{"id":6859,"date":"2026-04-16T00:08:20","date_gmt":"2026-04-16T00:08:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/?p=6859"},"modified":"2026-04-16T05:57:22","modified_gmt":"2026-04-16T05:57:22","slug":"drones-ai-and-the-new-face-of-terrorism-in-the-sahel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/drones-ai-and-the-new-face-of-terrorism-in-the-sahel\/","title":{"rendered":"Drones, Ai And The New Face Of Terrorism In The Sahel"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Sahel the semi-arid belt stretching from Senegal to Sudan has become, by virtually every measurable indicator, the global epicenter of terrorism. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) published by the Institute for Economics and Peace, the Sahel alone accounts for 19 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide and an extraordinary 51 percent of all global terrorism-related fatalities (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2025). Yet even as international attention grapples with these headline statistics, a more consequential transformation is unfolding beneath them. The systematic integration of commercially available drones and artificial intelligence tools into the operational repertoire of jihadist groups operating across West Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This development represents a qualitative not merely quantitative shift in the threat landscape. Armed groups are no longer dependent on large numbers of fighters or suicide bombers to achieve tactical objectives. Instead, they are leveraging inexpensive, widely available technologies to conduct surveillance, execute coordinated strikes, and project power far beyond their traditional operational boundaries. Understanding this evolution is no longer optional for security practitioners and policymakers; it is an imperative. “The weaponisation of civilian drones represents a shift in asymmetric tactics as armed groups circumvent the conventional military superiority of the region’s armed forces.” Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 2025<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Drone Revolution: From Surveillance to Strike<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by non-state armed groups in Africa has accelerated dramatically since 2023. A landmark 2025 ACLED report documented that 469 armed groups globally had deployed a drone at least once in a five-year window up from a mere 10 groups in 2020 (ACLED, 2025). In the Sahel specifically, the trend is being led by Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliated coalition primarily operating in Mali and Burkina Faso.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

JNIM’s first confirmed drone activity occurred in September 2023 in Bandiagara, Mali. Since then, its integration of the technology has been rapid and purposeful. Between 2023 and 2025, ACLED recorded JNIM deploying drones in at least 89 distinct incidents, 69 of which involved direct attacks (ACLED, 2025). Of particular significance is the group’s adoption of first-person view (FPV) drones. These are small, agile platforms originally designed for recreational racing adapted to deliver improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In February 2025, JNIM deployed FPV drones in Djibo, Burkina Faso, attaching plastic-bottle IEDs to strike military positions with precision that previously required human bombers (ISS Africa, 2025). By May 2025, a UN monitoring report noted that JNIM had “reached a new level of operational capability to conduct complex attacks with drones” (United Nations Security Council Monitoring Team, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), operating primarily in the Lake Chad Basin, has conducted at least 10 confirmed armed drone deployments between 2024 and 2026, including using surveillance drones to guide ambushes on Nigerian military convoys (ACLED, 2025). The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) in northern Mali conducted 28 drone attacks between 2024 and 2025, including the downing of a Malian military helicopter in the Tessalit region in July 2024 (Military Africa, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Ai Dimension: Intelligence, Propaganda, And Planning<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Beyond the hardware, analysts have flagged the growing role of artificial intelligence tools in supporting terrorist operations. The Soufan Center’s 2025 mid-year assessment noted that terrorist groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are leveraging AI to facilitate propaganda production and freeing up human capacity for operational planning. The Center further warned that it “will soon be the rule, not the exception, that terrorists use emerging technologies in one or multiple aspects of the attack planning cycle” (Soufan Center, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Sahel context, offline AI tools have been identified as a component of JNIM’s evolving drone programme. Commercial AI-assisted navigation and targeting systems are enabling drones to avoid standard jamming and detection protocols. JNIM’s preferred platform, the DJI M30T a high-end quadcopter with thermal imaging capability provides the group with sophisticated night-time surveillance capacity at commercially accessible price points (Al Jazeera, 2026). The barrier to sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations has effectively collapsed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A critical feature of the evolving threat is JNIM’s use of drone footage not only for operational planning but for psychological warfare. The group has systematically mimicked state military strike footage in its propaganda, broadcasting its drone attacks to contest state airpower narratives and signal dominance to rival armed groups (Milnes & Lyammouri, 2025). This dual operational and psychological use amplifies the impact of each drone deployment well beyond its immediate physical damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lethality, Geography, and The Contagion Risk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A nuanced assessment of JNIM’s threat trajectory requires moving beyond casualty counts. While Africa’s terrorism fatality count showed a modest decline in 2025, lethality per incident increased sharply from 10.5 deaths per military incident in 2024 to 18.9 in 2025 as JNIM shifted toward fewer but more concentrated strikes (Africa Terrorism Index, 2026). The group’s October 2025 assault between Djibo and Namsiguia killed over 120 soldiers, making it the deadliest single terrorist attack globally that year (Africa Terrorism Index, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Geographically, the contagion is unmistakable. JNIM attacks have been confirmed across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Togo, with JNIM suspected of launching the first-ever suicide drone strike on a Togolese military post in Djignandjoaga on 9 April 2025 (Africa Defense Forum, 2025). ACLED’s May 2025 briefing described this geographic expansion as evidence of the group’s “expanding operational reach, tactical innovation and strategic intent in the littoral states of West Africa” (ACLED, 2025). Eleven African countries including Burkina Faso, DRC, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and Togo have now experienced drone attacks by non-state actors (Africa Defense Forum, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

ISWAP recorded 92 attacks and 384 deaths in Nigeria alone in 2025 a 360 percent increase in attack frequency from the prior year. (Africa Terrorism Index, 2026)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Counter-Drone Responses: Gaps and Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regional responses to the drone threat remain critically underdeveloped. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger lack the capacity to monitor their borders effectively, let alone detect small, low-flying commercial drones (ISS Africa, 2025). Existing counter-drone systems relying on GPS jamming and radar detection are largely ineffective against the small, low-altitude, fast-moving platforms being deployed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A strategic counter-drone framework for the Sahel must be multi-layered. At the technical level, states and their partners must invest in comprehensive sensor networks combining long and short-range radars, optical systems, acoustic sensors, and GPS tracking. Technology manufacturers should prioritise the development of early warning systems calibrated to the Sahel’s specific terrain and threat actors. At the regulatory level, the ISS has recommended drawing on the Wassenaar Arrangement which governs export controls on dual-use technologies to establish regional frameworks for monitoring and regulating the sale of commercial drones across the region (ISS Africa, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the strategic level, however, no technical fix can substitute for coordinated intelligence sharing. A proposed multi-stakeholder task force involving Sahelian military planners, counterterrorism specialists, and AI\/drone warfare experts has been recommended to conduct red-team exercises simulating JNIM’s evolving tactics (Milnes & Lyammouri, 2025). Crucially, these recommendations presuppose the existence of functioning cooperative frameworks between ECOWAS and AES states the very cooperation that is currently most at risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The weaponisation of commercial drones and AI tools by jihadist groups in the Sahel is not a future threat. It is a present operational reality. The technological barrier to sophisticated asymmetric warfare has been effectively removed, and the region’s states have not yet adapted their doctrine, capabilities, or cooperative frameworks to match. The lesson is sobering: as the skies above the Sahel become contested terrain, the window for coordinated, pre-emptive technological and institutional response is narrowing rapidly. The question is no longer whether these technologies will reshape conflict in the Sahel, but whether states can adapt and develop before the advantage decisively shifts.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.  <\/strong>ACLED (2025). Drone Use by Armed Groups Annual Dataset. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. Retrieved from acleddata.com<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.  <\/strong>Africa Defense Forum (2025, August 12). Cheap Drones Multiply Terrorist Threats in Sahel. Africa Defense Forum Magazine.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.  <\/strong>Africa Terrorism Index (2026, March 25). Africa Security Crisis Data Analysis. Ujasusi Blog \/ Terrorism Monitoring Desk.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

4.  <\/strong>Al Jazeera (2026, February 11). Are Drones, AI Making it Harder to Fight Armed Groups in the Sahel? Al Jazeera News.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

5.  <\/strong>Institute for Economics and Peace (2025). Global Terrorism Index 2025. IEP, Sydney.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

6.  <\/strong>ISS Africa (2025). Sahel Militants Turn Civilian Drones into Deadly Weapons. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

7.  <\/strong>Milnes, N. & Lyammouri, R. (2025). Countering JNIM’s Drone Warfare in the Sahel. Policy Paper PP 24\/25. Policy Center for the New South (PCNS), Rabat.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

8.  <\/strong>Soufan Center (2025, July 11). Assessment of the Global Terrorism Threat Landscape in Mid-2025. The Soufan Center, New York.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

9.  <\/strong>UN Security Council Monitoring Team (2025). Report on ISIL\/Da’esh and Associated Groups. United Nations, New York.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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