Introduction
The Cold War started an ideological binary that has persisted in the post-Cold War era (Joenniemi, 1993; Papadopoulos, Heslop, & Beracs, 1990). Socialist or non-Western states are still viewed as adversarial and their narratives framed as manipulative (Mazarr, Casey, & Demus, 2019). This framing simplifies the complex geopolitical realities as well as reinforces the idea of Western moral superiority. Over the last decades, Russia has been widely branded as a purveyor of misinformation, especially in Africa (See Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024; Nwonwu et a., 2024; Kilkenny, 2021; Grassegger, & Krogerus, 2017). Western governments as well as their media platforms have time and again pointed out Kremlin-backed disinformation campaigns ranging from online propaganda to state-controlled media operations (see US Department of State, 2024; Borshchevskaya, 2023 from the Washington Institute among others). Yet while these charges are not inconsiderable, a couple of fundamental questions spring from them: what exactly constitutes misinformation, and who will be setting the benchmark of truth? And doesn’t singling out Russia frame an existential geopolitics where the West maintains its posture as guardian of facts? This paper, therefore, argues that Africa needs to look critically at the narratives on misinformation with an understanding of the geopolitical interests that often shape them. By locating the framing of Russian disinformation within the broader context of Western influence as well as information manipulation, this paper calls for a balanced and independent African perspective on the issue.
Defining Misinformation: Whose Truth?
The concept of misinformation is nowhere near neutral. Its meaning as well as practice occur in rather specific ideological and political contexts which are narrow in scope (Adams et al.2023; Jerit & Zhao, 2020). Accusations of Russian disinformation rest on biased and Western notions of the truth. The Western media and government generally presented their version as factual, while the other ones, including alternative perspectives, are described as propaganda. The label of misinformation is one that is applied very selectively. Every time Russia comments on its relations or partnerships with Africa or criticizes Western intervention, it is promptly labeled propaganda. Yet, when the West makes pronouncements about their view on democracy, governance, or geopolitics, these are presented as fact, neutral and objective truth. Which begs the question, who determines what constitutes misinformation and based on what? Can the West, which has a long tradition of molding global narratives to suit its purposes, be an honest broker of misinformation?
This dynamic takes a very specific turn in the context of Africa. Western powers, through the dissemination of colonialist propaganda to the current narratives related to governance, security, and development, have traditionally controlled how information flows within the continent. Any accusations made against Russia are, thus, in need of attention within this historic context: is this being done to safeguard the sovereignty of the African states or has this become a part of a large scheme of influence in maintaining a multipolar world?
The Geopolitical Framing of Russia as the “Bad Guy”
Misinformation is conventionally defined as false or misleading information, but this definition depends extensively on who gets to determine “truth.” The global information channels are heavily dominated by the Western states, in a way that the narrative monopoly discredits the voices of dissent coming from other states, for instance, Russia and China. This power dynamic frames any other perspective as inherently suspect, regardless of its validity. Framing Russia as a singular threat to Africa’s information ecosystem risks the simplification of a complex global reality. Western accusations of Russian disinformation often depict the Kremlin as an aggressor undermining democratic values as well as stability in Africa. But such framing completely omits the long history of the West’s own disinformation practices to advance its geopolitics. From intelligence fabrication in the Iraq War to partial reporting on conflicts in Africa, Western nations have never been any different in peddling the narratives serving their strategic interests.
Equally, the assumption that all that is contributed from Russia, China, North Korea, and other socialist countries represents misinformation is a well-developed bias worldwide. The immediate naming of such tales from these nations as being fake forfeits any chances for proper consideration of the view presented by these countries. For instance, Russia’s engagement with Africa is reduced to “misinformation campaigns” without considering the agency of African actors in creating its partnerships or critical assessment of the content of Russian narratives. In this same way, Chinese investments in Africa are often framed as exploitative without sufficient consideration of Western policies that have equally undermined African autonomy.
Africa’s Information Sovereignty: Taking Narratives with a Grain of Salt
While Russia’s activities on the continent-from the Wagner Group to media manipulation-have rightly been the subject of widespread criticism, the same level of scrutiny is rarely applied to Western actors. The lack of equivalent critique implies a double standard whereby Western narratives are normalized and Russian ones pathologized. This binary framing denies Africa the agency to independently analyze as well as respond to various external influences.
Africa must approach the issue of misinformation with caution, recognizing that all external narratives, whether from Russia, the West, or other global power, are shaped by specific interests. The emphasis should be on building robust, independent information ecosystems that prioritize African perspectives and realities. Rather than uncritically accepting Western critiques of Russian disinformation, African nations should evaluate the credibility and motivations behind all foreign narratives.
To achieve this, African governments and institutions must invest in media literacy, promote local journalism, and foster diverse and independent media platforms. By empowering African voices and perspectives, the continent can resist becoming a battleground for competing foreign narratives. This approach not only strengthens Africa’s information sovereignty but also ensures that its citizens have access to a plurality of viewpoints.
Conclusion
The Russian misinformation discourse in Africa is deeply embedded in global power struggles. As much as Russia’s actions call for scrutiny, so do the narratives and motivations of its accusers. Africa needs to navigate these narratives critically and take them, as it were, with a pinch of salt. It will require creating an independent, self-determined information landscape resistant to the manipulative action of all third-party actors. Only then can Africa take ownership of its narratives and ensure that its stories are truly told with integrity and honesty.
Reference
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