{"id":1743,"date":"2023-12-29T06:08:26","date_gmt":"2023-12-29T06:08:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/?p=1743"},"modified":"2024-01-31T15:41:16","modified_gmt":"2024-01-31T15:41:16","slug":"alliance-of-sahel-states-formation-objectives-implications-for-ecowas","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/alliance-of-sahel-states-formation-objectives-implications-for-ecowas\/","title":{"rendered":"Alliance Of Sahel States Formation: Objectives &amp; Implications for ECOWAS"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The West African political and security landscape has undergone significant transformations in the past decade, marked by a series of coups, the rise of jihadist insurgencies, and shifting regional alliances. Central to these developments is the recent formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, a mutual defence pact signed by the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. This report assesses the implications of this new alliance for the West African community, particularly the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The genesis of the AES can be traced back to the shared challenges these three Sahel nations have faced as well as the fact that each country is currently governed by a military regime. The jihadist insurgency that began in northern Mali in 2012 gradually spread to both Niger and Burkina Faso by 2015. This common threat, compounded by similar governance challenges and international pressures, has driven these nations closer together. The situation reached a critical juncture when all three countries experienced coups since 2020, with Niger&#8217;s coup in July 2023 against President Mohamed Bazoum being the most recent. In response to these coups, the regional bloc, ECOWAS, threatened military intervention to restore democratic governance but failed to follow through. Such threats, combined with the shared security challenges, provided the impetus for Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to solidify their alliance through the Liptako-Gourma Charter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Objectives of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), formalized through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, represents a significant shift in the security dynamics of the Sahel region. Established by the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, the alliance aims to address the shared challenges and threats faced by these nations. The objectives of the AES can be summarized as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1.\u00a0Mutual Defense and Assistance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0At the core of the AES is the principle of mutual defence. The charter binds the signatories to assist one another, including militarily, in the event of an attack on any member state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The alliance emphasises that any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more member states will be considered an aggression against all parties, necessitating collective action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2.\u00a0Counterterrorism and Security<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Sahel region has been a hotspot for jihadist insurgencies, with groups like JNIM &amp; Boko Haram linked to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State being particularly active. The AES prioritizes the fight against terrorism, aiming to combine military and economic efforts to counter these threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Article 4 of the alliance document underscores the commitment to combating terrorism in all its forms and organised crime as a common area of focus for the alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3.\u00a0Prevention and Settlement of Armed Rebellions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Beyond external threats, the AES also seeks to address internal challenges. The charter binds the member countries to work towards preventing or settling armed rebellions within their territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0This is particularly significant given the recent resumption of hostilities by armed groups in regions like Mali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4.\u00a0Economic and Political Emancipation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u00a0The alliance document highlights the need to continue the struggles waged by African nations for political independence, human dignity, and economic emancipation. This suggests that the AES also has broader socio-political and economic objectives, aiming to uplift the populations of the member states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>5.\u00a0Strengthening Regional Ties Amid International Pressures<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The formation of the AES comes at a time when the member states&#8217; relationships with international partners, particularly France, have been strained. By forming a regional alliance, these countries aim to assert their autonomy and reduce dependence on external powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The alliance also serves as a counterbalance to pressures from regional blocs like ECOWAS, which has threatened military intervention in response to coups in the member states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>6.\u00a0Securing Borders and Enhancing Regional Stability<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Given the porous nature of borders in the Sahel and the transnational nature of jihadist threats, the AES aims to enhance border security and promote regional stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The alliance also seeks to address the challenges posed by armed groups that have historically destabilised the region, such as the Tuareg armed groups in Mali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Likely Challenges Ahead for AES<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given the ambitious aims of the nascent alliance, it will doubtlessly be faced with several challenges, chief of which include the following:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1.\u00a0Political and Diplomatic Challenges<\/strong><br>\u00a0<br>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Internal Political Instability:\u00a0All three AES member states have experienced coups since 2020, leading to potential shifts in commitment and direction for the alliance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Diplomatic Isolation:\u00a0The formation of the AES, especially in the wake of recent coups, might result in diplomatic isolation from other African states and international bodies, possibly leading to sanctions or reduced international aid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2.\u00a0Security and Military Challenges<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Diverse Threat Landscape:\u00a0The Sahel is home to various armed groups, from jihadists to ethnic militias, requiring coordinated strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Differing Military Capabilities:\u00a0Integrating the diverse military structures, training, and equipment of the three countries into a cohesive force will be challenging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Potential for Overstretch:\u00a0The vast territories and multiple threats could strain the military capabilities of the member states, especially Mali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3.\u00a0Economic and Resource Constraints<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Economic Limitations:\u00a0The AES member states, being among the world&#8217;s poorest, have limited resources for defence and security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Border Porosity:\u00a0The vast and porous borders of the Sahel make monitoring and control challenging, potentially undermining security efforts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4.\u00a0Socio-Cultural and Community Challenges<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Historical and Ethnic Tensions:\u00a0The Sahel&#8217;s history of ethnic tensions can complicate joint military operations and strategies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>\u2022\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Community Trust:\u00a0Given past human rights abuses by security forces, building trust and ensuring positive civil-military relations will be essential.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Implications for ECOWAS: A Potential Fracture in the Offing<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1.\u00a0Challenge to ECOWAS&#8217; Authority and Governance Values<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The formation of the AES represents a bloc that can act independently of ECOWAS&#8217; decisions, undermining its authority. The recent coups in AES member states also highlight a divergence in governance values, with ECOWAS traditionally opposing unconstitutional changes in government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2.\u00a0Economic and Institutional Divergence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The AES might pursue distinct economic policies or trade agreements, disrupting ECOWAS&#8217; economic integration efforts. Additionally, if the AES establishes its own regional cooperation mechanisms, it could lead to parallel structures that compete with and weaken existing ECOWAS institutions. In addition, the formation of the AES is likely to become a major hurdling block in ECOWAS\u2019 plan for fostering better market integration and establishing a common currency.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3.\u00a0Security and Diplomatic Tensions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The mutual defence pact of the AES could lead to conflicts of interest in security matters, especially if ECOWAS decides to intervene in any AES member state. This could escalate into broader confrontations, sowing mistrust and hindering cooperation on regional security initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4.\u00a0Potential for ECOWAS Disintegration<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The emergence of the AES could lead to polarization within ECOWAS, with member states potentially forced to pick sides. Such divisions could strain the unity of ECOWAS, leading to its potential fracture or even disintegration.<br>\u00a0<br><strong>Forecast<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Moving forward, the AES will likely seek to secure its position within the region in order to provide the military governments in its member states with assurances for protecting their respective regimes. This process will have major geopolitical and security implications for West Africa and the entire African continent.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>1.\u00a0Undermining ECOWAS&#8217; Authority in the Sahel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The AES, with its mutual defence pact and shared objectives, is poised to become a formidable entity in the Sahel. As it consolidates its influence, ECOWAS&#8217; traditional authority in the region could be increasingly challenged. The AES, prioritizing its collective interests, might frequently act in ways that diverge from or even oppose ECOWAS directives. This could lead to a diminishing of ECOWAS&#8217; influence and effectiveness in the Sahel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>2.\u00a0Rise in Military Coups and Expansion of the AES<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The formation and perceived success of the AES could embolden military leaders in other West and Central African nations. Observing the benefits of mutual protection and collective defence, these leaders might be incentivised to orchestrate coups against their respective governments. Once in power, they could actively seek membership in the AES, viewing it as a shield against external pressures and a means of regime preservation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>3.\u00a0Global Powers Capitalising on the Situation:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>With the AES member states showing disaffection towards France, global powers like Russia and China might see an opportunity to expand their influence in the region. Both nations have a history of leveraging political and economic ties to gain footholds in resource-rich regions. Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are abundant in raw materials such as gold, uranium, and manganese. China, with its vast economic interests in Africa, could seek to dominate these mineral markets, while Russia might aim to expand its political and military influence, similar to its engagements in other parts of Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>4.\u00a0Shift in Geopolitical Alliances<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The potential deepening ties between the AES and countries like Russia and China could lead to a reconfiguration of geopolitical alliances in the region. This shift could further estrange the AES member states from traditional Western allies and ECOWAS, leading to a more multipolar and complex political landscape in West Africa. The continuing decline of French influence in the region opens the door for other global powers to step in. Russia and China, with their strategic interests in expanding their influence in Africa, are likely to capitalise on this opportunity. Both nations could leverage political, economic, and military ties to gain access to the significant raw materials in the region, such as gold, uranium, and manganese.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The establishment of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) marks a significant turning point in the political and security dynamics of West Africa. This alliance, formed by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, emerges as a response to shared security challenges and perceived inadequacies of existing regional structures, notably ECOWAS. The AES, by its very nature, poses a direct challenge to ECOWAS&#8217; traditional authority in the Sahel. As the alliance prioritises its collective interests, it could frequently act in opposition to ECOWAS directives, potentially diminishing the regional body&#8217;s influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The formation and perceived strength of the AES could serve as an inspiration for military leaders in other West and Central African nations. The allure of mutual protection and collective defence might incentivise these leaders to orchestrate coups and subsequently seek AES membership for regime preservation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In essence, the emergence of the AES is not just a regional development; it has the potential to reshape the geopolitical landscape of West Africa and Central Africa. The alliance&#8217;s actions and the reactions of both regional and global players to its formation will be pivotal in determining the future stability, security, and prosperity of the West African region. As the situation evolves, it will be crucial for all stakeholders to navigate these complexities with foresight and diplomacy to ensure a peaceful and prosperous West Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Source:\u00a0Intelligensis Security &amp; Political Analysis Division<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction The West African political and security landscape has undergone significant transformations in the past decade, marked by a series of coups, the rise of jihadist insurgencies, and shifting regional alliances. Central to these developments is the recent formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) through the Liptako-Gourma Charter, a mutual defence pact signed [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1744,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"subtitle":"","format":"standard","video":"","gallery":"","source_name":"","source_url":"","via_name":"","via_url":"","override_template":"0","override":[{"template":"1","single_blog_custom":"","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"1","layout":"right-sidebar","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"top","share_float_style":"share-monocrhome","show_share_counter":"1","show_view_counter":"1","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"0","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"1","show_popup_post":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"0","show_post_related":"0","show_inline_post_related":"0"}],"override_image_size":"0","image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post":"0","trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post":"0","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","sponsored_post_name":"","sponsored_post_url":"","sponsored_post_logo_enable":"0","sponsored_post_logo":"","sponsored_post_desc":"","disable_ad":"0"},"jnews_primary_category":{"id":""},"jnews_social_meta":{"fb_title":"","fb_description":"","fb_image":"","twitter_title":"","twitter_description":"","twitter_image":""},"jnews_review":[],"enable_review":"0","type":"percentage","name":"","summary":"","brand":"","sku":"","good":[{"good_text":""}],"bad":[{"bad_text":""}],"score_override":"","override_value":"","rating":[{"rating_text":"","rating_number":"10"}],"price":[{"shop":"","price":"","link":"","icon":""}],"jnews_override_counter":{"override_view_counter":"0","view_counter_number":"0","override_share_counter":"0","share_counter_number":"0","override_like_counter":"0","like_counter_number":"0","override_dislike_counter":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"jnews_post_split":{"enable_post_split":"0","post_split":[{"template":"1","tag":"h2","numbering":"asc","mode":"normal","first":"0","enable_toc":"0","toc_type":"normal"}]},"footnotes":""},"categories":[183],"tags":[193],"class_list":["post-1743","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analysts","tag-1st-edition"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Alliance Of Sahel States Formation: Objectives &amp; Implications for ECOWAS - CISA NEWSLETTER<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/alliance-of-sahel-states-formation-objectives-implications-for-ecowas\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Alliance Of Sahel States Formation: Objectives &amp; Implications for ECOWAS - CISA NEWSLETTER\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Introduction The West African political and security landscape has undergone significant transformations in the past decade, marked by a series of coups, the rise of jihadist insurgencies, and shifting regional alliances. 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