The Sahel region has long faced a convergence of complex security and environmental crises. However, since the outbreak of terrorist violence following the fall of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, the region has become the epicentre of armed insurgencies that not only threaten national sovereignty and stability but also have a profound impact on the Sahel’s natural resources, particularly gold mining, water access, and agriculture.
1. The Gold Economy: Terrorism and Resource Exploitation
The discovery of rich gold veins in the Sahel in 2012, notably in Sudan, ignited a gold rush that rapidly expanded artisanal mining, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This boom in unregulated mining has inadvertently become a revenue stream for non-state armed groups (Global Terrorism Index, 2025).
Terrorist factions such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), along with state-aligned paramilitaries like Burkina Faso’s Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), have increasingly targeted and seized control of artisanal gold mines.
These groups rarely extract gold themselves; instead, they tax local miners, monopolise transport routes, and use territorial control as a strategic lever to sustain their operations and project influence over local populations (Global Terrorism Index, 2025).
Gold’s value, portability, and untraceability make it an ideal commodity for smuggling. Smuggling routes run through neighbouring countries like Togo, allowing illicit gold trade to flourish and finance insurgent activities.
Despite attempts by governments, such as Burkina Faso’s closure of artisanal mines in July 2022, to choke off terrorist funding sources, these measures have proven counterproductive. Communities dependent on mining have often turned to insurgents for protection and support, further eroding state legitimacy (Global Terrorism Index, 2025).
International actors have also become entangled in the Sahel’s resource politics. For instance, Russia’s operations in Mali, according to the GTI, reflect a broader pattern seen in Sudan and the Central African Republic, where the acquisition of resources such as gold and diamonds, along with the acquisition of mining concessions, forms part of the Kremlin’s approach in Africa. This strategy involves providing security, military assistance, and other aid to access valuable resources, which, in part, helps Russia circumvent the sanctions imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
The full extent of such operations is difficult to uncover. Wagner troops were reported to have taken over artisanal mine sites in the past, and Russia has agreed to deals to build a gold refinery in Bamako. Furthermore, Mali’s largest international mining operations, run by Barrick Gold, ceased operations in January 2025 when the Malian government seized $245 million worth of gold and blocked Barrick’s access to its mines.
The government seeks to enforce recently passed laws mandating a larger share of revenues from international miners.
To date, however, the full picture of Russian involvement in the mining sector in Mali and beyond is piecemeal, the GTI indicates. It notes that while Russia may strike deals for future concessions, at least publicly, such deals are yet to be announced. Given the sanctions imposed on Russia over the war in Ukraine, it is highly likely that the full extent of its operations will not be known, the Index posits.
The GTI Index points out that a less discussed but perhaps more significant part of this story is the growing influence of China, which commands far less attention but is reportedly more significant in the mining sector. Chinese influence in the gold mining sector has also surged since the 2021 coup, and in December 2024, a Chinese-owned lithium production plant opened, with the Chinese ambassador in attendance alongside the junta leader Colonel Assimi Goita, who described Chinese ties with Mali as “a strategic and sincere partnership.”
The development of lithium mining in Mali is potentially significant, as lithium is a component of electric batteries and a critical mineral for the green energy transition. The more subtle and quieter influence-building approach in Mali appears to mirror Chinese strategy elsewhere on the African continent, where it has built significant influence in 27 countries.
2. Water Access Under Siege
Water, a vital yet scarce resource in the Sahel, has also become a strategic asset in the region’s conflict dynamics. The ongoing violence has caused the abandonment of villages, the displacement of thousands, and the collapse of water infrastructure. As terrorist groups gain territorial control, they impose their own rules on access and use of natural resources, including water sources such as boreholes, rivers, and springs (Houanye, 2024). Local chiefs, under pressure, act as intermediaries between communities and armed groups, making it nearly impossible to implement development projects without rebel consent.
In Mali’s central-southern regions, terrorist factions have taken control of agricultural lands and nearby water bodies, limiting local access to cultivable areas. These disruptions have worsened existing infrastructural deficiencies. As Burkina Faso’s interim president Captain Ibrahim Traoré highlighted, people in regions like Gorom-Gorom and Markoye walk long distances to fetch water due to collapsed infrastructure, including roadways and bridges (Houanye, 2024). Terrorism has not only intensified humanitarian suffering but also halted vital development projects like the EU-funded water initiative in Niger, which had to be suspended following the killing of eight people in a terrorist attack (Houanye, 2024).
3. Agriculture and Food Insecurity
Agriculture, the primary livelihood for over 85% of the population in Burkina Faso, has suffered dramatically due to terrorist violence. Recent studies show significant declines in household agricultural productivity and output in areas affected by terrorism (Adelaja & George, 2019; George et al., 2021). The insecurity restricts access to farmland, reduces the number of cultivated plots, and limits the use of agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides. Terrorist violence also disrupts seasonal labour, shifting farming practices toward less input-intensive cash crops like groundnuts and sesame, which yield lower returns (Odozi & Uwaifo Oyelere, 2021).
Furthermore, terrorism has weakened local institutions and discouraged investment in rural agricultural infrastructure. As violence continues, access to both markets and support services has declined, exacerbating food insecurity and undermining efforts by both the state and international partners to stabilise the region (Rockmore, 2020).
Conclusion
The impact of terrorism in the Sahel extends far beyond casualties and displacement; it has entrenched itself in the very fabric of the region’s economic and environmental systems. From illegal gold mining that fuels insurgency to the collapse of water governance and agricultural productivity, the consequences are multifaceted and deeply interlinked. Any strategy aimed at restoring peace and stability in the Sahel must, therefore, incorporate robust natural resource governance, improved rural infrastructure, and community-level resilience building. Without such integrated approaches, terrorism will continue to thrive in the vacuum left by state neglect and underdevelopment.
References
• Global Terrorism Index. (2025). Impact of Terrorism on Resources in the Sahel. Institute for Economics and Peace.
• Houanye, A. (2024). Terrorism & its Impacts on Water Access in the Sahel. IPS UN Bureau / GWP West Africa.
• Adelaja, A. & George, J. (2019). Effects of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian Agriculture. Applied Economics Letters.
• Arias, M.A. et al. (2018). Civil Conflict and Agricultural Production: Evidence from Colombia. Journal of Development Economics.
• George, J. et al. (2021). Terrorism and Agricultural Productivity in Nigeria. World Development.
• Odozi, J.C. & Uwaifo Oyelere, R. (2021). Labour and Conflict: Nigeria’s Agricultural Sector. African Journal of Economic Policy.
• Nillesen, E. (2016). Conflict and Agricultural Output: Evidence from Burundi. Journal of Peace Research.
• Rockmore, M. (2020). Conflict and the Composition of Household Assets. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
