online narratives to further their interests. Among the 189 documented disinformation campaigns in Africa, nearly 60 percent are foreign-sponsored, underscoring the scale of external influence on the continent’s media landscape.
Disinformation is more than an abstract concern—it has real-world consequences for African societies. The proliferation of misleading narratives contributes to instability by fuelling social tensions, validating military coups, and suppressing civil society voices. African countries facing conflict are particularly vulnerable, with a median of five disinformation campaigns targeting them, highlighting the strong correlation between instability and information warfare.
Moreover, Africa’s rapid digital transformation has made it a prime battleground for online influence. With over 400 million active social media users and 600 million internet users, the continent has one of the highest rates of digital news consumption globally. Countries like Nigeria and Kenya are among the top globally in terms of hours spent on social media, making them particularly susceptible to coordinated disinformation efforts. Alarmingly, these same countries report the highest levels of concern regarding misinformation, reflecting a growing awareness of the problem but also a heightened risk of manipulation.
Countering Foreign Disinformation Influence in Africa
To mitigate the impact of the global disinformation war, African nations must take proactive steps to strengthen media resilience by:
1. Promoting Independent Journalism: Supporting independent African media outlets that operate outside the influence of foreign state-sponsored propaganda is crucial. Funding, training, and capacity-building initiatives can help safeguard journalistic integrity.
2. Enhancing Media Literacy: Increasing awareness among African audiences about the tactics of disinformation and how to identify manipulated content can reduce susceptibility to propaganda.
3. Strengthening Digital Infrastructure Security: Ensuring that African nations retain control over their ICT infrastructure, rather than relying on foreign-controlled networks, can limit external influence over digital communications.
4. Exposing Disinformation Campaigns: Collaborative efforts between African governments, civil society, and international partners can help track, analyse, and expose foreign influence campaigns, making them less effective.
5. Diversifying Media Content: Encouraging diverse media ownership and reducing reliance on content provided by Chinese and Russian state-run outlets can help create a more balanced information environment.
Conclusion
The Fourth Industrial Revolution, which is a build-up on the Third Industrial Revolution which used electronics and information technology to automate production, presents opportunities for every region in the world. The West took advantage of the First Industrial Revolution’s steam engine to mechanise production, took advantage of the Second Industrial Revolution’s electric power for mass production and also took advantage of the Third Industrial Revolution’s use of electronics and information technology to automate production. Through these first three Industrial Revolutions, superpowers emerged and forged themselves into unassailable geo-economic powerhouses through which they gained a lot of geopolitical influence. It is, therefore, a no-brainer that the same powerhouses, as well as those who followed in their footsteps in the industrialisation race, such as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, would take advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to either entrench their global power status and influence or use it for purposes that advance their geopolitical and economic interests.
With Africa being the continent that currently offers the highest economic and political prospects in the world in terms of natural resources and political alliances, it is only natural that these super and intermediate powers fashion out strategies to either win over the continent or savour a dollop or two of its honey. The disinformation war on the continent is, thus, expected. However, it is incumbent on Africa and Africans to also know how to use the explosion in digital communication to advance their fortunes. Indeed, the ongoing disinformation onslaught on the continent carries a lot of opportunities for Africa as much as the dangers it portends. It is left to the continent and its leaders to strategise how to milk it for its interests and purposes.
References
- Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2023). China’s media influence in Africa: A growing challenge. ACSS.
- Brady, A. M. (2017). China’s propaganda machine. Routledge.
- Gagliardone, I. (2019). China, Africa, and the future of the internet. Zed Books.
- Mutsvairo, B. (2018). Media and communication research in Africa. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nyabola, N. (2018). Digital democracy, analogue politics. Zed Books.
- Polyakova, A., & Meserole, C. (2019). Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models. Brookings Institution.
- Schwab, K. (2016). The Fourth Industrial Revolution. World Economic Forum.
- Shen, S., & Breslin, S. (2021). China’s influence on African media narratives. Journal of Contemporary China, 30(128), 589-607.
- Wekesa, B. (2020). China’s strategic communication in Africa. African Journalism Studies, 41(2), 95-112.
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