1. Introduction
This article does not seek to legitimise or defend either Russian or Western military adventurism. Instead, it critically examines the politics of language in global security discourse, particularly the ways in which private military companies (PMCs) are framed. In international debates, the terms used to describe these actors are not neutral; they carry weight in shaping perceptions of legitimacy, legality, and morality. The same category of actors who are armed groups providing military services for profit can be cast either as “mercenaries” or as “contractors,” depending on geopolitical and discursive positioning. For example, the Wagner Group, a Russian-linked PMC active in Ukraine, Syria, and several African states like Mali and Central African Republic, is routinely labelled a “mercenary organisation” in Western media and policy circles. This framing conveys illegitimacy, lawlessness, and destabilisation. By contrast, Blackwater (now Constellis Holdings), a United States based PMC with a notorious record in Iraq and Afghanistan, is predominantly described as a “private security contractor.” The term carries a more bureaucratic, professional, and businesslike connotation, aligning such actors with legitimate outsourcing practices rather than illicit warfare. These divergent labels reveal less about the companies themselves and more about the discursive strategies used to position them in global politics. The central question driving this article is: How does framing private military companies as either “mercenaries” or “contractors” shape global perceptions, legitimacy, and governance of war? By exploring this question, the paper highlights the discursive power of framing in legitimizing certain military actors while delegitimising others, and examines the implications this has for international law, public perception, and geopolitical order.
2. Historical and Conceptual Background
The phenomenon of private actors participating in warfare is not new. From medieval condottieri in Italy to 19th-century soldiers of fortune in Africa and Latin America, individuals and groups have long sold their military services to the highest bidder (Leeson & Piano, 2020). What is distinctive about the contemporary landscape is the institutionalisation and corporatisation of such actors into private military companies (PMCs), especially since the end of the Cold War (Adams, 1999). The downsizing of national militaries, combined with the rise of neoliberal reforms that encouraged the outsourcing of state functions, created fertile ground for PMCs to flourish. They became a central, if often controversial, component of conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently, in African and Middle Eastern theatres.
In legal and policy debates, however, the language used to categorise these actors has remained contested. The term “mercenary” has deep roots in international law and carries strong negative connotations. Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989) provide definitions of mercenaries, emphasising their foreignness, profit motive, and lack of allegiance to a recognised state. Crucially, mercenaries are denied combatant or prisoner-of-war status under international law, rendering them illegitimate participants in armed conflict. By contrast, the designation “contractor” emerged as part of a neoliberal framing of warfare that aligns with privatisation and market logic. Contractors are not portrayed as lawless profiteers but as service providers offering technical, logistical, or protective support to states and corporations. This language situates them within the framework of legal contracts and global markets rather than illicit violence. The distinction between “mercenary” and “contractor” thus reflects not only legal categories but also discursive strategies that normalise certain actors while stigmatising others.
Despite these attempts at categorisation, there is no consistent terminology across contexts. Western PMCs such as Blackwater/Constellis Holding are often described in neutral or bureaucratic terms, while groups like Wagner are cast as mercenaries, even though both engage in combat operations and security provision under contractual arrangements. This inconsistency underscores that what is at stake is less the empirical behavior of these companies and more the discursive framing that shapes how they are understood, regulated, and judged in international politics.
3. Discourse and Framing Theory
According to French scholar Michael Foucault, discourse is never neutral; it reflects and reproduces power relations (Hill, 2001; Chiang, 2015). Building on this perspective, scholars of critical discourse analysis (CDA), such as Fairclough & Wodak (1997) emphasise how language and representation shape social reality by privileging certain meanings while marginalising others. In the context of private military companies, discourse determines whether these actors are viewed as legitimate extensions of state authority or as unlawful profiteers operating outside international norms. Closely linked to this is framing theory, which was introduced by Gregory Bateson was the expansion by the works of Erving Goffman. Framing involves selecting certain aspects of reality and making them more salient in communication, thereby promoting a particular interpretation (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009; Goffman, 1986). In security discourse, terms like “mercenary” and “contractor” operate as frames that shape public perception and policy responses.
The word “mercenary” evokes images of lawlessness, opportunism, and illegitimacy, often positioning actors outside the moral and legal order of war. In contrast, “contractor” suggests professionalism, bureaucracy, and market rationality, aligning actors with legal and economic frameworks rather than criminality (Barley & Kunda, 2006; Cross & Swart, 2020). Thus, frames do not merely describe reality; they actively construct hierarchies of legitimacy and morality. In practice, this means Western-affiliated PMCs are discursively normalised as professional contractors, while non-Western counterparts such as Russia’s Wagner Group are stigmatised as mercenaries. These linguistic choices are deeply political, shaping international governance and reinforcing global power asymmetries.
4. Case Study Comparison
The contrasting framings of the Wagner Group and Blackwater/Constellis Holdings illustrate how discourse shapes the perception of private military actors. The Wagner Group, linked to Russian operations in Ukraine, Syria, and across several African states, is consistently labelled as a mercenary organisation by Western governments, media, and international institutions. This framing casts Wagner as an illegitimate actor associated with shadow warfare, authoritarian patronage, and destabilisation. The term “mercenary” not only reflects Wagner’s clandestine nature but also delegitimises its activities within the international order, reinforcing the narrative of Russia’s use of illicit means to expand influence.
In contrast, Blackwater/Constellis Holdings, a United States of America-based PMC notorious for its role in Iraq and Afghanistan, has predominantly been described as a private security contractor. Despite incidents such as the Nisour Square massacre in 2007, which drew global condemnation, Blackwater/Constellis Holdings remained framed in media and policy discourse as a contractor providing professional services under U.S. government contracts. This label situates the company within the framework of legitimate outsourcing, portraying its activities as an extension of state authority rather than criminality.
These divergent framings are not accidental but the result of discursive reproduction by media outlets, governments, and international institutions. Through official statements, news coverage, and policy documents, the same type of actor, an armed group operating for profit, is placed into radically different categories depending on geopolitical alignment. The consequence is a discursive double standard that legitimises Western PMCs while stigmatising non-Western ones, with profound implications for how accountability, legality, and morality are applied in global security governance.
5. Conclusion
This article has examined how discourse and framing shape the legitimacy and governance of private military companies in contemporary international politics. By contrasting the framing of Russia’s Wagner Group as “mercenaries” with the portrayal of United States based Blackwater/Constellis Holdings as “contractors,” it becomes clear that the language used to describe these actors is not neutral. Instead, it reflects deeper power asymmetries in global security narratives, where Western-affiliated PMCs are normalised while non-Western counterparts are delegitimised.
Importantly, this analysis does not defend either Russian or Western military adventurism. Rather, it highlights the ways in which words such as mercenary and contractor carry normative weight, shaping legal categorisations, public perceptions, and geopolitical narratives. These frames influence whether PMCs are perceived as professional partners in state security or as unlawful profiteers, and in turn determine how they are regulated, sanctioned, or ignored.
The implications are significant: discursive framing reproduces global inequalities in security governance and undermines the possibility of consistent international regulation of PMCs. As long as Western actors are shielded under the language of contracting while others are condemned as mercenaries, accountability will remain uneven. Recognising the politics of naming is therefore crucial for developing a more balanced and transparent framework for regulating private military actors.
Ultimately, the discourse surrounding PMCs demonstrates that the language of war is as consequential as the weapons themselves. Naming is not a descriptive act but a political one, one that legitimises certain forms of violence while delegitimising others. A more consistent and critical approach to framing is essential if international governance is to move beyond double standards and address the complex realities of privatised warfare.
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