Introduction
In the shifting landscape of global influence, Africa has emerged as a strategic theatre where major powers—from China and Japan to Russia, the U.S., and Gulf states—compete for economic, political, and security leverage. Through high-profile fora such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Russia–Africa Summit, U.S.-Africa Summits, and Arab-African gatherings, these actors are fostering multifaceted partnerships that go far beyond traditional aid paradigms. This has come to be known as summit diplomacy, a situation where formal meetings are held between heads of state or governments ostensibly to further mutual interests.
These gatherings are often framed around themes of trade, investment, development, and peacebuilding. However, beneath supposed vestige of “partnership” lies a fierce competition among for strategic footholds, natural resources, and political alliances in a continent rich in minerals, markets, and manpower
It has almost become a second scramble for Africa – only this time, neither with weapons nor with Africa treated as a colony, as happened during the colonial era. The first Scramble for Africa took place in the late 19th century, most notably after the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, where European powers formally partitioned the continent without African representation. Between the 1880s and the onset of World War I, nearly the entire African continent was brought under European control, with only Liberia and Ethiopia maintaining their independence (Pakenham, 1991). The process was marked by aggressive military campaigns, coercive treaties, and the systematic exploitation of African resources and labour for the benefit of colonial powers (Herbst, 2000).
By contrast, today’s engagement with Africa is less about conquest and territorial control and more about economic influence, access to natural resources, trade, and strategic partnerships. Unlike the overt colonial domination of the past, current global competition over Africa involves soft power tools such as infrastructure investment, technology transfers, security cooperation, and diplomatic alliances (Alden & Large, 2011). This modern contest can therefore be seen as a “second scramble,” but one characterised by negotiations, contracts, and development projects rather than direct colonisation.
1. China’s Deepening Engagement via FOCAC
At the 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held September 4–6, China and 53 African states adopted the Beijing Declaration, reiterating their commitment to building an “all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2024focacsummit.mfa.gov.cn). President Xi Jinping announced ten cooperation priorities spanning trade liberalisation, industrial chain cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, health, agriculture, people-to-people exchange, green development, and security (sc.china-embassy.gov.cn, focac.org, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
Key initiatives include:
• Zero-tariff treatment for least-developed African countries across all tariff lines (sc.china-embassy.gov.cn).
• Infrastructure projects—30 connectivity projects under Belt and Road, trade zones, digital centres (sc.china-embassy.gov.cn, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
• Green development and security—30 clean energy projects, satellite cooperation, nuclear technology, training of 6,000 military and 1,000 law enforcement personnel, joint exercises, mine-action efforts (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, focac.org).
China positions FOCAC as a showcase of South-South cooperation rooted in non-interference and mutual respect, with African leaders affirming shared governance models, industrial modernisation, and support for the Global South (Ministry of Foreign Affairs China, sc.china-embassy.gov.cn).
2. Japan’s Reshaped Strategy at TICAD 9
At TICAD 9 (Tokyo, August 20–22, 2025), Japan signalled a transition from aid-centred approaches to private-sector-led development. The summit prioritised co-creation, emphasising African ingenuity matched with Japanese tech—under the theme “Co-Create Innovative Solutions with Africa” (The Economic Times).
Major pledges included:
• A $5.5 billion loan package via the African Development Bank to drive connectivity and industrial growth (AP News).
• Launch of an Indian Ocean–Africa economic zone, linking trade corridors among Africa, India, and the Middle East (AP News).
• A commitment to train 30,000 AI professionals over three years to accelerate digitalisation (AP News).
• A ¥25 billion Samurai loan (≈ $169 million) for Kenya’s vehicle assembly and energy sectors, aimed at lowering borrowing costs and addressing infrastructure inefficiencies (Reuters).
Japan’s pivot signals a strategic move toward enabling market access, industrial growth, and triangular connectivity among Africa, Asia, and the Indian Ocean.
3. Russia’s Multipronged Approach via the Russia–Africa Summit
The 2023 Russia–Africa Summit in St. Petersburg was framed as a platform to promote sovereignty, multi-polarity, and partnership—positioning Russia as a strategic, non-Western alternative (Summit Africa, Wikipedia). The summit yielded five major declarations, including arms control in space, information security, and counter-terrorism, alongside a 2023–2026 action plan and MoUs with key African regional blocs (IGAD, ECCAS) (Summit Africa, Africa Guardian).
Russia deepened security ties by signing military-technical agreements with dozens of African countries and even offering gifts of grain to several nations as a political counterweight after exiting the Black Sea grain deal (Reuters, Reddit). Observers note that Russia maintains its status as the second-largest arms supplier to Sub-Saharan Africa, despite declining investments (Reuters, Le Monde.fr).
Moreover, the rebranded “Africa Corps” (from Wagner) reflects Moscow’s continued security outreach in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—demonstrating a hybrid strategy blending military, financial, and informational influence (Le Monde.fr).
4. U.S. Strategy: Summits for Business and Leadership
The U.S.–Africa Business Summit (2025, Luanda) and the earlier U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit (Washington, D.C., December 13–15, 2022) encapsulate America’s blend of private-sector engagement and high-level diplomacy.
• Business Summit: Over 2,800 participants from 85 countries forged $4 billion in deals across energy, infrastructure, digital, and agribusiness sectors. It reinforced U.S. willingness to drive Africa’s modernisation through commerce—not just aid.
• Leaders Summit: With representation from 49 nations, it accentuated democratic governance, peace, climate action, health, and diaspora ties—framing Africa as a geopolitical and developmental partner.
Together, these summits present a values-driven, market-based alternative to Beijing’s state-centric model.
5. Arab States Deepen Africa Engagement via Strategic Summits
Arab–African summits—like the Arab-African Summit held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in November 2023 and the 27th Arab African Investment and International Cooperation Summit in Aswan in November 2024—signal the Arab world’s renewed approach to Africa: equal partnership rooted in shared culture, trade, security, and infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi-Africa Summit (2023), pledged:
• Up to $25 billion in future investments, including a $1 billion King Salman Initiative, $10 billion for exports, and $5 billion in development finance by 2030.
• Support for African debt relief, notably $533 million in fiscal aid.
• Expansion of diplomatic reach: plans to open embassies in up to 40 African countries.
• Security cooperation in the Sahel and Red Sea, aligning with regional initiatives like the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition.
• Advocacy for African AU membership in the G20, accomplished in 2023 (Le Monde.fr).
Qatar, via the Qatar Africa Business Forum, leverages:
• Sovereign wealth via the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) to invest in human capital, innovation, media, and agriculture.
• A soft-power orientation focused on cultural diplomacy, entrepreneurship, and sustainable investment—distinguishing itself from extractive models.
Arab ambitions reflect a strategic desire to leverage geographic proximity, religious and cultural affinity, and capital to become indispensable partners in Africa—competing alongside global powers on a unique, value-infused front.
What do these Summits Mean?
Through a mosaic of summits and fora—each reflecting distinct geopolitical philosophies—global powers are reshaping Africa’s partnerships. China emphasises infrastructure and modernisation; Japan pivots to co-innovation and connectivity; Russia blends security and multipolar rhetoric; the U.S. couples business with democratic values; and Arab states harness cultural affinity and financial diplomacy.
For African nations, the opportunity lies in balancing these partnerships toward industrialisation, value-added trade, and sustainable development—rather than becoming solely resource extraction zones.
Conclusion
The ultimate challenge remains: turning diplomatic inroads into equitable, long-term transformation. Africa can strategically leverage the numerous summits and fora by prioritising its own development agenda and ensuring that external engagement aligns with continental frameworks like the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) (AU, 2015). By negotiating as a bloc rather than as fragmented states, Africa can strengthen its bargaining power, demand technology transfer, and secure fairer trade and investment terms (Cheru, 2016).
Moreover, fostering competition among external partners—while maintaining transparency and accountability—offers Africa an opportunity to diversify sources of capital, infrastructure, and security cooperation (Taylor, 2020). Ultimately, the continent’s ability to transform these summits into tangible socio-economic gains depends on strong governance, regional integration, and the strategic assertion of African agency. By determining the what the details of the discussions a the Summits ought to be, Africa can ensure that issues of collective importance not only get tabled but discussed. Unless this is done, these summits would result in the total marginalisation of Africa in the emerging world order.
References
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