The Wagner Group is a private military company (PMC) that first emerged in 2014 during Russia\u2019s annexation of Crimea. They provided support to pro-Russian separatists and were involved in various military operations. The Wagner Group was reportedly founded by Dmitry Utkin, a former Russian military officer and a veteran of the GRU (Russian military intelligence). Utkin worked with the Russian state to deploy the group in eastern Ukraine and Syria in 2014. It then expanded its operations to Syria in 2015, where it fought against the Islamic State at the behest of the Bashar Assad regime, which provided Wagner with concessions to extract oil from the fields it had liberated from the radicals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From Syria, Wagner\u2019s operations extended to the Middle East and Africa, with garrisons established in Mali, Libya, Sudan, Madagascar, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic. The mercenaries served as bodyguards for government leaders and conducted military operations in coordination with the armies of these nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Sudan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The group arrived in Africa in 2017. The Wagner Group began its deployments in Sudan with a 500-strong force during the rule of former President Omar al-Bashir. Fearing that his rule was shaky due to large-scale protests against his government in Sudan, al-Bashir travelled to Russia in 2017 to meet with President Vladimir Putin and pitch Sudan to him as Russia\u2019s \u201cgateway to Africa\u201d in return for Russian support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n President Omar gave the mercenaries a valuable consideration in this transaction: Wagner received exclusive mining rights for gold. A short time later, Meroe Gold, a mining company owned by the Russian company M Invest, began bringing Russian mining experts into Sudan, Africa\u2019s third-largest producer of gold. Initially, Wagner Group’s main objectives were to guard mineral resources, especially gold mines, and to serve as a support force for the Bashir government, helping protect it from international opposition. Protests against al-Bashir\u2019s government continued until 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During this time, protests escalated, and the Wagner Group went from being a \u201cguardian\u201d army to a direct player in trying to repress demonstrations. President Omar al-Bashir was eventually removed from power in April 2019, and the Wagner Group was pushed back by Sudanese forces under the leadership of army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan into a \u201cguardian\u201d role, protecting its mining interests. Wagner has recently formed a relationship with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group in Sudan, and its commander, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A day after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Dagalo flew to Moscow, ushering in a new phase in the RSF\u2019s relationship with the Wagner Group. Sudanese and regional diplomatic sources have accused Wagner of supplying Sudan\u2019s RSF with missiles to aid their fight against the country\u2019s army – Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). According to a CNN report in April 2023, the RSF denied receiving aid from Russia and alleged that its rival, al-Burhan\u2019s SAF, had aligned itself \u201cwith these foreign forces, not RSF.\u201d The 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent wave of sanctions accelerated Russia\u2019s gold plunder in Sudan and further propped up military rule, increasing Wagner activity in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russian officials and representatives of the Wagner Group have consistently denied any military presence in Sudan, asserting that Russia is not involved in the ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. According to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia is solely interested in a “peaceful resolution” of the conflict. In April 2023, former Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin said, “Wagner PMC is in no way involved in the Sudanese conflict.” Russia continues to present itself as an impartial actor in Sudan, claiming its only goal is to help the country improve its security, stability, and economic development. (US DoD, 8 February 2024). There have been numerous reports that Wagner Group mercenaries have killed scores of Sudanese miners working in artisanal gold mines along the border between Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Central African Republic<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Wagner Group began operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2018 after the CAR and Russian governments signed an agreement exchanging Russian military support and weapons for lucrative mining concessions (CNN, 15 June 2021; International Crisis Group, 3 December 2021). In October 2017, CAR\u2019s President Faustin-Archange Touad\u00e9ra travelled to Russia to sign security agreements with the Russian government. Although the Wagner Group has been deployed in CAR since 2018, Russian officials still refer to the group\u2019s forces as \u201cRussian instructors\u201d when discussing their activities in the CAR.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In late 2020, Wagner\u2019s operations in CAR changed dramatically, morphing from a support and training role to a direct combat role as the security situation deteriorated ahead of the elections in late December. The deteriorating security situation came as a coalition of militias\u2014grouped as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC)\u2014formed. In forming the CPC, former President Fran\u00e7ois Boziz\u00e9 drew together several prominent militias, including the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation (RRR) and the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) (Foreign Policy, 21 August 2021). He launched an offensive across CAR to overthrow the government of President Faustin-Archange Touad\u00e9ra. Boziz\u00e9 formed the CPC after the Constitutional Court rejected his presidential candidacy. The Court also found that Boziz\u00e9 failed to fulfil \u201cgood morality\u201d requirements, citing UN sanctions and an international arrest warrant for alleged war crimes. After joining state forces in actively fighting against the CPC in December 2020, the Wagner Group became one of the dominant agents of political violence in CAR. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) records show that between December 2020 and July 2022, the Wagner Group was involved in nearly 40% of all events of political violence in the Central African Republic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Russian officials claim that Russian instructors have \u201csaved\u201d CAR and are strengthening peace and stability to bring lasting peace. CBS reported in May 2023 that Wagner forces used extreme violence to gain control of a key mining area near the city of Bambari. According to the United Nations (UN), there could be more than 2,000 instructors deployed by Russia to the CAR, including recruits from Syria and Libya, where Wagner has been active. UN experts reported in October 2021 that people in CAR, including journalists, aid workers, minorities, and international peacekeepers, have been violently harassed and threatened by so-called \u201cRussian instructors\u201d from the Wagner Group. In December 2021, the European Union (EU) said it would no longer train CAR government soldiers because of their links to Wagner. According to the CAR government, the mercenaries are there to support the fight against rebels, who still control many parts of the country despite recent government advances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mali<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner forces began operating in Mali at the end of 2021 a pivot away from traditional international partners by the Malian military junta following the coup in May. In June 2021, citing the coup, France moved to reduce its military presence in Mali and end joint operations with Malian state forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In January 2022, tensions with traditional partners escalated after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) imposed fresh sanctions on Mali. Mali retaliated by denying international forces access to its airspace, expelling Danish troops, and the French ambassador to Mali (Reuters, 31 January 2022). France officially announced the withdrawal of troops in February 2022 before Mali announced in early May that it would withdraw from long-term defence accords with France. Upon arriving in Mali in December 2021, Wagner troops began to construct a camp just outside the perimeter of Bamako\u2019s Modibo Ke\u00efta International Airport, southwest of Airbase 101, a military installation used by Mali\u2019s air force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Wagner Group has been involved in attacks targeting civilians in Mopti, Segou, Tombouctou, and Koulikoro regions\u2014core areas of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama\u2019at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). ACLED records nearly 500 civilian fatalities from these attacks, including the massacre of hundreds of civilians in Moura in the Mopti region in late March 2022. Over 71% of Wagner\u2019s engagement in Mali has taken the form of political violence targeting civilians. Attacks on civilians by the Wagner Group have primarily targeted Fulani communities. The targeting of Fulani communities in Mali has been driven by their perceived links to armed groups, JNIM and its affiliates. Mali\u2019s military has denied frequent allegations that civilians are being targeted and has dismissed claims of abuse as untrue, labelling them as part of a disinformation war against Mali. Amidst these allegations, the decision by Malian state forces to continue to operate and perpetrate violence targeting civilians alongside the Wagner Group is indicative of their reduced reliance on traditional military partners, which have publicly raised concerns about Wagner Group abuses in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In November 2023, Mali’s military government announced it had entered into an agreement with Russia to establish a gold refinery in Bamako, the capital. The agreement, which is a non-binding memorandum of understanding, includes the construction of a refinery with a capacity of 200 tonnes per year. This is one of several deals between the two countries as Russia aims to expand its influence in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Libya<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya descended into a civil war with multiple factions vying for control. The country was split between the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, backed by the United Nations, and the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by General Khalifa Haftar. The Wagner Group began its involvement in Libya around 2018, reportedly on the side of General Haftar’s LNA. This involvement was part of a larger Russian effort to gain a foothold in Libya and, by extension, the Mediterranean region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2019, Wagner Group provided highly disciplined rooftop snipers to help warlord Khalifa Haftar in his attempt to seize the capital, Tripoli, and trained Haftar\u2019s forces in the use of sophisticated air defence systems. It also hired former Syrian rebels to enter Libya as supplementary infantry forces. The group reportedly brought advanced military capabilities to the LNA, including precision-guided artillery, electronic warfare systems, and anti-aircraft systems. These assets provided Haftar’s forces with a technological edge over their adversaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Wagner failed in Haftar\u2019s drive to capture Tripoli in the face of Turkish drone strikes, with atrocities that included leaving behind improvised explosive devices in the homes of civilians who had fled the fighting. Reports emerged of Wagner Group operatives being involved in serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and the laying of landmines in civilian areas. The group was accused of violating international law in several incidents. The Wagner Group’s activities in Libya drew international condemnation, with the United Nations and various human rights organisations calling for investigations into their alleged war crimes. The UN documented multiple violations by Wagner operatives, including the use of mercenaries, which is illegal under international law. Following the failure of the Tripoli offensive and the ceasefire agreement in October 2020, Wagner forces pulled back from the frontlines, relocating to central and eastern Libya. They remained in the country, fortifying key strategic locations such as airbases and oil facilities. Their presence is a key element of Russia\u2019s broader geopolitical ambitions in North Africa and the Mediterranean, reflecting a calculated approach to influence and control in the region. The future of Wagner’s role in Libya remains uncertain, particularly as international pressure mounts and the country continues its fragile transition toward stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Burkina Faso<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner\u2019s involvement in Burkina Faso has gained attention following the 2022 military coup that brought Captain Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 to power. The new government, which has shown signs of distancing itself from former colonial power France, has been reported to seek closer ties with Russia, potentially including Wagner Group. The group\u2019s role in Burkina Faso is believed to be focused on providing military assistance against jihadist insurgencies that have plagued the country. There have been reports of Wagner operatives arriving in Burkina Faso to assist the government in its counter-insurgency efforts, mirroring their activities in neighbouring Mali. Burkina Faso’s government, facing mounting security crises, views Wagner as a potential partner to bolster its military capabilities. This partnership is part of a broader trend of Sahelian countries turning to Russia and Wagner as alternatives to Western military support, particularly as relations with France have deteriorated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Niger<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner’s presence in Niger has been more subtle and less documented compared to its activities in other African countries. However, after the July 2023 military coup that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, there were reports and speculations that the new junta might seek Wagner\u2019s support to consolidate power and address security challenges, particularly against jihadist groups in the Sahel. The situation remains fluid, and while there\u2019s no confirmed large-scale deployment of Wagner forces in Niger, the group’s potential involvement is seen as part of Russia\u2019s effort to fill the void left by Western influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mozambique<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner Group entered Mozambique in 2019 to assist the government in combating an insurgency by Islamist militants in the northern Cabo Delgado province. The group provided military support, including training, equipment, and combat forces. However, Wagner’s operations in Mozambique faced significant challenges, including difficult terrain, unfamiliarity with local conditions, and heavy casualties. Due to these setbacks, Wagner\u2019s involvement reportedly decreased by 2020, and the Mozambican government began seeking assistance from other private military contractors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Guinea<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner Group\u2019s involvement in Guinea has been tied to protecting Russian mining interests. After the military coup in 2021, which saw the ousting of President Alpha Cond\u00e9, reports suggested that Wagner operatives were deployed to ensure the security of Russian companies operating in the country, particularly in the bauxite mining sector. Their presence is part of a broader strategy to safeguard Russia’s economic investments in resource-rich regions of Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cameroon<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In Cameroon, Wagner\u2019s activities have been relatively limited and primarily focused on providing military training and support to government forces. These efforts are aimed at combating various insurgencies in the country, including Boko Haram in the north and separatist movements in the Anglophone regions. Wagner\u2019s presence in Cameroon aligns with Russia\u2019s broader strategy of securing influence through military cooperation and support for embattled governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Wagner’s strategic objectives in Africa include establishing a military foothold in North Africa to threaten the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and control Mediterranean maritime traffic, enhancing Russia\u2019s global stature by positioning itself as a key player despite its international isolation and supporting authoritarian regimes to undercut democracy and gain influence. Wagner’s activities are part of Russia\u2019s efforts to counteract Western influence in Africa. Russia positions itself as an alternative power broker by supporting regimes and securing resources. Rather than being a single entity, Wagner is a complex network of businesses and mercenary groups whose operations have been closely tied to the Russian military and intelligence community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n References<\/p>\n\n\n\n Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2022). Wagner Group Operations in Africa<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/resrep42841<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n MATUSEVICH, M. (2019). Russia in Africa<\/em>: A Search for Continuity in a Post-Cold War Era<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Insight Turkey<\/em>, 21<\/em>(1), 25\u201340. https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/26776045<\/p>\n\n\n\n