{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"CISA NEWSLETTER","provider_url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com","author_name":"CISA EDITORIAL","author_url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/author\/cisa-editorial\/","title":"Russia in Africa: continuities in external engagement patterns - CISA NEWSLETTER","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"hz0oc52EZN\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/russia-in-africa-continuities-in-external-engagement-patterns\/\">Russia in Africa: continuities in external engagement patterns<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/russia-in-africa-continuities-in-external-engagement-patterns\/embed\/#?secret=hz0oc52EZN\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Russia in Africa: continuities in external engagement patterns&#8221; &#8212; CISA NEWSLETTER\" data-secret=\"hz0oc52EZN\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/06\/Russia-in-Africa-continuities-in-external-engagement-patterns-1024x683.png","thumbnail_width":1024,"thumbnail_height":683,"description":"Introduction For much of the past decade, Russia has increased its engagement in Africa, particularly in the Sahel and other regions. In political discourse, this engagement has often been framed as an alternative to established Western partnerships, with emphasis placed on sovereignty, non-interference, and security cooperation. This framing has gained attention in contexts where dissatisfaction [&hellip;]"}