{"id":5555,"date":"2025-07-25T00:05:27","date_gmt":"2025-07-25T00:05:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/?p=5555"},"modified":"2025-07-01T07:19:17","modified_gmt":"2025-07-01T07:19:17","slug":"leveraging-traditional-leadership-for-national-security-a-community-centred-approach-to-counter-violent-extremism-in-ghana","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/leveraging-traditional-leadership-for-national-security-a-community-centred-approach-to-counter-violent-extremism-in-ghana\/","title":{"rendered":"Leveraging Traditional Leadership for National Security: A Community-Centred Approach to Counter Violent Extremism in Ghana"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The persistent and growing strength of violent extremist organisations in the Sahel threatens to worsen the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa, posing significant security and risks to the coastal countries of West Africa \u2013 Benin, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, The Gambia and Senegal. The continuing collapse of international counterterrorism support, as well as weakening leadership in regional efforts, has created a vacuum in which violent extremism can expand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Organisations including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Boko Haram, Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), and others have already taken advantage of that vacuum, using countries in the region as platforms to launch indiscriminate attacks on government forces and civilians alike. The possible convergence of security threats, including increased cooperation among terrorist organisations, and between terrorist and criminal organisations, could intensify the danger those groups pose in the region and beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A spike in militant Islamist group attacks in coastal West Africa is validating long-held fears that unmitigated extremist violence in the Sahel will spill over into its neighbours. The border areas of Ghana, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, and Mauritania are all facing greater strains from various militant groups attempting to enflame tensions within and between communities as a means of gaining access and influence. The annual number of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in and within 50 km of the borders of the Sahel\u2019s coastal West African neighbours keeps on increasing. With Togo and Benin facing significant attacks in their northern regions especially around the WAP (W, Arli and Pendjari) reserve parks serving as a tri-border zone across Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger. Due to increasing attacks in Togo, the authorities have extended the state of emergency in the Savane regions for another year, making it three years consecutive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Coastal West African states are at a critical if not eminent threat level of these terrorist groups. Without drilling into the whole year of 2024, just a snapshot of the first quarter of 2025 will buttress the speculation made before this.<\/p>\n\n\n

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For 2025 Q1 these were the total number of attacks and fatalities associated to them across Africa by terrorist groups.<\/p>\n\n\n

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The above shows the terrorist groups primary targets and their various ways of carrying out attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n

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This also shows for the whole continent the distribution of attacks and its associated fatalities per region. West Africa as seen, is a hotbed.<\/p>\n\n\n

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This shows for the whole continent the distribution of fatalities among the military and security officials followed by civilians then the terrorists killed during those attacks. West Africa again shown to lead the chart.<\/p>\n\n\n

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This shows for West Africa (both central Sahel and three coastal countries) the distribution of attacks and their fatalities among the military and security officials followed by civilians then the terrorists killed during those attacks. The last column shows the number of terrorists neutralised during counter-terrorism operations by security agencies of respective countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With Burkina Faso leading the chart which is a neighbouring state to Ghana, this calls for immediate concern. The songs of possible expansions are no longer in the realms of \u201chow probable\u201d but \u201cwhen\u201d as Togo and Benin have had in recent months frequent deadly attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What should a country like Ghana do in the face of these threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendation 1: REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reviving the Accra Initiative as a Unified Coastal\u2013Sahelian Response to Violent Extremism, with Inclusion of AES Members<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the threat of extremist violence intensifies in the Sahel and spills into the Gulf of Guinea, coastal West African states must urgently enhance regional security coordination. The Accra Initiative\u2014initially created by Ghana, Benin, Togo, C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, and Burkina Faso\u2014provides a homegrown foundation for such collaboration. While it has lost momentum in recent years, current realities demand its revival or the creation of a similar security mechanism using the Accra Initiative model. Crucially, this effort must include members of theAlliance of Sahel States (AES)\u2014Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger\u2014to foster a pragmatic, non-ideological alliance against violent extremism, despite their current political distance from ECOWAS and the AU. A joint security structure would allow for cross-border coordination, real-time intelligence sharing, and synchronised operations in border zones where terrorist mobility is highest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The feasibility<\/strong> of this proposal is moderate<\/strong>, owing to the pre-existing diplomatic architecture of the Accra Initiative and the shared security interests among coastal and Sahelian states. While political tensions remain\u2014especially due to the AES members’ recent departure from ECOWAS\u2014a narrowly focused, security-driven mechanism could bypass broader political disputes and concentrate on common threats. The successful execution of joint operations like Koudanlgou I\u2013III<\/em> shows that tactical cooperation is achievable even amid differing governance systems, provided there is clear command structure and mutual respect for sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In terms of sustainability<\/strong>, the proposal is medium<\/strong>\u2014its longevity will depend on institutionalising a permanent secretariat, depoliticizing security collaboration, and securing funding from both member states and strategic partners. The impact<\/strong> of such a coalition would be high<\/strong>, as it could deny terrorist groups sanctuary and freedom of movement across Sahel\u2013coastal corridors, while also enabling early-warning and community resilience strategies. The urgency<\/strong> is very high<\/strong>, as extremists continue to exploit governance vacuums in the Sahel and porous borders to establish logistical and ideological footholds in northern Ghana, Benin, and Togo. Reviving or remodelling the Accra Initiative\u2014with AES inclusion\u2014may represent one of the few viable options to close these security gaps before they widen into regional destabilisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendation 2: RELIGIOUS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Promoting Moderate Islamic Teaching to Pre\u2011empt Extremist Radicalisation in Northern Ghana<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Northern Ghana\u2019s sizeable Muslim population makes it a prime target for Sahel\u2011based jihadist groups seeking recruits and logistical depth.  Adapting Morocco\u2019s celebrated model\u2014anchored in the Mohammed\u202fVI Institute for the Training of Imams, which has already graduated hundreds of clerics from across Africa in a curriculum that couples classical theology with civic values\u2014Ghana can launch a state\u2011endorsed imam\u2011training and certification programme that equips local religious leaders to rebut violent interpretations while preserving cultural authenticity.  Partnerships with Morocco\u2019s Ministry of Endowments, its Foundation for African\u202fUlema, and Ghana\u2019s existing Islamic councils would ensure doctrinal credibility and rapid rollout.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 Feasibility<\/strong> is high: Ghana enjoys a long record of inter\u2011faith tolerance and has well\u2011organised Muslim leadership structures willing to collaborate.  A modest start\u2011up budget\u2014covering curriculum design, scholarships for trainee imams, and a media unit to broadcast peace\u2011oriented sermons\u2014makes initial costs manageable.  Embedding the syllabus in mosque schools, community radio, and preacher\u2011licensing rules renders the approach sustainable<\/strong>; once institutionalised, it self\u2011propagates with only periodic refresher courses and a small endowment fund for quality control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The projected impact<\/strong> is high<\/strong> because extremist recruiters thrive on theological vacuums and grievance narratives; credible, home\u2011grown clerics delivering a doctrine of non\u2011violence, social justice, and democratic coexistence directly undercut that appeal.  Recent intelligence indicates Sahel militants are already using northern Ghana as a medical and supply rear\u2011base\u2014an early warning that ideological infiltration could follow if left unchecked.  That makes the urgency<\/strong>, moderate\u2011to\u2011high<\/strong>: acting now, while radicalisation is still in its early stages, is far cheaper\u2014and far safer\u2014than trying to de\u2011radicalise communities once violent ideology has taken hold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Policy Recommendation 3: COMMUNITY-LED SECURITY FRAMEWORK<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Integrating Traditional Leadership into Ghana\u2019s National Security Architecture<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ghana\u2019s traditional leadership structure\u2014ranging from sub-chiefs to paramount chiefs\u2014remains deeply embedded in rural governance and community trust. In areas where the state\u2019s presence is limited, these leaders serve as the first line of authority and influence. By formally integrating traditional rulers into Ghana\u2019s national security architecture, the country can create grassroots, culturally embedded early-warning and intelligence network capable of detecting extremist movements and suspicious activity before they escalate. Each sub-chief would oversee locally appointed community security agents, whose reports would feed into a layered communication pipeline\u2014reaching from the village to the National Security Council Secretariat via the Regional Security Councils. This bottom-up approach would complement state-led counter-terrorism efforts by ensuring hyper-local situational awareness across rural Ghana.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The feasibility<\/strong> of this policy is moderate to high<\/strong>. Traditional authorities already play key roles in land administration, dispute resolution, and community development, and their inclusion in security structures would be a logical and culturally coherent expansion. Potential resistance due to politicisation or concerns over overstepping customary mandates could be mitigated through dialogue, legal clarity, and targeted incentives\u2014such as state-supported training and logistical resources for selected chiefs and their security liaisons. Once trust is built, the sustainability<\/strong> of the model is strong<\/strong>, as chieftaincy institutions are among Ghana\u2019s most enduring and community-anchored frameworks. Once institutionalised, their participation in early warning becomes part of traditional leadership\u2019s social contract.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The impact<\/strong> would be high<\/strong>, especially in rural and peri-urban areas where extremists could otherwise move undetected. By empowering chiefs to act as both cultural custodians and security actors, Ghana gains a force multiplier for national vigilance\u2014built on social trust, local knowledge, and legitimacy. Moreover, the urgency<\/strong> is moderate to high<\/strong>: extremist groups have already exploited governance gaps and rural alienation in neighbouring states. By acting now, Ghana can close its intelligence gap at the periphery, build community resilience, and avoid the dangerous disconnect between central authorities and local populations that has fuelled extremism elsewhere.
<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion and Recommendation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The evolving threat of violent extremism from the Sahel into coastal West Africa requires urgent, pragmatic, and culturally embedded responses. Ghana, although not yet experiencing large-scale extremist violence, is vulnerable to radicalisation, infiltration, and destabilisation, especially in underserved rural communities. While regional military coordination and ideological counter-narratives remain critical, Ghana\u2019s most effective and sustainable national response lies in institutionalising its traditional leadership within the security architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chiefs and traditional authorities, already central to rural governance and dispute resolution, possess unmatched social legitimacy and community insight. Integrating them into a formal, multi-tiered intelligence pipeline\u2014from sub-chiefs through paramount chiefs to the National Security Council\u2014would transform local knowledge into actionable early-warning signals. This community-based security framework ensures that threats are identified before escalation and that intelligence flows are grounded in local context and trust.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Such a model strengthens local ownership, builds state legitimacy, and enables a pre-emptive security posture\u2014far more cost-effective and socially resilient than reactive counter-terrorism operations. Moreover, it aligns with Ghana\u2019s longstanding values of decentralised governance and cultural cohesion. In view of growing threats from across the northern borders, the recommendation is clear:<\/p>\n\n\n\n