West Africa has experienced a surge in violence in recent years, grappling with an array of security concerns. Persistent terrorist activities, recent military coups, and ongoing political instability have created a volatile environment. Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram have entrenched themselves, carrying out regular attacks and expanding their influence. Despite regional initiatives such as the G5 Sahel Joint Force and international interventions like France’s Operation Barkhane and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), combating these threats remains challenging. This phenomenon has significantly affected countries in the region—namely, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Mauritania.
Terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa remain largely homegrown and driven by local dynamics, although foreign actors may have provided doctrinal influence, financial support, and training. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2024, the epicentre of terrorism has shifted from the Middle East and North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa, concentrated largely in the Sahel region. This region now accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally. Burkina Faso became the country with the highest impact from terrorism for the first time, with deaths from terrorism increasing by 68 per cent to 1,907. A quarter of all terrorism deaths occurring globally were in Burkina Faso.
West Africa has experienced more than twice as many attempts (successful and unsuccessful) at unconstitutional changes of government (including military coups) in the past decades as any other subregion on the continent. Frequent leadership changes create power vacuums, allowing terrorist groups to exploit the ensuing chaos and expand their operations. Military takeovers often divert resources and attention away from counterterrorism efforts, leading to deteriorating security conditions. Coups erode public trust in democratic processes, fostering further political instability. This cycle of instability undermines regional development, exacerbates humanitarian crises, and poses more threats to the region. Burkina Faso faced coups in 2015 and 2022, Mali experienced coups in 2020 and 2021, and Niger experienced a coup in 2023.
The 15-nation regional bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 to promote economic trade, cooperation, and self-reliance. It has since grown to become the region’s top political authority, often collaborating with states to solve domestic challenges on various fronts from politics to the economy and security. Recent attempts by ECOWAS to restore democratic governance to the coup-hit countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger resulted in the three countries announcing their immediate withdrawal from ECOWAS on January 27, 2024, further complicating the situation in the region.
Why Are Junta-Led West African Countries Gravitating Towards Russia and Cutting Ties with Old Allies?
In recent years, Russia has emerged as the preferred security ally for some countries in West Africa, particularly the junta-led countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), replacing traditional allies such as France and the United States.
Experts attribute this shift to long-standing dissatisfaction with Western interventions and African countries’ simmering resentment over a lack of representation in international institutions, as well as other reasons.
1. Anti-Colonial Sentiment
The legacy of colonialism continues to shape the political and social environment in West African countries, especially in their relationships with France and, to a lesser extent, the United States. There is lingering resentment towards France due to its history as a colonial power, which some African countries believe still exerts a neo-colonial influence through economic and political interventions. This resentment is rooted in the historical exploitation and oppression experienced during colonial rule, which has left deep scars and a desire to assert national sovereignty and independence. Additionally, both France and the United States are often perceived as meddling in the internal affairs of these nations, particularly regarding governance and human rights issues. In August 2022, Mali accused France of violating its airspace and delivering weapons to armed groups. In a letter to the head of the United Nations Security Council dated August 15, 2022, Mali’s foreign affairs minister, Abdoulaye Diop, said the country’s airspace had been breached more than 50 times during the year, mostly by French forces using drones, military helicopters, and fighter jets. He also accused France of using Malian airspace to collect information for terrorist groups operating in the Sahel and to drop arms and ammunition to them. This perceived interference is seen as paternalistic and undermining the autonomy of the countries involved, leading to a strong desire to break away from these old ties.
2. Military Support
Unlike the United States and France, which often attach political and moral stipulations to their military aid, Russia has adopted a strategy of non-interference in domestic affairs, providing food, security, and weapons without the familiar Western preconditions.
Since the coups struck, Russia has in recent times provided military support to Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, often through private military companies such as the Wagner Group. This support comes with fewer strings attached compared to assistance from Western allies, which typically impose conditions related to democratic governance. Security assistance from Russia is without political interference, making it an appealing ally for countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, which are currently governed by military juntas that have seized political power in recent years. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso military governments have turned to Russia for military support amidst escalating violence from jihadist groups.
The country’s leaders have sought the services of the Wagner Group to bolster their military capabilities after ousting hundreds of French troops. Reports indicate that Wagner mercenaries have been deployed to assist Burkinabe forces in combat operations, providing training, strategic planning, and direct engagement with insurgents. Since January 2024, a shipment of Russian arms and a team of 100 paramilitary fighters have arrived in the country, with additional troops expected. This partnership has been particularly appealing to Burkina Faso’s government because it allows them to take immediate action against threats without the lengthy negotiations and conditions often tied to Western aid. Mali has also sought Russian military assistance through the Wagner Group.
Following the 2020 and 2021 coups, Mali signed a security agreement with Russia in November 2022, leading to the deployment of Wagner mercenaries. These mercenaries have been involved in various operations, including training Malian soldiers and participating in joint missions against extremist groups. The Wagner Group’s involvement in Mali has been controversial, as their presence has coincided with allegations of human rights abuses.
However, the Malian government values the direct and robust support provided by Wagner over the more conditional and scrutinised assistance from France. On April 12, 2024, Russian military instructors arrived in Niger with air defence systems following an agreement between Niger’s military government and Russia in January 2024 to step up security cooperation between the two countries to combat jihadist groups in the Sahel. By the end of 2023, Niger’s military junta had expelled 1,500 French troops. In March 2024, Niger declared its intention to terminate a 2012 agreement with the United States, which includes an already established drone base worth $100 million in Northern Niger.
3. Economic Aid and Sanctions Relief
Aligning with Russia offers Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali alternative economic opportunities beyond Western dependencies. Mali, for instance, wants to boost its lithium and uranium production capabilities in the southern parts. There are large lithium and uranium deposits in the southern and western areas of the country. However, Mali does not have the infrastructure to extract and process these deposits and relies on foreign companies to develop these projects. The Malian junta emphasized lithium production as a key economic target in 2024. According to The Institute for the Study of War, a Canadian company is financing a mineral exploration project for uranium and other minerals in southern Mali that has included exploratory drilling but is not building infrastructure except for the site’s camp. Al Qaeda–linked insurgents have also escalated activity near these areas since 2022, which threatens mineral exploration and provides a potential justification for Wagner to operate in the area to protect both Russian and Malian interests.
Aligning with Russia provides Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali with alternatives to Western financial and economic systems, helping to mitigate the impact of sanctions imposed by the US and France after the coups. Sanctions often target military aid, making it difficult for sanctioned countries to maintain their security apparatus. Russian military support, including the supply of arms and training, helps these regimes rely less on Western military aid, which may be restricted due to sanctions. For example, Mali has directly used tax revenue from gold mining to finance Wagner mercenaries, underscoring how this revenue boost helps fund the junta’s defense budget. By partnering with Russia, these countries gain access to new markets for their exports, reducing their reliance on Western economies and former allies. This diversification helps them to maintain economic stability even when facing harsh Western sanctions.
Why Is Russia Interested in These African Countries?
Russia’s stepped-up engagement across Africa is driven by the interaction of three sets of factors: status aspirations, the quest for geopolitical influence, and economic interests.
By expanding its influence in Africa, Russia seeks to project power beyond its traditional spheres of influence. This allows Russia to showcase its military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities, positioning itself as a key player on the international stage.
Russia aims to create strategic alliances and gain access to key regions that can serve as footholds for expanding its global influence. This includes securing military bases and engaging in security cooperation.
Africa’s vast natural resources, including minerals, oil, and gas reserves, provide attractive economic opportunities for Russia. Wagner Group reportedly secures valuable natural resources in each country it operates, using them not only to cover expenses but also to generate substantial revenue.
According to a report by Blood Gold, Russia has extracted approximately $2.5 billion (£2 billion) worth of gold from Africa over the past two years. This revenue is believed to have contributed to funding Russia’s military operations in Ukraine. In Mali, for instance, Russian fighters, formerly associated with Wagner mercenaries, assumed control of Mali’s Intahaka gold mine, located near the Burkina Faso border, in February this year. The artisanal mine, which is the largest in northern Mali, has been disputed among several armed groups operating in the region for several years.
Conclusion Africa’s abundant natural resources, including minerals, oil, and gas reserves, present lucrative economic opportunities for Russia. Expanding its presence in Africa allows Russia to access these resources and establish trade partnerships outside the Western sphere of influence. Additionally, Russia’s growing influence in Africa provides a strategic means to indirectly put pressure on the West. The Wagner Group’s involvement in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali may have short-term motives to support local rebels, but the long-term objective for Russia is to establish a significant proxy military presence. This presence would enable Russia to maintain a full west-to-east presence in Africa, challenging US-EU strategic interests in the region. The three West African states with close ties to Wagner—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—have all experienced military takeovers in recent years. Subsequently, they announced their withdrawal from the regional bloc ECOWAS and the formation of their own “Alliance of Sahel States” in September last year.
