In 2024, several elections were held across Africa, reflecting a wide range of political landscapes, from presidential and legislative contests to local elections.
Ghana climaxed Africa’s busy year of elections with a generally peaceful, free and fair general elections in December 2024. This led to a seamless transition in early January 2025, from the incumbent government to the opposition party, which won both presidential and parliamentary polls. This democratic achievement of 32 years of uninterrupted democracy, thus, opened a fresh window of optimism for the African continent’s elections billed for this year. In this article, the Centre for Intelligence and Security Analysis (CISA Ghana) assess upcoming African elections in 2025 and how their credibility how otherwise will shape the continent’s democratic journey. Will these elections have integrity? Will the winners be the legitimate victors? Will the people’s will and choices be respected by those already at the helm of affairs? And will fairness, transparency, peace and justice win at the end of the day?
In contrast, with 20 elections that made 2024 a busy election year for Africa, only half that number of countries will be going to the polls this year. According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies the following countries will hold election this year; Togo (senatorial), Gabon (presidential and legislative), Malawi (presidential and legislative), Seychelles (presidential and legislative), Guinea (presidential and legislative), Cameroon (presidential), Cote d’Ivoire (presidential), Tanzania (presidential and legislative), Guinea-Bissau (presidential) and Central African Republic (presidential and legislative)
Togo will be heading to the polls on February 15, followed by Gabon in August, and then Malawi and Seychelles on September 16 and September 27, respectively. Guinea’s is scheduled for September and October. Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Tanzania are all having their elections in October. Guinea-Bissau’s legislative poll is billed for February and the presidential scheduled to take place between October and November. Central African Republic (CAR) will end the year with its polls in December.
Apart from the 10 countries named above, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies also lists five African countries that will be holding only legislative elections in 2025. They are: Comoros (January 12), Burundi (June 5), Equatorial Guinea (November), Egypt and Tunisia. A discussion of the key issues at country levels follows.
Togo
Togo is not holding presidential elections this year because the country’s National Assembly voted unanimously to amend the constitution with a provision that denies citizens the right to direct suffrage when it comes to the election or selection of a president. The constitutional amendment creates a President of the Council of Ministers (PCM), a 6-year renewable executive position without any term limit. The PCM is elected by the National Assembly.
The dominant party, Union pour la République (UNIR), in a one-sided legislative election held last year, elected President Faure Gnassingbé to be the first President of the Council of Ministers.
This means so far as UNIR dominates Togo’s legislature and barring any dissent against his leadership of the party, Mr Gnassingbé will become President of the Council of Ministers for life. This is akin to a one-party state with all executive powers in the hands of the leader of the prevailing party of the day. Togo’s February 2025 elections will introduce a new upper chamber to the country’s legislature. Two-thirds of the senatorial seats will be filled through elections by local authority representatives, while the remaining one-third will be directly appointed by the President of the council of ministers (PCM).
While his late father, Gnassingbé Eyadema used dictatorship to cement his hold on Togo for 38 years, his progeny has learned to use pseudo-democratic processes and procedures to achieve the same feat, and, thus, keep perpetuating the Gnassingbé dynasty, perhaps, until the last of them falls.
Gabon
After ousting his cousin, Ali Bongo on 30 August 2023 and collapsing the 56-year-old Bongo dynasty in Gabon, Brigadier General Brice Oligui Nguema, who once served as aide-de-camp to his uncle Omar Bongo until he died in 2009, has a stranglehold on Gabon’s transitional processes with him as Transition President. Additionally, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies says the coup leader has appointed loyalists to two-thirds of the Senate and National Assembly, named all 9 members of the Constitutional Court, and banned 200 political parties in the country.
He has also re-written the constitution to allow military personnel to stand for political office, removed the role of the prime minister, extended presidential terms to seven years, and abolished Gabon’s two-round electoral system, thus, lowering the threshold of popular support needed. From all indications, the late Omar Bongo’s nephew, it appears, is flattening all mountains and levelling all valleys to make his path to the presidency, a smooth-sailing one in any elections that would be held. But would he have legitimacy if he won the presidency? It remains to be seen as to how different he would be from the Bongos he toppled judging from his dictatorial posturing and power centralisation moves.
Cameroon
In Cameroon, 91-year-old Paul Biya, who has been president of the West African country since 1982, is all set to run for an eighth term. His party, Rassemblement démocratique du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC), removed the two-term constitutional limit on the presidency in 2008. The world’s oldest head of state and his party, in the past four decades, have had very tight control over all of Cameroon’s government institutions, including the electoral commission and judiciary. As a result, independent observers have often branded the country’s polls as fraudulent. Biya is also heavy-handed on the opposition. This makes any national election seem a foregone conclusion. Despite his failing health, Biya is determined to go the long haul, thus, making him the quintessential president for life on the continent.
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau was billed for elections in December 2024 but Umaro Sissoco Embalo postponed the polls to this year – a move challenged by the opposition who found it suspicious and unconstitutional. Embalo insists his current tenure ends in September this year despite observers arguing that it terminates on February 27. He has hinted at holding the election in November. The Africa Centre notes President Embalo has always been in favour of re-centralising power in the executive following the Lusophone country’s constitutional amendment aimed at enhancing the separation of powers among the various arms of government in the semi-presidential system the country runs.
After losing that fight in parliament due to the lack of a majority, Embalo, a former brigadier general in the army, chose to create his own shadow cabinet made up of former ministers and security officials with close ties to the army and police. He also targeted and dismissed the prime minister elected by parliament and also dissolved the legislature on two occasions alleging coup attempts. Currently, MPs cannot enter the National Assembly though parliament has officially resumed. Additionally, Embalo has banned all opposition party rallies and activities except those of his party and allies. All these anti-democratic and authoritarian moves by Embalo create an unhealthy political and security atmosphere in the country. Since gaining independence in 1973, Guinea Bissau has suffered four coups and experienced more than a dozen attempted coups.
For a country known to be a major cocaine transit hub in West Africa for Latin American drug cartels and ranked 158 out of 180 in the world on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, having a power-thirsty dictator entrench himself in power by tactically stifling and manipulating institutions of state bodes ill socio-economic consequences.
Perhaps, the active role of civil society organisations in the country coupled with a National Electoral Commission comprised of magistrates nominated from the Superior Council of the Judiciary and elected for a four-year term by parliament, could help ensure some level of transparency and legitimacy in the electoral process.
Central African Republic (CAR)
Typical of undemocratic leaders, President Faustin-Archange Touadera of the Central African Republic has removed constitutional term limits, weakened the rule of law, and is ever manoeuvring to concentrate authority in his hands. He has made the Constitutional Court a government-controlled council, allowing him to appoint additional judges to the Supreme Court. He has also extended the presidential term from five to seven years and voided the National Assembly’s role in overseeing mining contracts. He also removed the head of the Constitutional Court when she ruled that a proposed constitutional referendum was illegal. He has also created a media-unfriendly atmosphere in the country by suppressing freedom of speech and gagging opposition voices. Touadera’s close association with Russia, as a result of which the Kremlin has gained control over CAR’s gold, diamond and logging concessions, has been a cause for worry. In general, the atmosphere created by Touadera makes it difficult for a free and fair election to take place. Despite all that, the opposition parties remain determined and are offering alternatives to the people.
Guinea
After failing to hold elections in December 2024, Guinea’s Mamadi Doumbouya-led junta plans to do so this year. Even though all members of the transitional military authority have been barred from running in the elections, there are indications that Doumbouya would. His well-orchestrated constitutional referendum removed all obstacles in his way. The whole transitional process has been opaque. The junta has also been heavy-handed on opposition parties and just about anyone or group that criticises the prevailing authority. The Africa Centre mentions the arrest, detention and torturing of opposition leaders Oumar Sylla, Mamadou Billo Bah and Mohammed Cisse in 2024. In the same year, opposition leader Aliou Bah was abducted by soldiers, tried in a kangaroo court and sentenced to two years for “offending” Doumbouya. Additionally, popular rapper Djanii Alfa was arbitrarily arrested and subjected to harassment and trials. The crackdown has been intense and on all fronts. This is meant to pave the way for Doumbouya to be crowned with the presidency through a façade.
After 25 years of Ahmed Sekou Toure’s rule from 1958 to 1984 and the 24-year regime of Lansana Conte, it would be welcome news to have Guinea return to a democratic path following the ousting of the country’s first democratically elected president, Alpha Conde in September 2021.
Tanzania
While the elected President Samia Suluhu Hassan, brought some sense of relief to Tanzanians following the death of John Magufuli – a hardliner – her government has subsequently come under fire for backing the hard-line ideology of her predecessor. She has also been accused of intimidation, abduction and assassination of her critics.
Tanzania’s political climate took a sharp authoritarian turn in the latter half of 2024, marked by mass arrests, suspicious deaths, and suppression of opposition voices. In August, for instance, the Africa Centre says 500 supporters of the opposition party Chadema were arrested ahead of an International Youth Day rally. Among those detained were key opposition party leaders. The arrests reignited fears of security forces being weaponised to silence dissent.
Just a month later, Ali Mohamed Kibao, a member of Chadema’s secretariat, was abducted and found dead, bearing signs of severe abuse, including acid burns. President Samia Suluhu Hassan quickly condemned the killing, but the case fits a disturbing pattern. The Tanganyika Law Society has documented 83 cases of abductions and disappearances, fuelling public outrage and raising serious human rights concerns.
November’s local elections in 2024 provided little relief for Tanzania’s embattled opposition. Thousands of opposition candidates were disqualified, and by official counts, the ruling CCM party secured an improbable 99% of the seats. For context, opposition parties collectively garnered 45% of the votes in Tanzania’s 2015 legislative elections, underscoring the implausibility of the latest results. Tanzanian police added to the tension by arresting young voters, en masse during the elections.
The opposition did not take the results lying down. ACT-Wazalendo filed 51 lawsuits, pointing to glaring irregularities in voter registration, nomination processes, and the drafting of election regulations. But with proposed electoral reforms stalled and the CCM retaining control over the election commission, meaningful change remains elusive.
The media landscape has also come under fire. Three prominent online news outlets—The Citizen, Mwananchi, and Mwanaspoti—were suspended for 30 days after publishing cartoons critical of President Samia. The crackdown reflects a growing intolerance for dissenting voices, even as the administration faces mounting internal and external challenges.
President Samia’s leadership appears increasingly influenced by the resurgence of Magufuli-era hardliners within CCM. Viewed as an “outsider” within her own party, she seems to have aligned herself with these factions to consolidate her position, rather than confront their autocratic tendencies.
Tanzania’s democratic backslide has cast a long shadow over its political future, with opposition parties, civil society, and independent media bearing the brunt of the ruling party’s crackdown. As the country inches closer to the 2025 general elections, the outlook for a free and fair contest remains grim.
Cote d’Ivoire
Unlike the high level of predictability and obvious orchestration and choreography in the aforementioned elections, that of Ghana’s Western neighbour is a far outlier. If the incumbent president, Alassane Ouattara decides to run for a fourth term, as it is appearing, then the 83-year-old president is likely to face off with a raft of heavyweights including Simone Gbagbo, a former First Lady of Côte d’Ivoire and ex-wife of former President Laurent Gbagbo. Mr Ouattara and Mr Gbagbo have dominated Ivorian politics in the past two decades with some devastating consequences. The most recent crisis associated with these two big Ivorian politicians unfolded after the disputed 2010 election when then-President Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat to Alassane Ouattara. The standoff escalated into armed clashes that claimed nearly 3,000 lives before Ouattara took office in 2011 as the internationally recognised winner.
This crisis followed a civil war between 2002 and 2007, triggered by a power struggle after military leader Robert Guéï refused to step down despite losing the 2000 election to Gbagbo. The conflict widened ethnic divisions and left the nation deeply fractured. For decades, Gbagbo and Ouattara have been at the centre of Ivorian politics, with their rivalry often sparking fears of renewed violence. However, recent reconciliation efforts have sought to bridge the divide.
In 2021, Gbagbo, now 79, returned to Côte d’Ivoire after being acquitted by the International Criminal Court of charges related to the 2010-2011 violence. In a symbolic step toward healing, President Ouattara has extended Gbagbo the full privileges of a former head of state, signalling a willingness to move beyond the bitter divisions of the past.
Even though Laurent Gbagbo has expressed a wish to run again for the presidency, a jail sentence for looting the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) during the post-election crisis of 2011, bars him from doing so since he has not been amnestied even though Ouattara has pardoned him.
The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies notes that Ouattara could be replaced by potentials such as the President of the National Assembly Adama Bictogo or the governor of the autonomous district of Abidjan and a former minister of education, Cissé Bacongo, should the president opt out.
Other names that could be seen on the ballot paper include former Ivorian Prime Minister Pascal Affi N’Guessan who ran in 2015 and 2020; Tidjane Thiam, a former finance minister and former chief executive of Swiss bank Credit Suisse; Guillaume Soro, a former prime minister under Ouattara, who has been in exile since 2019 after he was convicted in absentia in Côte d’Ivoire for “undermining state security” and “handling misappropriated public funds.”
However, one critical threat to Cote d’Ivoire’s election could be external meddling by Russia, which has tried in the past to influence the country’s elections through disinformation. The Kremlin also has been accused of sponsoring certain political parties in Cote d’Ivoire as part of Putin’s efforts to gain a foothold in the country.
Seychelles
Seychelles is gearing up for a closely watched presidential election in 2025, with President Wavel Ramkalawan seeking a second term. Ramkalawan, leader of the Linyon Demokratik Seselwa (LDS) party and a former Anglican priest, made history in 2020 when he ended more than four decades of rule by the United Seychelles party and its predecessors. His victory, achieved on his sixth presidential attempt, marked a turning point for the 115-island archipelago nation of 122,000 people in the Western Indian Ocean.
The United Seychelles party, formerly known as the Seychelles People’s Progressive Front, had dominated the country’s political landscape since a 1977 coup led by Albert René, just one year after Seychelles gained independence from Britain. Although multiparty democracy was introduced in the early 1990s, United Seychelles maintained control of the presidency until 2020 and had majority in the National Assembly until 2016. With a per capita income of over $17,000, the highest in Africa, a free press, and independent institutions working in a democratic atmosphere without intimidation from the prevailing authority, the 2025 elections in this 115-island archipelago nation in the Western Indian Ocean are billed to entrench democracy rather than destroy it.
Malawi
Malawi’s incumbent, President Lazarus Chakwera, is seeking a second term. Chakwera, leader of the Malawi Congress Party, faces stiff competition from two former presidents — Peter Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Joyce Banda of the People’s Party (PP). Mutharika, now 84, served as president from 2014 to 2020 and was unseated by Chakwera in the landmark 2020 election. Banda, aged 74, led the country from 2012 to 2014 following the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika.
All three candidates bring significant political experience to the contest, but each also carries the weight of past controversies. Chakwera’s government has been criticised for failing to alleviate ongoing economic difficulties, including inflation and high unemployment. Mutharika’s tenure was marred by allegations of corruption and economic mismanagement, while Banda has faced similar scrutiny over her leadership during a period of financial instability.
As Malawi grapples with persistent economic woes, voters will be looking for credible solutions from the candidates, who must address both past grievances and the pressing need for recovery. The outcome of the election could signal a shift in public confidence or a reaffirmation of the country’s political status quo.
Conclusion
For any election to be deemed democratic so it confers legitimacy on the victor, it must be free, fair and transparent; have universal and equal suffrage, be conducted by independent electoral management body free of any government interference and intimidation. It should also take place in an environment of free media, free expression with equal access to media without violence or intimidation. These tenets are missing and completely absent in some of these ten African countries. Ab initio, the results are anybody’s guess.
In those countries where democratic traits prevail genuinely and not a mere façade, it is hard to predict the outcome. From a purely inductive point of reasoning, those who have shown dictatorial, authoritarian and undemocratic tendencies and are overseeing the processes of their countries’ elections with overbearing influence are more than likely to have their way. That will be a setback for Africa’s flagellant democracy. However, there is a glimmer of hope in the few who have determined not to let the thirst for power push them to manipulate elections for selfish gains.
