Introduction
In the global politics chessboard, disinformation became the strong power tool for nations in pursuing interests that transcend conventional diplomacy and military strategies (Wilhelm, 2020; Colomina, 2022). To Russia, disinformation is both a shield and a sword: it cuts through world narratives and acts as a mantle for its geopolitical maneuvers (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2024; Zadorożna & Butuc, 2024; Grassegger & Krogerus, 2017). Today, such machinations increasingly place African countries and their peoples at the center, not as agents but as pawns in the game, exploited, manipulated, and sacrificed for a greater agenda. This essay looks into how Russia leverages disinformation in Africa, what that means for the continent’s sovereignty and governance, and the need for urgent action by African countries in fighting such external exploitation.
Disinformation as a Geopolitical Weapon
The purposeful dissemination of untrue stories as a means to manipulate public opinion has been a core part of Russia’s geopolitical plan for many years (Broda & Strömbäck, 2024; Sánchez del Vas & Tuñón Navarro, 2024). Propaganda as well as psychological warfare, born in the Soviet era, have given place to new digital technologies of today that power contemporary campaigns of disinformation (Verrier, 2023; Kilkenny, 2021). These have found fertile ground in Africa, tapping into the socio-economic vulnerabilities, historical grievances, and residual impacts of colonialism (Albrecht, Fournier-Tombs & Brubaker, 2024; Institute of Development Studies, 2024). Russia presents itself as a different model from Western domination and, through that, taps into popular dissatisfaction with the failures perceived in the policies of the West in the continent (Rumer, 2023).
This narrative is compounded by the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked paramilitary organization that not only conducts direct military interventions but also serves as a pro-Russian propaganda vehicle. On social media, through state-controlled news outlets like RT (formerly Russia Today) as well as clandestine operations, Russia concocts tales of itself as a liberator pitted against neo-colonial oppression. Such narratives evoke powerful resonances in countries rife with political instability, economic deprivation, and insecurity.
Africans as Pawns in Russia’s Geopolitical Game
The Kremlin has managed to develop a strong mechanism in spreading disinformation through the exploitation of African journalists. Poor remuneration in the media sector makes many journalists susceptible to monetary inducements (Ru, Xue, & Zhang, 2024; Ajaegbu et al., 2015). According to an investigation carried out by Forbidden Stories, Russian operatives in the Central African Republic financially rewarded local journalists to run propaganda supporting Russian military activities (Peruchon, 2024). This technique commonly exploits economic hardship through the offer of compensation well above local wages. Russia also offers guided tours for African journalists to conflict zones, including Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine (Nwonwu, Tukur, Alo, & Korenyuk, 2024). These trips were well planned to fit the narratives pushed by the Kremlin. For example, African journalists who toured Mariupol were chaperoned by Russian military personnel where their respective reports reflected a pro-Kremlin leaning. These narratives were then published in local languages, thus adding an air of authenticity and thereby increasing the reach of Russian propaganda exponentially.
In addition, Russia employs proxy agents who disguise themselves as freelance journalists or neutral actors to hide its involvement. A good case in point was the recent arrest of three Russians and a Belarusian in Chad for spreading propaganda associated with the Wagner Group (ADF staff, 2024). As Russian media tried to delegitimize the actions of Chad, the Chadian government defended its measures as necessary to protect its sovereignty and information ecosystem. These events reveal the Kremlin’s secret and a widespread strategy for influencing discourse across the continent.
Implications for African Sovereignty and Governance
These disinformation campaigns, as part of Russia’s operations, do not only undermine Western influence but also weaken the sovereignty of the continent. In aligning local elites, paramilitary groups, and occasionally even governments with Russian interests, such methods create dependencies that strip nations of their capacity for independent navigation through developmental and security challenges.
The Sahel region offers a strong example. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, for instance, the Wagner Group stepped into the security vacuums created by ineffective state institutions and the general decline in Western involvement. While these interventions are welcomed as an immediate solution to insurgencies as well as political instability, they also come with their long-term impacts. Russian-backed engagements are marked by allegations of human rights abuses, unfair contracts in addition to erosion of democratic institutions, which make the nations more fragile and less sovereign than before. This is particularly disturbing, as this replays the very exploitative relationships which African nations struggled to overcome at the time of their independence. Yet, by presenting itself as a counterbalance to neocolonialism, Russia ironically perpetuates the very dependency as well as external control it claims to stand against.
Beyond media manipulation, Russia employs proxy networks like the Wagner Group to execute disinformation campaigns in Africa. A 2024 report by the U.S. Department of State detailed the way Wagner works in places like Mali, Sudan, and the CAR under various guises of security or economic cooperation. These actions go along with effective propaganda to give legitimacy to Wagner’s presence, thus weakening democratic institutions in the process. This disinformation strategy of the Wagner Group is part of a more general system of resource exploitation for deeper Russian influence on the continent.
Press Freedom Erosion and Its Role in Disinformation
Russia’s disinformation campaigns thrive in environments where freedom of the press is hindered. Junta-led nations in the Sahel, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, have systematically prevented access to independent journalism. These governments, many of which have formed alliances with Russia have suspended critical Western media outlets, creating a vacuum that is filled by Russian-backed narratives. In countries like Burkina Faso, for instance, governments ban major French media and significantly restrict the activities of local journalists. In Mali, a suspension of French radio broadcasts by RFI and France 24, among others, means there is limited diverse reporting of news. This suppression of press freedoms enables Russian state-backed media platforms to have unparalleled visibility in the information environment as well as giving citizens little choice but to take disinformation for fact.
Conclusion
In the chess game of global politics, Africa is being used as a pawn in Russia’s disinformation strategy, a strikingly stark reminder of how vulnerable this continent can be to manipulation from others. But such is not necessarily Africa’s destiny. By recognizing these strategies, investing in resilience, and exercising agency, African countries can turn from pawns into players in their own right in shaping their own narratives and securing their futures. The game is far from over; the next moves will tell if Africa emerges a winner or continues to be a battleground of contending powers.
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