Around much of the world, coups have become increasingly rare, with their occurrence now standing out as exceptional rather than routine. For instance, in South America, the dramatic events of 26 June 2024 in Bolivia \u2014 when President Luis Arce swiftly thwarted an attempted coup after troops and tanks stormed the presidential palace \u2014 underscored how such disruptions are now met with swift resistance and broad international condemnation (Al Jazeera, 2024). In Asia, the last widely recognised successful military takeover occurred in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, when the Tatmadaw seized power and plunged the country into a prolonged and brutal conflict (Britannica, 2021). Europe\u2019s most cited modern example remains the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine, interpreted by many as a revolution but framed by its opponents as a coup, nonetheless marking the last time a sitting government on the continent was forcibly ousted (Revolution of Dignity, 2014). North America has seen even fewer such ruptures, with Haiti\u2019s 1994 U.S.-backed removal of a military regime standing as the region\u2019s last widely recognised successful coup (Haiti Crisis, 1994).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Taken together, these cases illustrate a global pattern: coups outside Africa have become infrequent, often short-lived, and broadly delegitimised. Yet on the African continent, the trend runs in the opposite direction. While the rest of the world moves toward political stabilisation, Africa has witnessed a troubling resurgence of military takeovers \u2014 raising urgent questions about governance, security, and the future of democratic rule on the continent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In early December 2025, Benin became the latest state to confront this reality when a coup attempt by army mutineers was foiled on 7 December. According to an ECOWAS emergency communiqu\u00e9 (ECOWAS, 2025), the regional bloc ordered the deployment of rapid-response troops from Nigeria, Sierra Leone, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire and Ghana, with Nigerian fighter jets providing air support \u201cto preserve constitutional order and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Benin.\u201d President Patrice Talon publicly denounced the attempt, calling it an assault on the stability the country has sought to maintain since the early 1990s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
France also played a major role in foiling the coup, as reported by DW and France24. Acting on the initiative of President Emmanuel Macron, the French coordinated with West African leaders and, at the request of the Beninese government, provided surveillance, observation, intelligence, and logistical support to the Benin armed forces, while Mr. Macron led a regional coordination effort to help loyalist forces regain control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Benin\u2019s post-independence history\u2014marked by multiple coups and the long Marxist-Leninist rule of Mathieu K\u00e9r\u00e9kou\u2014remains an important backdrop. While Benin has been considered politically stable since 1991 (International Crisis Group, 2023), recent developments suggest growing institutional strain. In January, two close associates of Talon were sentenced to 20 years in prison over an alleged 2024 coup plot, and in late 2025 lawmakers extended presidential terms from five to seven years while maintaining the two-term limit (Benin National Assembly Proceedings, 2025). Governance analysts note that such moves often heighten elite tensions (ISS Africa, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Guinea-Bissau: A \u201cSimulated Coup\u201d or Another Military Intervention?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Events in Guinea-Bissau deepened regional unease. On 26 November 2025\u2014one day before the electoral commission was due to release the 23 November presidential results\u2014the military announced it had detained President Umaro Sissoco Embal\u00f3, alleging it had foiled a destabilisation plot. The army suspended the release of results and halted the electoral process (Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces Statement, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Senegalese Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko and former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan characterised the incident as \u201cstaged\u201d and \u201cceremonial\u201d (West African Elders Forum Briefing, 2025). Jonathan questioned why Embal\u00f3 himself first announced his overthrow during a live phone call to France 24, a departure from typical coup dynamics in the region. Local civil society organisations echoed suspicions, accusing Embal\u00f3\u2014who has previously faced criticism for using crises to consolidate power\u2014of engineering a \u201csimulated coup\u201d to pre-empt unfavourable election results (Civil Society Platform of Guinea-Bissau, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Guinea-Bissau\u2019s history lends weight to such interpretations. Since 1980, the country has experienced repeated coups, failed putsch attempts, civil war, and the assassinations of senior political and military figures (UN Panel of Experts Report on Guinea-Bissau, 2020). Scholars identify the state as a classic case of entrenched praetorianism, where the military acts as the ultimate arbiter of political transitions (Chatham House, 2022).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Madagascar and the Widening \u201cCoup Belt\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Madagascar’s military takeover between 12 and 14 October 2025, which ousted President Andry Rajoelina, further extended what analysts term Africa\u2019s modern \u201ccoup belt\u201d\u2014a continuous chain of states stretching across West Africa, the Sahel and Central Africa (ISS Africa, 2024). Apart from Madagascar, Benin and Guinea-Bissau, other African countries, such as Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Gabon have all undergone military or military-backed power seizures or attempts since 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Sahel remains the epicentre of this resurgence. Juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger cite escalating jihadist violence, pervasive insecurity and failures of elected governments as justification for military rule (UN Security Council Sahel Briefing, 2024). Analysts consistently note that public frustration with deteriorating security conditions has created fertile ground for military interventions (International Crisis Group, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The French Factor: Neocolonial Grievances and Foreign Realignment<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A common thread linking many recent coups is backlash against French influence. Countries such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad inherited political and economic structures deeply shaped by France, including the CFA franc monetary system and post-independence defence arrangements that enabled French troop deployments for decades (Brookings Africa Security Report, 2023). What once appeared to many as stabilising partnerships has, for younger populations, become a symbol of neocolonial entrenchment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anti-French protests, expulsions of French forces, and public denunciations of Paris reflect broader demands for sovereignty and economic autonomy (Sahel Social Movements Study, 2024). Many juntas have reoriented outwardly\u2014toward Russia, the Wagner Group, and increasingly Turkey\u2014while downgrading relations with France and its allies (EU External Action Service Sahel Report, 2024). This geopolitical reconfiguration has even intersected with the Russia\u2013Ukraine war, with Ukrainian support for opposition groups in some Sahelian countries contributing to proxy contestation on the continent (NATO Strategic Review, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Francophone Concentration of Coups<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Aside from Guinea-Bissau and Sudan, nearly all states experiencing coups since 2020 are Francophone. Political historians attribute this partly to the administrative structures France left behind\u2014centralised governance, politicised militaries, and long-standing security dependencies that have complicated democratic consolidation (Centre for African Studies, 2023). Guinea-Bissau, though Lusophone, is linguistically and institutionally tied to the Francophone sphere through its membership in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF). Sudan\u2019s association with the former French Soudan region further underscores the fluidity of these colonial legacies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n AES \u201cSpring\u201d: Revolutionary Template or Authoritarian Wave?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)\u2014comprising Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso\u2014signals an ideological consolidation around anti-French sentiment and military-led governance. Analysts argue that AES seeks to project itself as an alternative centre of gravity to ECOWAS (Sahel Political Transitions Review, 2025). Because all AES members are under junta rule, it is plausible that future aspirants would also be military-led, reinforcing the bloc\u2019s revolutionary rhetoric.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For many young Africans disillusioned with governance failures, figures such as Burkina Faso\u2019s Captain Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 have become symbols of dignity, resistance and anti-colonial revival (African Youth Political Sentiment Survey, 2025). Yet scholars warn that the rise of this narrative also offers cover for opportunistic military actors who may exploit popular anti-colonial sentiment for personal power (ISS Africa Governance Watch, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The resurgence of coups across Africa, particularly in Francophone West Africa and the Sahel, reflects a confluence of historical grievances, governance failures, geopolitical realignment and public frustration. While some actors frame coups as tools of liberation from entrenched neocolonial influence, others appear to weaponise this discourse for factional or personal gain. As the continent navigates this turbulent era, the challenge lies in distinguishing genuine pathways toward sovereignty and renewal from opportunistic power seizures masked as revolutionary reform. One thing that remains clear and uncontestable is that France\u2019s neocolonial<\/em> hold on Francophone West Africa weakens with each successful coup in the region. This is why Macron had to intervene in the Benin situation to salvage whatever influence France still has and preserve any remaining foothold for continued exploitation of the region. It is as though Francophone West Africa, through these coups, is shedding its French skin and identity in a tortuous attempt to find its true self and cut the African oxygen pipeline that has been keeping France alive. These countries appear to have found coups as the only vortex to escape the decades-old exploitative power and influence of France. Though a coup per se is condemnable, these Francophone West African countries see it as a lesser evil that serves as a conduit to their freedom from a greater evil \u2013 France. To them, the end justifies the means and, so, there is no backing down until the purge is done.<\/p>\n\n\n\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Al Jazeera. (2024). Bolivia president says coup attempt thwarted after troops storm palace.<\/em> ECOWAS. (2025). Emergency Communiqu\u00e9 on the 7 December Coup Attempt in Benin.<\/em> Guinea-Bissau Armed Forces Statement. (2025). Statement on the Foiled Destabilisation Plot.<\/em> ISS Africa. (2024). The Expanding Coup Belt in Africa.<\/em> Brookings Africa Security Report. (2023). France\u2019s Post-Colonial Influence in Francophone Africa.<\/em> Centre for African Studies. (2023). Francophone Administrative Legacies and Coup Dynamics.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Sahel Political Transitions Review. (2025). The Alliance of Sahel States and Regional Power Reconfiguration.<\/em> Around much of the world, coups have become increasingly rare, with their occurrence now standing out as exceptional rather than routine. For instance, in South America, the dramatic events of 26 June 2024 in Bolivia \u2014 when President Luis Arce swiftly thwarted an attempted coup after troops and tanks stormed the presidential palace \u2014 underscored […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6437,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"subtitle":"","format":"standard","video":"","gallery":"","source_name":"CISA ANALYST","source_url":"cisanewsletter.com","via_name":"","via_url":"","override_template":"0","override":[{"template":"1","single_blog_custom":"","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"home","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"topbottom","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_share_counter":"0","show_view_counter":"0","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"0","show_post_author":"0","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"0","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"1","show_popup_post":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"0","show_inline_post_related":"0"}],"override_image_size":"0","image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post":"0","trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post":"0","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","sponsored_post_name":"","sponsored_post_url":"","sponsored_post_logo_enable":"0","sponsored_post_logo":"","sponsored_post_desc":"","disable_ad":"0"},"jnews_primary_category":{"id":""},"jnews_social_meta":{"fb_title":"","fb_description":"","fb_image":"","twitter_title":"","twitter_description":"","twitter_image":""},"jnews_review":[],"enable_review":"0","type":"percentage","name":"","summary":"","brand":"","sku":"","good":[{"good_text":""}],"bad":[{"bad_text":""}],"score_override":"","override_value":"","rating":[{"rating_text":"","rating_number":"10"}],"price":[{"shop":"","price":"","link":"","icon":""}],"jnews_override_counter":{"override_view_counter":"0","view_counter_number":"0","override_share_counter":"0","share_counter_number":"0","override_like_counter":"0","like_counter_number":"0","override_dislike_counter":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"jnews_post_split":{"enable_post_split":"0","post_split":[{"template":"1","tag":"h2","numbering":"asc","mode":"normal","first":"0","enable_toc":"0","toc_type":"normal"}]},"footnotes":""},"categories":[183],"tags":[266,265,272],"class_list":["post-6428","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysts","tag-1st-edition-2026","tag-265","tag-jan-week2"],"yoast_head":"\n
Britannica. (2021). Myanmar military seizes power in February coup.<\/em>
Revolution of Dignity. (2014). Ukraine\u2019s Euromaidan and the fall of the Yanukovych government.<\/em>
Haiti Crisis. (1994). U.S.-backed restoration of constitutional order in Haiti.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
International Crisis Group. (2023). Benin: Trends in Democratic Stability.<\/em>
Benin National Assembly Proceedings. (2025). Legislative Amendments on Presidential Term Extension.<\/em>
ISS Africa. (2025). Elite Tensions and Constitutional Reform in Benin.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
West African Elders Forum Briefing. (2025). Political Developments in Guinea-Bissau.<\/em>
Civil Society Platform of Guinea-Bissau. (2025). Civil Society Response to the 26 November Events.<\/em>
UN Panel of Experts Report on Guinea-Bissau. (2020). Assessment of Political Instability and Illicit Networks.<\/em>
Chatham House. (2022). Praetorianism and Political Transitions in Guinea-Bissau.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
UN Security Council Sahel Briefing. (2024). Security Developments and Governance Failures in the Sahel.<\/em>
International Crisis Group. (2024). Public Sentiment and Military Interventions in the Sahel.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sahel Social Movements Study. (2024). Drivers of Anti-French Sentiment in the Sahel.<\/em>
EU External Action Service Sahel Report. (2024). Geopolitical Alignments of Sahelian States.<\/em>
NATO Strategic Review. (2024). Proxy Dynamics of the Russia\u2013Ukraine Conflict in Africa.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n
African Youth Political Sentiment Survey. (2025). Perceptions of Anti-Colonial Leaders Among African Youth.<\/em>
ISS Africa Governance Watch. (2025). Risks of Authoritarian Drift in Post-Coup Regimes.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"