Introduction
Though scholarly research on the topic of foreign fighting is relatively recent, the practice itself is not new. The quantity of foreign fighters in the Middle East has dramatically increased since 2005, and they are now seen as the public face of the jihad movement (Malet, 2015). A foreign fighter is someone who travels overseas to fight for a nation they do not belong to or to take part in a non-international armed conflict (Asal & Malet, 2021). It is widely believed that these foreign combatants either relocate from one conflict zone to another or perish on the battlefield. However, in 2017, Cargin’s research revealed that most of these foreign fighters return home, meaning law enforcement, intelligence, and other security agencies should prepare for a significant influx of returnees in the event of a ceasefire. He noted that uncertainty around recidivism rates presents a major obstacle to progress.
This article aims to discuss the phenomenon of foreign fighters through the prism of security contagion and show how this issue relates to national security in Ghana. Specifically, this article will put into perspective the historical context and recent trends in foreign fighting, especially in the Middle East and Ukraine, to highlight the potential security risks resulting from returning foreign fighters. Secondly, it seeks to point out how these individuals, once they return to their country of origin, may affect the security situation in Ghana, a country which has so far been relatively immune to the direct effects of conflicts outside its borders. Using empirical evidence, the article will underscore how readiness on the part of law enforcement and intelligence agencies is a key factor in managing the possible influx of returning fighters and reducing related risks.
Historical Context and Recent Trends in Foreign Fighting
Throughout human history, mercenary camps have been a common sight on the battlefield. These camps are often made up of fighters from various backgrounds who have no particular allegiance to their place of origin (Singer, 2000). Even after the establishment of state-based armies, it took many years for nations to reduce their reliance on mercenaries. Leading European countries did not strongly strive to create a monopoly over the lawful use of violence until the nineteenth century by obstructing the actions of violent of non-state transnational organizations (Thomson, 1994).
Although foreign fighters are typically associated with Muslims joining fellow Muslims in jihadist activities around the globe, this phenomenon is not limited to those who identify as Muslims. Conflicts based on various religious identities, ethnic identities, and ideologies have involved foreign soldiers. Foreign combatants were present in the Spanish Civil War on both sides; they were also present when communists fought fascism, and when Catholics volunteered to fight communism (Malet, 2010). American Jews travelled to the Middle East to enlist in the Israeli army during the 1948 Israeli-Arab conflict, while members of the Muslim Brotherhood fought independently for the Egyptian army (Mendelsohn, 2011).
With the ongoing battles in Syria and Iraq and the apparent increase in terrorist operations globally, the issue of aspiring and returning “foreign fighters” is becoming more pressing for the international community (European Union, 2016). The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had about 30,000 fighters as of December 2015, coming from at least 85 different nations. While the Middle East and the Arab world account for the vast majority of ISIS recruits, there are also significant numbers of individuals from Western countries, including most EU members, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Along with hundreds from Tajikistan and Indonesia, thousands of fighters from Russia have also enlisted. The global phenomenon of ISIS recruiting foreign fighters gives the organization the human capital it needs to operate outside of the Middle East (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2016). Specifically, researchers in the European Union estimated in 2016 that between 3,922 and 4,294 fighters had departed for Syria/Iraq (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016). Furthermore, more than seven thousand foreign jihadists left North Africa for Syria and Iraq, significantly complicating the terrorism landscape (African Union, 2022). In October 2017, it was reported that about 100 Ghanaian migrants had joined ISIS in Libya.
In February 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sparking the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, which has led to a refugee crisis and tens of thousands of deaths. On March 14, 2024, the Russian foreign ministry tweeted that since February of 2024, 13,387 mercenaries had arrived in Ukraine. A continental breakdown listed 13 African countries, with Nigeria topping the chart at 97 out of 249 foreign fighters. There have also been reports that Russia tricked a group of 14 young men from Ghana into fighting in Ukraine. A video emerged online in March 2024, showing men believed to be Ghanaians dressed in camouflage and armed with AK-47 rifles, endorsing Fly Away Travel Agency, claiming it facilitated their recruitment into the Russian army. They urged other Ghanaians to trust the agency for similar opportunities. They spoke in Twi, a local dialect. In August 2024, it was reported that a Ghanaian foreign fighter had died on the front line in the war.
Security Contagion and Its Implications
The concept of security contagion provides a valuable framework for understanding the potential impact of returning foreign fighters on national security. Security contagion refers to the spread of security threats across borders, much like a contagious disease, where instability in one region can lead to vulnerabilities in another. This theoretical framework is particularly relevant when examining the phenomenon of foreign fighters, individuals who travel overseas to engage in conflicts that are not directly related to their home countries. These fighters often become vectors of security contagion, as their experiences and ideologies can influence and destabilise their countries of origin upon their return.
One major concern related to returning foreign fighters is the security risks they pose. The uncertainty of recidivism rates—that is, how likely they are to engage in violent activities again—presents a significant challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Returnees are difficult to track, as civil liberties must be balanced with national security. In 2016, it was estimated that between 3,922 and 4,294 fighters had left for Syria and Iraq from the European Union; approximately 30% had returned to their home countries, posing potential security threats, whether by reintegrating peacefully or engaging in domestic or international terrorism. A field study conducted in Tunisia, Mali, and Niger, according to the African Union (2022), suggests that foreign fighter flows in this region are likely to have long-lasting impacts, both from a security and socio-economic perspective.
Historical accounts indicate that blowback from foreign fighter returnees can be traced back to the 18th century when participants in the American Revolution returned to Europe and led uprisings or formed transnational networks that plotted attacks elsewhere. Blowback from the modern jihad movement can be seen in returnees from the 1980s Afghan mujahideen, who went on to conduct bombing attacks, such as those in New York in 1993 and Bali in 2002. Hegghammer (2013) researched Jihadi returnees between 1980 and 2010 and found that 11% became involved in domestic terror plots, with their attacks being significantly more likely to succeed and result in fatalities. Maletta & Hayesb (2022) extended this analysis, showing that most foreign fighters who returned to their home countries and engaged in domestic terrorism did so within six months. Most attacks or attempts occurred within the first year of their return, with a few exceptions involving individuals linked to terror plots more than three years after their return.
Conclusion
The situation in Ghana, a country that has so far remained relatively insulated from the direct impacts of foreign fighting, highlights the importance of preparedness. While Ghana has not been a major source of foreign fighters, perhaps due to inadequate data, the potential return of even a small number of these individuals could introduce new security risks. The recent reports of young men from Ghana being tricked into fighting in the Russian-Ukraine war underscore the need for vigilance. By understanding the dynamics of security contagion and learning from the experiences of other regions, Ghana can better prepare its law enforcement and intelligence agencies to handle the possible influx of returning fighters and mitigate related risks.
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