Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in July firmed up their decision to turn their backs on the regional bloc, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) after their January announcement to do so. The three Sahelian nations led by junta leaders Assimi Goita (Mali), Ibrahim Traore (Burkina Faso), and Abdourahmane Tchiani (Niger), met as Confédération des États du Sahel or Confederation of Sahel States, and signed four documents to that effect. They met just on the eve of the ECOWAS leaders’ summit in July 2024 and cemented their decision to exit the bloc.
At their parallel meeting, Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tchiani called for the establishment of a “community far removed from the stranglehold of foreign powers” (AFP). “Our people have irrevocably turned their backs on ECOWAS,” Tchiani said at the Sahel group meeting in Niamey on Saturday, 6 July 2024.
When ECOWAS met the following day, Sunday, 7 July, the head of its Commission, Omar Alieu Touray, warned: “Our region is facing the risk of disintegration,” adding that the triad risked “political isolation”, losing millions of dollars in funding and hampering freedom of movement (AFP). Apart from that, Touray feared the split would worsen insecurity in the Sahel, which is already reeling under severe terrorist and jihadist attacks with Burkina Faso now the epicentre of such extremism.
Also, Burkina Faso’s 36-year-old leader, Captain Ibrahim Traore, according to France24, told his audience at the summit: “We have the same blood that runs in our veins. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who fought and won for us this land that we call Mali, Burkina and Niger. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors who helped the whole world rid itself of Nazism and many other scourges. In our veins runs the blood of those valiant warriors that were deported from Africa to Europe, America, Asia … and who helped to build those countries as slaves. In our veins runs the blood of worthy men, robust men, men who stood tall. And for this, we should be proud and grateful to be nationals of the AES.”
Traoré condemned “la Françafrique” – the system whereby former colonial master France continues to have overbearing influence and a say in whatever Francophone West Africa does. “These imperialists have just one cliché in their heads – Africa as an empire of slaves,” Traoré stressed, adding: “That’s how they see Africa.” “For them, Africa belongs to them. Our lands belong to them. Our subsoil belongs to them. They’ve never changed that framework, even today,” he underscored.
Mali’s interim President Colonel Assimi Goïta, for his part, said the confederacy guarantees freedom of movement of goods and citizens of the three-country bloc of 72 million people. “We’re moving beyond individual national identities. Instead of citizens of Mali, Burkina Faso, or Niger, we’ll refer to ourselves as people of the AES. In this alliance, a Burkinabe or Nigerien will feel at home in Mali, and vice versa, without encountering administrative barriers,” reported France24.
New Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye, in the meantime, has been appointed by ECOWAS as an envoy to mediate the impasse. Faye, who is almost age mates with the three leaders, said: “We must do everything we can to avoid the withdrawal of these three brotherly countries from ECOWAS,” and stressed the need to “adapt ECOWAS to the realities of our times”.
Why Are the Three Junta-Led Countries Leaving ECOWAS?
1. Political Instability and Military Coups: All three countries have experienced recent military coups, leading to strained relationships with ECOWAS, which has a policy of promoting democracy. Following these coups, ECOWAS imposed sanctions and demanded a swift return to civilian rule, which was resisted by the military governments (BBC)(DW) (SABC News).
2. Security Concerns: The Sahel region faces severe security challenges from various militant groups. The governments of these countries believe that ECOWAS has failed to effectively address the security threats and provide necessary support in combating terrorism and insurgencies linked to Al-Qaeda and ISIS (BBC) (DW) (SABC News).
3. Sovereignty and External Influence: The military regimes argue that ECOWAS’s interventions infringe on their sovereignty and accuse the bloc of being influenced by external powers. They have also distanced themselves from France, a former colonial power, and have sought security support from Russia instead (SABC News).
4. Perceived Drift from Founding Ideals: The leaders of Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso claim that ECOWAS has strayed from its original ideals and the spirit of Pan-Africanism. They express disappointment in what they perceive as the organization’s failure to support their existential fight against terrorism and insecurity (DW) (SABC News).
What Is the CES All About?
The establishment of the Confederation of the Sahel States (CES), according to the Critical Threats Project, marks a significant expansion of the operational scope of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Originally formed in September 2023 by the juntas as a mutual defence pact to deter ECOWAS military intervention, the AES, according to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has evolved into a multi-sectoral alliance through the CES. The confederation coordinates diplomatic, economic, and military policies among its member states and introduces new institutions like a rotating presidency and parliament to implement these objectives (TechCabal) (Digital Frontiers Institute).
In recent months, cabinet-level officials had discussed various initiatives and changes, leading to the formation of the CES. The Malian press reported that the new confederation shares similar goals with ECOWAS, despite the juntas’ criticism of ECOWAS’s inaction on regional security issues. The CES, The Critical Threats Project notes, aims to set up a unified security force and a joint military action plan, building on earlier discussions from March to enhance joint counterinsurgency operations.
Since its inception, the AES has conducted limited joint operations, such as a week-long patrol by Burkinabe and Nigerien soldiers in June 2023. However, it has maintained coordinated drone strikes across member states’ borders. The CES plans to further integrate the economies of its member states, decrease reliance on external partners, and facilitate the free movement of people, goods, and services. The confederation also aims to pool resources in strategic sectors like agriculture, water, energy, and transport, and to establish an investment bank and stabilisation fund (TechCabal) (CSIS) (Digital Frontiers Institute).
The AES leaders frame the CES as part of their struggle for sovereignty, challenging ECOWAS, which they accuse of being a foreign-dominated body serving Western interests. This stance stems from ECOWAS’s sanctions and demands for a return to constitutional rule following the coups in the AES countries. The juntas have reiterated their withdrawal from ECOWAS, citing it as part of their effort to break free from foreign influence (TechCabal) (Digital Frontiers Institute) (CSIS).
How Significant Were the Three Countries In ECOWAS?
Mali
Economics and Trade: Mali’s economy has been significantly influenced by its membership in ECOWAS. The country benefited from regional trade agreements and economic collaboration. However, following the coups in 2020 and 2021, ECOWAS imposed economic sanctions, which were lifted in 2022 to support Mali’s transition to civilian rule. These sanctions had strained Mali’s economy, highlighting the interconnectedness of political stability and economic vitality within the bloc (Africanews).
Geopolitics: Geopolitically, Mali’s relationship with ECOWAS has been turbulent. The political instability resulting from the military coups led to Mali’s decision to withdraw from ECOWAS in January 2024, along with Burkina Faso and Niger. This decision underscored a shift away from traditional alliances, particularly with France, and a move towards closer ties with Russia. Mali, along with the other withdrawing nations, formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), signalling a new geopolitical alignment in the region (Africanews).
Counter-Terrorism: Mali’s involvement in counter-terrorism within ECOWAS has been critical due to the ongoing security challenges in the Sahel region. The country has been at the forefront of regional counter-terrorism efforts, collaborating with ECOWAS members to combat extremist groups. Despite its recent withdrawal from the bloc, Mali’s strategic location and security concerns ensure that it remains a key player in regional counter-terrorism initiatives (Africanews).
Mali’s role in ECOWAS has been multifaceted, deeply intertwined with the region’s economic stability, geopolitical shifts, and collective security efforts.
Burkina Faso
Economics and Trade: Burkina Faso is a crucial economic partner within the ECOWAS framework. It is a significant supplier of agricultural products to neighboring countries, such as Ghana. Ghana imports about 90% of its fresh tomatoes and a large portion of its livestock from Burkina Faso. This interdependence has been facilitated by the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, which promotes a free trade area within West Africa, allowing for reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers. However, the recent decision by Burkina Faso, along with Mali and Niger, to withdraw from ECOWAS poses a risk to these economic benefits, potentially leading to increased costs and trade disruptions for member states like Ghana (DW) (The Business & Financial Times).
Geopolitics: The geopolitical landscape of West Africa has been significantly influenced by Burkina Faso’s actions within ECOWAS. The withdrawal of Burkina Faso, along with Mali and Niger, marks a significant shift in the region’s political dynamics. The decision to leave ECOWAS was driven by perceived external influences and dissatisfaction with the bloc’s response to military coups in these countries. This withdrawal is seen as a political blow to ECOWAS, weakening its cohesion and potentially undermining regional stability and integration efforts (DW) (Democracy Now!).
Counter-Terrorism: Burkina Faso is central to regional counter-terrorism efforts due to its location in the Sahel, a hotspot for terrorist activities. The country has been involved in several joint security initiatives, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), and the Accra Initiative (AI). These initiatives focus on intelligence sharing, training of security personnel, and joint military operations to combat terrorism. The exit of Burkina Faso from ECOWAS raises concerns about the future effectiveness of these collaborative security efforts. The lack of trust and cooperation that may follow could hinder information sharing and joint operations, thus exacerbating the security situation in the region (DW) (The Business & Financial Times).
Burkina Faso’s participation in ECOWAS has been pivotal in enhancing economic ties, fostering geopolitical stability, and bolstering counter-terrorism efforts in West Africa. The recent decision to withdraw from ECOWAS, however, introduces significant uncertainties and challenges for the region’s economic and security landscape.
Niger
Economics and Trade: Niger’s economy is heavily reliant on agriculture, livestock, and mining, with significant exports of uranium. As part of ECOWAS, Niger has benefited from regional trade agreements, allowing for the free movement of goods and services. However, the country’s economic stability has been challenged by internal and regional security issues, impacting trade flows and economic development. The sanctions imposed by ECOWAS following the 2023 coup further strained Niger’s economy, affecting government spending and causing a default on debt payments over $500 million (Voice of America) (CSIS).
Geopolitics: Niger has been a strategic player in West Africa, balancing relationships with both Western and regional powers. It has been a key partner for the United States in counterterrorism efforts, hosting significant U.S. military bases and receiving substantial military assistance (Global). However, the political landscape shifted dramatically after the 2023 coup, leading to strained relations with Western allies and pushing Niger closer to other military-led governments in the region, such as Mali and Burkina Faso. These three countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States, signalling a potential realignment of regional alliances away from ECOWAS (CSIS).
Counter-Terrorism: Niger has been at the forefront of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel. It has faced persistent threats from groups like Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda affiliates. The country has collaborated closely with international partners, particularly the United States and France, to enhance its counter-terrorism capabilities. This cooperation included the establishment of drone bases and military training programs. However, the coup and subsequent political instability have disrupted these efforts, raising concerns about the future effectiveness of Niger’s counter-terrorism strategies (Global) (Voice of America).
The political upheaval following the 2023 coup led ECOWAS to impose and then lift sanctions on Niger, reflecting the bloc’s struggle to address the wave of military takeovers in the region. This instability threatens the economic and political integration efforts of ECOWAS and highlights the bloc’s challenges in maintaining influence and promoting democratic governance in its member states (Voice of America) (CSIS).
Niger’s role in ECOWAS has been marked by significant contributions to regional security and economic integration, but also by recent challenges that have strained its relations within the bloc and with international partners.
How The Exit Will Affect the Triad
The exit from ECOWAS presents substantial challenges for Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, impacting their economic stability, regional political dynamics, and security cooperation.
Economic Impact: The withdrawal disrupts trade benefits under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, increasing costs for imports and exports. For instance, Ghana, a major trading partner, faces potential shortages and price hikes in commodities such as fresh tomatoes, livestock, and onions previously sourced from these countries. The economic isolation could also hinder access to regional markets and international partnerships, exacerbating economic challenges (The Business & Financial Times).
Geopolitical Impact: Geopolitically, the exit signals a shift towards forming the Alliance of Sahel States, distancing from ECOWAS’s influence. This move reflects dissatisfaction with ECOWAS’s handling of political transitions and military coups, potentially leading to a reconfiguration of alliances within West Africa. The confederation could, thus, suck in others within the region such as Chad, Guinea and Sudan, all of which have strong ties with Russia and are like-minded with the AES. Should these other countries join, the influence of the confederacy will grow while that of ECOWAS weakens in the region. (ISW). The realignment could weaken ECOWAS’s political cohesion and influence in the region (The Business & Financial Times).
Security Impact: Security cooperation is likely to suffer, particularly in counter-terrorism efforts. The trust necessary for intelligence sharing and joint military operations may be compromised, affecting initiatives like the Accra Initiative and the Group of Five for the Sahel. The region’s stability could be further threatened by reduced collaboration and increased terrorism risks, particularly affecting neighboring countries like Ghana, which shares a border with Burkina Faso (The Business & Financial Times).
How The Exit Will Impact the ECOWAS Bloc
Economic Impact:
- Trade Disruptions: The departure of these three countries, all of which are landlocked and rely heavily on regional trade, will disrupt trade flows within West Africa. For instance, Ghana, which imports significant amounts of fresh tomatoes and livestock from Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as onions from Niger, will face higher costs and potential shortages due to the reintroduction of tariffs and other trade barriers (The Business & Financial Times).
- Investment and Financial Stability: The exit may lead to decreased investor confidence and reduced access to international lending for these countries. Their departure from ECOWAS is expected to delay elections and weaken cooperation on security and economic reforms, further impacting their financial stability and growth prospects (SP Global) (Stratfor).
Geopolitical and Security Implications:
- Counter-Terrorism Efforts: The withdrawal complicates regional counter-terrorism strategies. ECOWAS has played a crucial role in coordinating military and intelligence efforts to combat jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel region. The departure of these countries could undermine joint initiatives like the Accra Initiative, which focuses on intelligence sharing and joint military operations (The Business & Financial Times) (Stratfor). For instance, the 11 July 2024 Africa file of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), notes that as the US withdraws from northern Niger, the Ivorian government has approved the construction of a US base in northwestern Côte d’Ivoire. ISW explains that the new base “will have some practical range limitations for US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones compared to the previous base in northern Niger,” and warns: “The new base risks fomenting a popular anti-Western backlash against the Ivorian government and the United States.”
- Regional Stability: The move is likely to fuel further instability in the region. With Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso being some of the most affected by terrorist activities, their exit could embolden jihadist groups, leading to an increase in attacks and broader regional insecurity (Stratfor).
Impact on ECOWAS:
- Loss of Influence: ECOWAS’s ability to influence political and security developments in the Sahel is diminished without these three countries. The bloc’s efforts to maintain democratic governance and regional stability are undermined, particularly given the strategic importance of these nations in the fight against terrorism and their significant geographical positions (SP Global) (Stratfor).
- The exit also risks imperilling ECOWAS’s aim to firm up democracy in the region, as it is not clear when and how the AES countries will transition to democracy.
- Economic Consequences: The exit of these countries will affect intra-regional trade and economic policies. ECOWAS will need to reassess its economic strategies and trade agreements, potentially leading to economic fragmentation within West Africa. The region might see increased inflation and economic uncertainty as a result (The Business & Financial Times). It will also impact the region’s strive for a common currency, Eco, as the AES countries have also expressed their intention to have a common currency among the three-bloc group, called the Sahel.
Analysis
From the above, the exiting countries on the one hand and the regional bloc, on the other hand, will suffer some damage in the situation. It disrupts trade thereby instancing economic disruptions, affects the fight against terrorism in the Sahel and makes ECOWAS look weaker in the grand geopolitical scheme. The ECOWAS Commissioner’s fear that the exit may “disintegrate” the regional bloc, thus, is a real one. Also, several foreign powers could potentially benefit from this fragmentation:
- Russia: Russia has been increasing its influence in the Sahel region, particularly through the presence of the Wagner Group in Mali and Burkina Faso. The breakdown of ECOWAS could enhance Russia’s leverage, as the new Alliance of Sahel States (comprising Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso) is perceived to be more aligned with Moscow. This shift away from France and the West opens opportunities for Russia to expand its strategic footprint in the region, including military and economic engagements (CSIS) (Crisis Group).
- China: China might also see an opportunity to strengthen its economic ties and infrastructure projects in West Africa. With ECOWAS weakened, individual states might be more inclined to negotiate bilateral deals with Beijing. China’s investment in infrastructure and natural resources could increase as it seeks to fill the void left by Western influence (Voice of America).
- Turkey: Turkey has been seeking to expand its influence in Africa through economic investments and soft power. The instability and fragmentation of ECOWAS could present an opportunity for Turkey to establish stronger bilateral relations with individual West African countries, especially those that feel marginalised by the regional bloc (JURISTnews).
- France: Paradoxically, while France might suffer from a loss of influence in the Sahel due to the withdrawal of its former colonies from ECOWAS, it could also benefit from a scenario where ECOWAS struggles to maintain cohesion. This could drive remaining ECOWAS members to seek stronger bilateral ties with France for security and economic support, counterbalancing the influence of the breakaway Sahel states (Crisis Group).
- Iran: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute also said: “Iran has shown interest in becoming an economic and defence partner to the AES since 2023”, noting: “Iranian officials met with their AES counterparts multiple times throughout 2023. The Iranian regime and affiliated media outlets have repeatedly emphasised economic issues as an area of focus in Iran-AES relations. Iran has signed several agreements on energy, mining, and other sectors with Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023 and 2024 and defense deals with Mali and Burkina Faso in 2023”.
The disintegration of ECOWAS is likely to lead to a more fragmented and competitive geopolitical environment in West Africa, with various foreign powers seeking to capitalise on the region’s instability and shifting alliances.
According to the 11 July 2024 Africa file of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) on the exit of the three countries, “The new confederation expands the operational scope of the juntas’ alliance and will likely create more opportunities for the juntas to continue coordinating diplomatic efforts and solidifying ties with like-minded non-Western partners. The confederation could seek to add new members, which would further strengthen its power and legitimacy as an alternative regional bloc. The deteriorating security in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger poses the biggest threat to the respective regimes and broader confederation.”
