{"id":5342,"date":"2025-06-01T00:10:05","date_gmt":"2025-06-01T00:10:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/comment-la-concurrence-entre-les-superpuissances-modifie-le-terrorisme-au-sahel\/"},"modified":"2025-06-01T05:57:53","modified_gmt":"2025-06-01T05:57:53","slug":"comment-la-concurrence-entre-les-superpuissances-modifie-le-terrorisme-au-sahel","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/comment-la-concurrence-entre-les-superpuissances-modifie-le-terrorisme-au-sahel\/","title":{"rendered":"Comment la concurrence entre les superpuissances modifie le terrorisme au Sahel"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

La r\u00e9gion du Sahel est devenue un th\u00e9\u00e2tre critique de la concurrence mondiale, o\u00f9 les int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques s’entrecroisent avec certaines des menaces terroristes les plus persistantes au monde. Alors que les puissances occidentales r\u00e9\u00e9quilibrent leur engagement, la Russie, la Chine et, dans une moindre mesure, l’Ukraine, se sont engouffr\u00e9es dans la br\u00e8che, chacune fa\u00e7onnant le paysage antiterroriste de la r\u00e9gion de mani\u00e8re distincte et cons\u00e9quente. <\/p>\n\n

Russie : Guerre par procuration, arm\u00e9es priv\u00e9es et capital g\u00e9opolitique<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n

L’engagement croissant de la Russie au Sahel, en particulier au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger, refl\u00e8te un pivot plus large vers l’Afrique \u00e0 la suite de son isolement g\u00e9opolitique apr\u00e8s l’invasion de l’Ukraine en 2022. Le d\u00e9ploiement de l’Africa Corps – anciennement Wagner Group – a positionn\u00e9 la Russie non seulement comme un partenaire militaire mais aussi comme un contrepoids aux interventions occidentales impopulaires(Global Terrorism Index 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

Au Mali, la Russie a fourni une assistance militaire directe par l’interm\u00e9diaire des troupes du Corps africain, qui sont arriv\u00e9es \u00e0 la fin de l’ann\u00e9e 2021 pour participer aux op\u00e9rations de contre-insurrection. Malgr\u00e9 leurs tactiques brutales, ces forces ont gagn\u00e9 la faveur d’une partie de l’opinion publique et de l’arm\u00e9e maliennes, d\u00e9sillusionn\u00e9es par l’inefficacit\u00e9 des missions de maintien de la paix de la France et de l’ONU. Les sondages d’opinion r\u00e9alis\u00e9s au d\u00e9but de l’ann\u00e9e 2024 ont r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 un taux d’approbation de 82 % pour l’implication de la Russie au Mali, bien que ce sentiment ait \u00e9t\u00e9 mis \u00e0 l’\u00e9preuve par des \u00e9v\u00e9nements tels que l’embuscade tendue par les rebelles touaregs en juillet 2024, qui a tu\u00e9 au moins 84 membres du personnel russe(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

L’implication de la Russie n’est toutefois pas uniquement ax\u00e9e sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le pays a strat\u00e9giquement tir\u00e9 parti de l’engagement militaire pour extraire de la valeur \u00e9conomique, en particulier dans les transactions mini\u00e8res et d’infrastructure, tout en utilisant des campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation pour soutenir les r\u00e9cits anti-occidentaux. Des op\u00e9rations d’influence coordonn\u00e9es – diffus\u00e9es via les m\u00e9dias sociaux, les influenceurs locaux et les m\u00e9dias soutenus par la Russie – ont r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 modifier le sentiment public au Burkina Faso et au Mali, augmentant consid\u00e9rablement les perceptions n\u00e9gatives de la France(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

N\u00e9anmoins, le r\u00f4le de la Russie est en \u00e9quilibre pr\u00e9caire. Ses op\u00e9rations en Afrique sont de plus en plus tendues en raison des revers militaires en Ukraine et de la perte potentielle de son centre logistique en Syrie. L’effondrement du r\u00e9gime d’Assad a suscit\u00e9 des inqui\u00e9tudes quant au maintien de l’acc\u00e8s aux bases m\u00e9diterran\u00e9ennes comme Tartous, ce qui a incit\u00e9 la Russie \u00e0 repositionner plus de 100 v\u00e9hicules militaires de la Syrie vers le Mali au d\u00e9but de 2025(GTI 2025<\/em>). En outre, l’implication de l’Ukraine – par le biais d’un \u00e9change de renseignements et d’\u00e9ventuelles fournitures de drones aux rebelles touaregs – laisse entrevoir un conflit par procuration naissant au Sahel, qui fait \u00e9cho aux tensions plus larges entre l’Est et l’Ouest(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

La Chine : Int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e9conomiques et implications pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n

La pr\u00e9sence croissante de la Chine au Sahel est principalement motiv\u00e9e par des raisons \u00e9conomiques, mais elle adopte de plus en plus une posture s\u00e9curitaire pour prot\u00e9ger ses investissements. Au Burkina Faso, la Chine a \u00e9tendu son empreinte apr\u00e8s la rupture des relations avec Ta\u00efwan en 2019, en obtenant des licences mini\u00e8res et en renfor\u00e7ant ses liens avec le gouvernement militaire(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

Si l’engagement de la Chine reste largement non militaire, elle s’est engag\u00e9e \u00e0 verser 1 milliard de yuans (environ 136 millions de dollars) pour former 7 000 agents de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 africains dans le cadre de son initiative de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 mondiale, ce qui t\u00e9moigne d’un engagement plus large en faveur de la stabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale(GTI 2025<\/em>). La d\u00e9cision de soutenir une force continentale en attente marque un changement dans la politique chinoise, laissant entrevoir de futurs r\u00f4les de maintien de la paix ou de contre-insurrection l\u00e0 o\u00f9 ses investissements sont menac\u00e9s. <\/p>\n\n

Au Niger, l’un des principaux fournisseurs d’uranium, les entreprises chinoises reprennent leurs activit\u00e9s et \u00e9tendent leur influence dans le contexte de la vacance du pouvoir qui a suivi le coup d’\u00c9tat. Avec l’augmentation de la demande mondiale d’uranium, en particulier en Chine, l’int\u00e9r\u00eat de P\u00e9kin pour le Niger est appel\u00e9 \u00e0 cro\u00eetre, ce qui l’impliquera encore davantage dans la dynamique s\u00e9curitaire complexe de la r\u00e9gion(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

Les \u00c9tats-Unis : Un repli strat\u00e9gique face \u00e0 une influence croissante<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n

Malgr\u00e9 les revers enregistr\u00e9s \u00e0 la suite des coups d’\u00c9tat au Mali, au Burkina Faso et au Niger, les \u00c9tats-Unis ont conserv\u00e9 une influence consid\u00e9rable, notamment gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 un engagement \u00e9conomique et diplomatique soutenu. Au Mali, par exemple, l’aide bilat\u00e9rale am\u00e9ricaine est pass\u00e9e de 132 millions de dollars en 2019 \u00e0 plus de 156 millions de dollars en 2020, malgr\u00e9 la d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration de la stabilit\u00e9 politique(GTI 2025<\/em>). L’influence am\u00e9ricaine s’est paradoxalement accrue alors m\u00eame que l’engagement europ\u00e9en faiblissait. <\/p>\n\n

Les restrictions impos\u00e9es apr\u00e8s le coup d’\u00c9tat ont limit\u00e9 le soutien militaire direct, mais les \u00c9tats-Unis se sont adapt\u00e9s en r\u00e9orientant leur lutte contre le terrorisme vers la coop\u00e9ration avec la C\u00f4te d’Ivoire et le B\u00e9nin, et ont r\u00e9cemment renvoy\u00e9 des forces sp\u00e9ciales au Tchad(GTI 2025<\/em>). Cette reconfiguration r\u00e9gionale vise \u00e0 maintenir un acc\u00e8s strat\u00e9gique tout en r\u00e9duisant la visibilit\u00e9 des empreintes militaires am\u00e9ricaines dans les pays politiquement instables. <\/p>\n\n

Cependant, les \u00c9tats-Unis sont \u00e9galement confront\u00e9s \u00e0 une baisse de l’approbation du public dans certaines parties du Sahel. Au Burkina Faso et au Mali, le soutien aux \u00c9tats-Unis a diminu\u00e9 de 9 % et 15 % respectivement, contrastant avec un sentiment croissant dans d’autres parties de la r\u00e9gion(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

La France et l’Occident : Un h\u00e9ritage en perte de vitesse<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n

La France, qui \u00e9tait autrefois l’acteur dominant en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au Sahel, a vu son influence s’effondrer de fa\u00e7on spectaculaire. Expuls\u00e9e du Mali et du Burkina Faso, et confront\u00e9e \u00e0 des r\u00e9vocations de licences mini\u00e8res au Niger, la capacit\u00e9 fran\u00e7aise \u00e0 influencer les r\u00e9sultats en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 s’est consid\u00e9rablement affaiblie. Ce d\u00e9clin a \u00e9t\u00e9 exacerb\u00e9 par le sentiment anti-fran\u00e7ais, enflamm\u00e9 par la d\u00e9sinformation russe et les \u00e9checs des interventions pass\u00e9es(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

Le d\u00e9part de 13 000 soldats fran\u00e7ais et de l’ONU a laiss\u00e9 un vide s\u00e9curitaire majeur, aujourd’hui partiellement combl\u00e9 par les SMP russes et, de plus en plus, par des arm\u00e9es r\u00e9gionales enhardies par le soutien ext\u00e9rieur. Les efforts d\u00e9ploy\u00e9s par l’Occident pour maintenir son influence sont d\u00e9sormais essentiellement \u00e9conomiques ou diplomatiques, l’assistance militaire \u00e9tant fortement r\u00e9duite(GTI 2025<\/em>). <\/p>\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n

Dans l’ensemble du Sahel, les r\u00e9gimes militaires du Mali, du Burkina Faso et du Niger ont pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 leur engagement avec des puissances non occidentales comme faisant partie d’un effort plus large de reconqu\u00eate de la souverainet\u00e9. Le recours \u00e0 des entreprises militaires priv\u00e9es permet aux gouvernements de contourner les conditions souvent impos\u00e9es par l’aide occidentale et le soutien militaire. <\/p>\n\n

Toutefois, ce nouveau mod\u00e8le de coop\u00e9ration en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, domin\u00e9 par le Corps africain de la Russie et la diplomatie \u00e9conomique de la Chine, soul\u00e8ve des inqui\u00e9tudes quant au simple remplacement d’une forme de d\u00e9pendance ext\u00e9rieure par une autre. En l’absence d’une v\u00e9ritable coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale et de r\u00e9formes internes, ces partenariats risquent d’enraciner l’autoritarisme tout en n’apportant pas d’am\u00e9liorations durables en mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Le Sahel n’est pas seulement une zone d’instabilit\u00e9 : c’est d\u00e9sormais un champ de bataille pour l’influence mondiale, o\u00f9 convergent le terrorisme, l’effondrement des \u00c9tats et la rivalit\u00e9 des superpuissances. Les r\u00e9sultats de ces luttes se r\u00e9percuteront bien au-del\u00e0 de la r\u00e9gion, fa\u00e7onnant l’architecture de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 mondiale pour les ann\u00e9es \u00e0 venir. Alors que les puissances occidentales refont leurs calculs et que la Russie et la Chine se retranchent, les populations du Sahel restent prises dans le collimateur d’une temp\u00eate g\u00e9opolitique qui ne montre aucun signe d’apaisement. <\/p>\n\n

R\u00e9f\u00e9rence<\/h3>\n\n

Indice mondial du terrorisme 2025. Institut pour l’\u00e9conomie et la paix<\/em>. (2025).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La r\u00e9gion du Sahel est devenue un th\u00e9\u00e2tre critique de la concurrence mondiale, o\u00f9 les int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques s’entrecroisent avec certaines des menaces terroristes les plus persistantes au monde. 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