Introduction
As the 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana approach, interest in social media platforms as spaces to extract insight into political discourses has increased. Of these, YouTube has emerged as a critical space where a wide variety of political content, ranging from news analyses to commentaries, is widely shared. While these provide new opportunities for public engagement and the sharing of ideas, they are equally responsible for spreading misinformation and misinterpretation that distorts citizens’ perceptions and influences voter decisions.
Ghanaian media ownership was examined by Geopoll in 2017. According to the report, there was a significant degree of political affiliation among the nation’s media proprietors, which has a propensity to influence the media to serve a particular political agenda rather than the general welfare. This may be the cause of the spread of propaganda news stories and infectious fabrications in certain media sources in the country. Ghanaian media are politically and economically aligned, according to Akpojivi (2018). This contributes to the ownership structure, whereby the political and economic system benefits the media and its owners. Within the framework of the coming election, the role of YouTube bloggers—mainly independent contributors who regularly publish unverified or biased information—cannot be overlooked. Such influencers, motivated by personal political interests, financial gain, or the desire for online notoriety, often contribute content that may or may not meet the expected verification or fairness standards used in journalism. This research seeks to elaborate on the contribution of YouTube bloggers in Ghana towards misinformation and misinterpretation in these critical months, September and October 2024, leading to the election. It will, therefore, undertake a detailed social media analysis to ascertain the nature, source, and impact of such content.
2. Literature review
2.1 Introduction to Misinformation in Political Discourse
Misinformation and disinformation have become critical issues in modern political communication, particularly during elections (Broda & Strömbäck, 2024). While history demonstrates that the spread of false and misleading information is not new (Kapantai et al., 2021; Ortoleva, 2019), most observers seem to concur that the last ten years have seen a significant increase in the prevalence of misinformation, disinformation, and fake news (Benkler et al., 2018; Kavanagh & Rich, 2018; O’Connor & Weatherall, 2019). Misinformation is false information shared without the intention to deceive. This contrasts with disinformation, which is the intentional sharing of false information to influence public opinion or behavior (Frenda et al., 2013). The health and well-being of individuals, organizations, nations, democratic deliberation, and democracy itself are all seriously threatened by false and misleading information in all its forms, which can grow misperceptions and knowledge resistance (Klintman, 2019; Krishna & Thompson, 2021; Rosenfeld, 2019).
History is full of examples of how misinformation has altered election outcomes, but this aspect has been amplified exponentially with the rise of social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (Broda & Strömbäck, 2024). Misinformation campaigns have been observed in various countries, including in the 2016 U.S. presidential race, which succeeded in shifting voter decisions to affect election results (Bozkurt, Townes, & Li, 2024; Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). In Ghana, as elsewhere on the continent, misinformation has often worked against political trust and voter confidence, creating an environment of distorted political rhetoric and misleading voter behaviour through the spread of incorrect claims (Kwode & Selekane, 2023).
2.2 Social Media and Political Communication
Social media has changed the face of political discourse, particularly in the twenty-first century (Battista, 2024). YouTube has emerged as one of the most prominent channels for political discourse, creating a medium through which both mainstream media and independent bloggers can air their opinions. In 2014, YouTube proudly proclaimed that its site was a major venue for citizens to engage with their governments and elected officials, publicly attesting to the platform’s role as an increasingly important means of political communication (Korotaev & Kollnig, 2021; Ricke, 2014; Gillespie, 2010).
Social media platforms have fundamentally altered the way political discourse unfolds (Battista, 2024). YouTube, in particular, has emerged as a key platform for political commentary, offering a space for both traditional media outlets and independent bloggers to disseminate their views. In 2014, YouTube publicly declared itself an important platform where citizens engage with their governments and elected officials (Korotaev & Kollnig, 2021), thereby showing that the platform has become an essential tool for political communication (Ricke, 2014; Gillespie, 2010). Recent studies on social media also reveal that alongside immediate communication power, social media has systemic opinion power. Such power means the ability to create dependencies and influence other players in a democracy (Helberger, 2020), which resonates with Baudrillard’s concept of hyper-reality, where media shapes perceptions of reality, often blurring the line between the real and the simulated (Baudrillard, 1981). It also aligns with Marcuse’s idea of repressive tolerance, where social media structures, through algorithms and content curation, suppress alternative viewpoints, thereby distorting public discourse and weakening true democratic engagement (Marcuse, 2015).
In the case of YouTube, this may lead to the creation of a distorted picture of reality by changing, shifting, and radicalising the public discourse on political matters (Korotaev & Kollnig, 2021). The role of YouTube in political communication is twofold: it enables more direct engagement between politicians, influencers, and the public while also opening the door for the spread of misinformation. The accessibility and global reach of YouTube videos have made them a powerful tool in political campaigns, but they also pose significant challenges, particularly when videos mislead or misinform the public (Korotaev & Kollnig, 2021).
3. Methods and Approach
This study was based on a social media analysis approach to understand the role of YouTube bloggers in furthering misinformation and misinterpretation in the run-up to the 2024 elections. The YouTube videos were searched using several keywords, including “2024 Ghana election,” “political parties in Ghana,” “electoral fraud,” “Ghana voting system,” and the names of the key candidates. Only videos uploaded between September 1, 2024, and October 31, 2024, were taken into consideration; by this, the analysis focused on the period preceding the elections, during which misinformation can most strongly impact voter behaviour. To ensure that only the most relevant and influential content was included in the analysis, the following inclusion criteria were applied:
| Source | Videos must be created by independent bloggers, political commentators, or YouTube content creators without formal affiliations to established media houses or political parties. |
| Content Relevance | The videos must specifically discuss political topics related to the 2024 Ghana elections, including electoral issues, party politics, candidates, and controversial election-related events. |
| Engagement Metrics | Videos with a minimum of 1,000 views were prioritised based on their potential reach and audience engagement. |
| Language | Only videos in English or Twi (the two most commonly spoken languages in Ghana’s political discourse) were considered. Videos in other languages were excluded unless they met all other criteria and could be reliably translated. |
The initial video pool was created through keyword search terms that were filtered for relevance to the 2024 election. After the automated filtering process, all videos underwent manual review to verify that each video met the above-named inclusion criteria. The engagement of viewers with the videos was considered, as it typically reflects their general influence.
3.1 Content Analysis
A qualitative and quantitative content analysis was performed after the selection of the videos. This review checked for the accuracy of information on the following points:
- Accuracy of Information: Each video was assessed for factual accuracy, with particular attention to unsubstantiated claims or false narratives. Specific issues, such as allegations of election fraud or voter suppression, were scrutinised for evidence of misinformation.
- Tone and Framing: The tone of each video was analysed to identify emotional appeals, sensationalist language, and the overall framing of issues. Content that used fear, exaggeration, or polarised rhetoric was categorised as potentially misleading or biased.
- Misinformation vs. Disinformation: The distinction between misinformation (false information spread without intent to deceive) and disinformation (deliberate falsehoods intended to mislead or manipulate public opinion) was a critical aspect of the analysis.
- Misinterpretation of Facts: Instances of misinterpreting facts or selectively presenting information to create a skewed narrative were identified. This included videos that presented factual information out of context or omitted key details to influence viewer perception.
4. Analysis and Discussion
4.1 Overview of the Video Content
The selected YouTube videos showcase a variety of content relating to the 2024 Ghanaian presidential election, with a primary focus on political rivalries, alleged electoral fraud, and sensational claims about key political figures. One of the videos, Video 1, uploaded by Ayeka TV, presents a misinterpretation of a leaked audio of the late President Atta Mills. The video claims that Mills is endorsing the current ruling party’s vice-presidential candidate, although the original audio discusses Mills’ political ambitions, not an endorsement. This misrepresentation is echoed in Videos 2 and 3, uploaded by Odeneho TV and King2TV respectively, which further distort the narrative, suggesting that the flagbearer of the largest opposition party has been exposed for wrongdoing and is seeking pardon.
Other videos, such as Video 4 by Loud Silence Media, falsely accuse the ruling party of involvement in the death of one of the presidential candidates and hint at potential plans to kill another candidate to manipulate ballot positions. Similarly, Pendream TV’s Video 5 circulates an unverified claim that Mahama may declare himself president if the election results are disputed. Meanwhile, Videos 6 and 7 by Nimdeɛ News and 2k News spread unverified claims about political parties, making vague references to scandals and electoral manipulation. Many of these videos employ sensational language and selective reporting, distorting the political narrative to sow fear and division among voters.
4.2 Misrepresentation and Distortion of Facts
Several videos in this sample misrepresent facts or present them out of context. In the case of Ayeka TV’s Video 1, the misinterpretation of the leaked audio from President Mills is a notable example of how context can be manipulated to fit a particular narrative. While the original audio reflects Mills’ political aspirations, the bloggers misrepresent it as an endorsement of the ruling party’s candidate. This manipulation not only distorts historical facts but also aims to influence public opinion by selectively presenting information that fits a political agenda.
Similarly, in Videos 4 and 5, Loud Silence Media and Pendream TV spread unverified allegations of electoral fraud and violence. Loud Silence Media’s claim that the ruling party was involved in the death of one of the presidential candidates lacks credible evidence, and Pendream TV’s suggestion that the opposition leader might declare himself president if the election results are contested is an unsubstantiated rumour. These videos, while provocative, do not provide any verifiable evidence to support their claims. The unchecked spread of such misinformation undermines trust in the electoral process and deepens political polarization.
4.3 Tone and Framing
A recurring feature in many of the videos is the sensational tone and emotional appeal used to convey political messages. Words such as “danger,” “looming threat,” and “bad news” are designed to provoke fear and anxiety. For example, Pendream TV’s “Danger Looms” (Video 5) and Loud Silence Media’s “Ruling Party Killed…” (Video 4) rely heavily on fear-based language to heighten the emotional stakes. Such rhetoric can resonate strongly with viewers, particularly in a politically charged environment, and can distort their perceptions of the political situation.
While emotional appeals are not inherently problematic, their use in videos with highly polarized content can contribute to political division. Both pro-government and opposition-supporting videos use similar tactics to stoke fear and distrust. For example, the videos from Ayeka TV and King2TV selectively emphasize parts of the leaked audio to portray the opposition in a negative light, while omitting important context that would offer a more balanced view.
4.4 Impact on Voter Behavior and Public Perception
The promotion of misleading content through these videos can have significant implications for public perception, particularly in the pre-election period when voter opinions are still forming. Misinformation about electoral fraud, violence, and questionable political endorsements can make voters more sceptical of the electoral process and the legitimacy of the election results. This may lead to distrust among the electorate, which can undermine the integrity of democratic processes. Moreover, the polarising nature of such videos can intensify political divisions, making it harder for voters to make objective, informed decisions.
By focusing on sensationalist and one-sided narratives, these videos contribute to a toxic political environment, where voters are more likely to align themselves with extreme viewpoints and less likely to engage in nuanced discussions about the election. In many cases, the videos reinforce pre-existing biases, leading to confirmation bias, where voters are inclined to believe content that aligns with their political views. As a result, these videos can have a lasting impact on voter behaviour, encouraging voters to make decisions based on incomplete or distorted information.
4.5 Comparison to Existing Literature
The findings in this analysis are consistent with broader trends identified in academic literature regarding the role of social media in election campaigns. Scholars such as Broda & Strömbäck (2024) and Kavanagh & Rich (2018) have documented how platforms like YouTube amplify the spread of misinformation, particularly during election periods. These studies emphasize that social media platforms create a fertile ground for emotional manipulation, selective fact reporting, and polarising narratives, all of which can significantly influence public opinion and voter behaviour.
As Broda & Strömbäck (2024) note, the rise of social media has allowed for the unchecked spread of both sensational and manipulated content, which can shape the direction of public discourse and potentially alter the outcome of elections. Similarly, Kavanagh & Rich (2018) highlight how emotional appeals and selective reporting on social media platforms can reinforce political polarization, making it more difficult for voters to access balanced, accurate information.
This analysis also supports existing findings regarding the amplification of partisan narratives through digital media. While traditional news outlets are often subject to editorial oversight, social media platforms like YouTube provide a space for unregulated political discourse, where biased or sensational content can spread rapidly without sufficient fact-checking.
Conclusion
The analysis of these seven YouTube videos reveals how misleading content and sensationalist language can influence public perception and voter behaviour in the lead-up to the 2024 Ghanaian presidential/ parliamentary elections. Both pro-government and opposition-supporting videos use emotional appeals and selective reporting to create distorted narratives that contribute to political polarisation and undermine trust in the electoral process. This highlights the need for more responsible content creation and consumption, as well as the importance of critical media literacy among voters to navigate the challenges posed by misinformation in election periods.
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