Introduction

Russia is a country very much in the news.  Since its invasion of Ukraine, there have been several interpretations of its expanding interests in other parts of the world, particularly Africa in several ways. Russia’s current leader, President Vladimir Putin, has been described as a man working tirelessly to build the lost glory of what used to be the USSR (Oliker, 2020; Walker, 2018; BBC, 2014).  Expanding the interests of his country therefore to Africa, seeking friendship is perhaps one of the ways to express that desire (Götz & Kaas, 2024). Russia instituted the Russia- Africa Summit, starting in 2019 and has used this to reach out to the highest ranking influential and political figures of the continent (Rouget, 2023). The summit aimed at bringing about a fundamentally new level of mutually beneficial partnership to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The goal is to promote efforts to strengthen comprehensive and equal cooperation between Russia and African nations across all areas of society including politics, security, economic relations, science and technology, and the cultural and humanitarian spheres.¹

Critics have stated that Putin sees Africa as a region that is not only geo-strategically important, but is full of potential in the grand scheme of global power politics  and seeks to  surpass  the influence that China, and the United States of America have historically enjoyed on the continent (Githua, 2024; Drion & Dolbaia, 2023; Mankoff,  2009). The Russian premier is hell bent on creating a new ally for Africa, and this after historically showing little to no interest (Goumıdı, 2023; Fidan & Aras, 2010). Furthermore, Putin’s interests in Africa are said to be driven by his need for Africa’s approval and support, particularly within the United Nations, as it has 54 countries that can vote for it if need be.  For example, in a speech by Putin which was read by Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister stated, Putin expressed his support for the continent: 

I would like to reiterate that our country will continue to provide total support to our African friends in different sectors: ensuring sustainable development, the struggle against terrorism and extremism, combating epidemics, food problems and the consequences of natural disasters (Putin, 9th November, 2024 at African -Russia Summit).

The BBC reported on 11 November 2024 that during the summit, Burkina Faso’s Foreign Minister Karamoko Jean-Marie Traoré said Russia was a more suitable international partner than the former colonial power, France. The BBC added that Traoré’s view was reiterated by Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop, who contrasted the Kremlin’s “sincere” partnership to Western powers’ “neo-colonial” relationship. This article seeks to assess whether the interests of Russia’s Putin in Africa are truly genuine or is another hidden agenda to make Africa its footstool.

Russia’s friendship and support as part of a grand strategy

International relations among nations is governed by what is usually referred to as the national interest (Donnelly, 2000; Birgerson, Kozhemiakin, & Kanet, 1996). It is therefore easy to explain that Russia’s support for Africa and its subsequent involvement in African affairs is a strategy for military, diplomatic, economic and geopolitical power in its quest to multi-polarise the world and fight the U.S.-led hegemony (Brookings Institution, 2021; 2020;  Megerisi, 2020).

Militarily, Africa could serve as a base for expanded Russian economic and military operations as Africa has uranium and plutonium in abundance (Al-Sabahi, 2024; Blank, 2024). These are two critical raw materials that can feed Russia’s thirst for nuclear arms superiority (Saptakee, 2024). Diplomatically, getting Africa on Russia’s side makes Moscow more influential in the geopolitical scheme of things and shores up the Kremlin’s influence in international fora as a way of breaking or reducing the West’s dominance in world affairs (Goumıdı, 2023; Fidan & Aras, 2010). The Council on Foreign Relations notes, for example, in an article titled, ‘Russia’s growing footprint in Africa,’ published on 28 December 2023, that: “At the United Nations, it lobbies African allies for favourable votes on issues such as the Ukraine conflict and works to sow distrust with UN Peacekeeping missions and other multilateral efforts.” (Ferragamo, 2023). Economically, Russia sees Africa as a fertile trade hub for arms, energy and grains (Seigle, 2023).

So, in essence, Putin’s “total support” for Africa equally means Africa’s “total support” for Russia – economically, militarily, geo politically and diplomatically, especially now as many military led African countries like Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso see France and the United States as up-to-no-good enemies. It is a quid-pro-quo affair and Putin’s Russia is feasting on Africa’s strained relations with France and the US in Moscow’s. This state of affairs has been entrenched by the behaviour of France and Western countries in their relations with African countries, particularly in the harsh conditionalities for their support.

Russia’s approach

Russia’s engagements with Africa “extend from deepening ties in North Africa, expanding its reach in the Central African Republic and the Sahel, and rekindling Cold War ties in southern Africa (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, n.d;  Giles, 2013). Russia’s approach is distinctive among external actors in that Moscow typically relies on irregular (and frequently extralegal) means to expand its influence—deployment of mercenaries, disinformation, election interference, support for coups, and arms for resources deals, among others (Inwood & Tacchi, 2024; Goumıdı, 2023) . This low-cost, high-influence strategy seeks to advance a very different world order than the rules-based, democratic political systems to which most Africans aspire (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024) . The outcomes from Russia’s interventions in Africa, therefore, will have far-reaching implications for governance norms and security on the continent.

Russia’s military footprints in Africa and implications for democracy

There is increasing concern for the implications of Russia’s approach to militarising its support for Africa.  Coups in the central Sahel region have been supported by Russia’s Wagner Group, now the Africa Corps (Minde, 2024). This private military corporation or mercenary group has now been roped into Russia’s military and defence infrastructure and gained both military and economic influence on the continent (Ehl, 2024). The Africa Corps now provides security services and protection for the junta leaders, who have all failed to return their countries to democratic rule.

Burkina Faso’s junta, for example, will remain in power for another five years after extending the transition back to democracy by 60 months from July, according to an approved new charter signed by military leader Ibrahim Traore. “The elections marking the end of the transition may be organised before this deadline if the security situation permits,” said the charter, as reported by Reuters.

Since the military takeover in Mali in August 2020, there has been a coup contagion in the region and other parts of the continent. Aljazeera counts more than 10 recorded coup attempts in Central and West Africa since the Mali putsch. The contagion undermines Africa’s still-fledgling and crawling democratic foundation, which is yet to be fully established as a bedrock for political stability and socio-economic development. Apart from Niger and Burkina Faso, the contagion spread to Guinea, Sudan and Gabon (Aljazeera, 2024).

Furthermore, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have exited the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and formed a splinter group, Alliance of Sahel States (AES), thus fracturing the region more and creating an environment for terrorists and extremist groups to grow.  This is primarily due to the fact that the regional efforts to combat insurgency have been either disrupted or completely discontinued as French and US troops involved in various counter-terrorism operations have all been sent packing out of the Sahel with dire consequences for security in the region. A fractured community means fractured cooperation militarily, economically, diplomatically and democratically.

Russia’s Grain Diplomacy

Apart from the military/defence strategy used by Putin, Moscow’s free grain to some African countries have made Russia appear as a true and supportive friend. In February 2024, Russia’s Ministry of Agriculture announced that it had shipped 200,000 tonnes of grain in humanitarian aid to six African nations, fulfilling the Kremlin’spledge to the continent last July, Russia’s state news agency TASS reported. It quoted Agriculture Minister Dmitry Patrushev saying that Burkina Faso, Mali, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe each received 25,000 tonnes of grain while the Central African Republic and Somalia got 50,000 tonnes each.

“The first ship departed on November 7, 2023. The average travel time stood at 30-40 days. The last vessel arrived in Somalia in late January and the unloading of its cargo was completed on February 17,” Patrushev said, adding that “this is the first time that our country carried out such a large-scale humanitarian operation”.

The beneficiaries have tended to see Russia as a benevolent nation, supporting them in their time of need.  Critics of this effort are of the view that some on the continent  seem to have lost sight of the fact that Russia created the very same food insecurity in the first place.  It was exploiting its humanitarian gestures for glory, even though it had invaded Ukraine in the first place which had created the shortage on the international markets.  Ukraine, together with Russia, are  major exporters of grains to Africa. The war disrupted supply chains and consequently created a shortage that caused food prices to skyrocket and, thereby, created food shortages in parts of Africa.

The grain donation was a strategic move by Putin to win over the continent ahead of his political rivals.

Russia’s disinformation agenda

Putin has also been waging a disinformation campaign in Africa to win the minds and hearts of the continent. These campaigns are led by the Wagner Group and the Africa Initiatives, which is an Africa-focused information agency run by the Kremlin. Russia also uses press tours to subtly influence the narratives of African journalists. “Russia uses these guided tours as a way of propagating certain narratives,” Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies told the BBC, noting that China organises similar tours.

Potential Concerns

While Russia’s growing engagement in Africa may have economic and diplomatic benefits for both parties, there are concerns about the potential for a “hidden agenda” regarding control.  The exploitation of resources that have been reported in areas where Russian backed Wagner Forces have been active is concerning. 

Furthermore, there are fears of efforts to destabilise countries that are not particularly friendly to Russia through misinformation and disinformation, use of the internet and proxy conflicts in which it could intervene as an interested arbiter.

As stated earlier, there are also concerns that the Africa region of 54 nations that tends to vote largely together on matters of mutual interest may be coerced by Russia to vote in its favour at the United Nations.  While such a tactic is not new, it could expose Africa to new entrants in economic control and could stimulate a new form of East -West battle in Africa.

Conclusion

While it is clear that Russia’s interests in Africa are multifaceted—ranging from economic gain to geopolitical strategy—the extent to which these interests serve a hidden agenda for control is a subject of ongoing debate and analysis. The situation is complex, and as Russia continues to deepen its ties with African nations, the implications for both Russia and the countries involved will evolve.  Putin is playing a strategic chess game with the West, and unfortunately, Africa just happens to be his pawn in that game. He seems to be exploiting Africa’s current challenges as leverage. There is no doubt that he needs Africa to keep that game going until he achieves his ultimate goal of creating a new world order where the influence of the West is weakened geopolitically. He presents himself as a “friend” to Africa using narratives that present countries such as France and the United States as oppressors.

However the tide is changing as there have been calls for Africa to put the breaks on forging closer relations at a fast pace.  Seeing Putin as a liberator from neo-colonialist and hegemonic global dictators who colonised and enslaved Africans in the past may not be necessarily right. Africa must be careful.  There is a reason for every gift. Nations are directly concerned by what interests them and are not benevolent philanthropists.

Endnotes

1.  ^{https://summitafrica.ru/en/about-summit/}

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