The Sahel region has become one of the world’s most volatile security environments. Once viewed mainly through the lens of insurgency and state fragility, the region has now become a theater for great power competition. Rival global and regional actors, including Russia, Western states, China and increasingly Ukraine, are exerting influence through military, political and economic means. Recent accusations by Russia that Ukraine and Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) are supporting terrorism in the Sahel have brought this competition into sharper focus. These claims underscore how geopolitical rivalries are now deeply entangled with Africa’s evolving terrorism landscape.
The Sahel’s Security Crisis: A Background
The Sahel, stretching from Mauritania to Sudan, faces overlapping crises of terrorism, governance failure, and humanitarian displacement. Since 2012, jihadist insurgencies linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have expanded across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Weak governance, porous borders and economic marginalization have allowed extremist groups to gain territories. The withdrawal of the French-led Operation Barkhane in 2022 and the termination of the UN’s MINUSMA mission in Mali have further reduced international counterterrorism efforts, leaving power vacuums that external actors are eager to fill.
Amid this instability, the region’s security dynamics have shifted toward bilateral and transactional partnerships with foreign powers. Military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger now shape their security alignments based on perceived reliability rather than shared democratic values. These shifts have opened the door to intensified involvement by Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, both positioning themselves as alternative partners to Western powers.
Russia’s Expanding Footprint
According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025 (GTI), Russian involvement in the Sahel has increased markedly since the 2021 deployment of the Wagner Group, now rebranded as the Africa Corps. Around 1,000 Africa Corps personnel are currently deployed in Mali, substantially fewer than the combined 13,000 UN and French troops previously stationed there (GTI, 2025). The Russian private military contingent operates alongside Malian forces in counterterrorism missions, though their record in improving security outcomes remains mixed.
Russia’s approach contrasts with that of the United Nations and France. Rather than emphasizing protection of civilians, Africa Corps focuses on direct offensive operations against armed groups. This approach has been controversial, but it has received domestic approval in Mali, where 82% of surveyed citizens in early 2024 expressed positive views of the junta’s partnership with Russia (GTI, 2025). Nevertheless, the approach has also drawn criticism for its brutality and limited long-term stability gains.
Russian involvement is not confined to military engagement. Moscow has expanded its influence through economic interests, particularly in mining and resource extraction.
China’s Parallel Economic Strategy
While Russia’s involvement is highly visible and militarized, China has pursued a subtle strategy centered on economic diplomacy. Chinese companies have increased investments in Mali’s mining sector, particularly in gold and lithium production. In December 2024, Mali inaugurated a Chinese-owned lithium plant attended by the Chinese ambassador and Colonel Assimi Goïta, who described relations with China as a “strategic and sincere partnership” (GTI, 2025).
China’s approach avoids direct security entanglements while building long-term economic and infrastructural influence. This contrast between Russian and Chinese engagement underscores how major powers employ distinct strategies to secure footholds in the same volatile region.
Emerging Narratives
The Global Terrorism Index 2025 also highlights how Russia’s deepening presence in the Sahel coincides with escalating narratives about foreign interference. Moscow has repeatedly accused Ukraine and the GNU of Libya of supporting terrorism in the region. At the 13th International Meeting of High Representatives for Security Issues in May 2025, Russian Foreign Ministry official Tatyana Dovgalenko alleged that “the Kiev regime is directly involved in destabilizing the situation in Africa” through collaboration with terrorist groups in the Sahel (MSN News, 2024).
According to Dovgalenko, Western-supplied weapons intended for Ukraine are allegedly being diverted to extremist groups across Africa, thereby contributing to the escalating insecurity. Similar statements were made by Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, who claimed that Ukrainian intelligence had provided drones and training to militants via coordination with Libya’s GNU (Libya Observer, 2024).
Ukraine has denied these allegations, describing them as disinformation intended to discredit Kyiv and divert attention from Russia’s activities in Africa. However, the verification of Russia’s claims remains limited, neither the United Nations nor any major intelligence agencies have confirmed the allegations. Nonetheless, the exchange of accusations illustrates how the Sahel has become an ‘extension’ of the ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict.
From Counterterrorism to Proxy Competition
The shift from multilateral counterterrorism operations to bilateral ones has weakened regional cooperation in the Sahel. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, now carries out counterterrorism operations through a partnership lens that favors Russia. Meanwhile, Western nations have allegedly redirected resources toward coastal West African states like Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, to prevent the southern expansion of Sahel-based militant networks.
These divisions mirror Cold War–era dynamics, where ideological alignment determined security partnerships. The result is a patchwork of rival counterterrorism efforts that lack coordination and intelligence-sharing. Extremist groups exploit these divisions by relocating across borders and manipulating local grievances. For instance, after recent Russian and Malian offensives in northern Mali, Tuareg rebel groups re-emerged, reportedly collaborating with external actors for intelligence support (GTI, 2025).
Conclusion
The worsening security situation in the Sahel shows how foreign interventions and global rivalries have shaped the region’s instability. Russia’s military role, China’s growing economic presence and the accusations against Ukraine all highlight how outside powers are using counterterrorism as a way to expand their influence. This has made it harder to stabilize the region, weakened cooperation between states and allowed extremist groups to exploit the gaps.
In the end, lasting security in the Sahel will depend less on which foreign power gains the upper hand and more on how African governments take charge of their own security. Strong governance, regional cooperation and policies free from outside manipulation are key. Without this, the Sahel will continue to serve as a battleground for global competition instead of a region working toward peace and stability.
Reference
Global Terrorism Index. (2025). Measuring the impact of terrorism in 2025: Key findings for the Sahel region. Institute for Economics and Peace.
MSN News. (2024, October 10). Russia accuses Ukraine of sponsoring terrorists in Africa. Retrieved from https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-accuses-ukraine-of-sponsoring-terrorists-in-africa/ar-AA1FZXyf
Libya Observer. (2024, October 9). Russia accuses Ukraine and GNU of backing terrorism in Africa’s Sahel. Retrieved from https://libyaobserver.ly/news/russia-accuses-ukraine-and-gnu-backing-terrorism-africas-sahel
