{"id":5291,"date":"2025-05-17T00:00:20","date_gmt":"2025-05-17T00:00:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/"},"modified":"2025-05-17T00:38:44","modified_gmt":"2025-05-17T00:38:44","slug":"instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/","title":{"rendered":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation &#8211; d\u00e9finies comme la diffusion d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e de fausses informations dans le but de manipuler, d&rsquo;induire en erreur ou de d\u00e9stabiliser &#8211; ont touch\u00e9 toutes les r\u00e9gions d&rsquo;Afrique, avec au moins 39 pays cibl\u00e9s (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Ces campagnes se sont concentr\u00e9es : en 2024, 20 pays africains ont \u00e9t\u00e9 confront\u00e9s \u00e0 trois incidents ou plus, contre seulement sept en 2022. Les pays en conflit sont les plus durement touch\u00e9s, avec en moyenne cinq op\u00e9rations de d\u00e9sinformation chacun, impliquant souvent des acteurs multiples et parfois contradictoires (ACSS, 2024).  <\/p>\n\n<p>Acteurs \u00e9trangers<\/p>\n\n<p>Pr\u00e8s de 60 % de ces campagnes sont parrain\u00e9es par des puissances \u00e9trang\u00e8res, notamment la Russie, la Chine, les \u00c9mirats arabes unis, l&rsquo;Arabie saoudite et le Qatar. La Russie est l&rsquo;acteur le plus important, responsable de 80 campagnes document\u00e9es dans 22 pays africains, repr\u00e9sentant pr\u00e8s de 40 % de la d\u00e9sinformation sur le continent (ACSS, 2024). Ces campagnes diffusent souvent des contenus anti-occidentaux et antid\u00e9mocratiques par le biais de r\u00e9seaux coordonn\u00e9s de faux comptes et de m\u00e9dias manipul\u00e9s.  <\/p>\n\n<p>Les p\u00e9riodes \u00e9lectorales sont particuli\u00e8rement vis\u00e9es. Par exemple, le groupe isra\u00e9lien \u00ab\u00a0Team Jorge\u00a0\u00bb aurait interf\u00e9r\u00e9 dans plus de 20 \u00e9lections africaines depuis 2015 (The Guardian, 2023). Des acteurs nationaux y ont \u00e9galement contribu\u00e9, notamment lors des r\u00e9centes \u00e9lections au Kenya et au Nig\u00e9ria (BBC, 2023). Les pays o\u00f9 la dur\u00e9e du mandat pr\u00e9sidentiel est limit\u00e9e sont moins souvent cibl\u00e9s, ce qui sugg\u00e8re que l&rsquo;influence autoritaire est un motif cl\u00e9.   <\/p>\n\n<p>La presse, qui constitue une contre-mesure essentielle contre la d\u00e9sinformation, s&rsquo;affaiblit sous l&rsquo;effet de la r\u00e9pression. Les lois visant ostensiblement \u00e0 lutter contre les fausset\u00e9s num\u00e9riques sont utilis\u00e9es pour r\u00e9duire au silence les journalistes et les militants (Freedom House, 2023). <\/p>\n\n<p>Il existe actuellement 23 campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9chelle du continent &#8211; principalement li\u00e9es aux int\u00e9r\u00eats russes et chinois &#8211; qui propagent des r\u00e9cits anti-ONU, anti-occidentaux, pro-coup d&rsquo;\u00c9tat et n\u00e9gationnistes sur le climat (ACSS, 2024). La Russie est la plus active, avec 16 campagnes transnationales orchestr\u00e9es par ses ambassades, ses groupes mandataires et le Russian Africa Corps, cr\u00e9\u00e9 apr\u00e8s la mort du fondateur du groupe Wagner, Evgeniy Prigozhin, en 2023 (France 24, 2023). <\/p>\n\n<p>R\u00e9partition par r\u00e9gion<\/p>\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><strong>Afrique de l&rsquo;Ouest (72 campagnes) :<\/strong> La r\u00e9gion la plus cibl\u00e9e, en particulier le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger, o\u00f9 les r\u00e9seaux russes, les juntes militaires et les groupes islamistes sont profond\u00e9ment impliqu\u00e9s.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Afrique de l&rsquo;Est (33 campagnes) :<\/strong> D\u00e9sinformation nationale importante, en particulier au Soudan et au Kenya. Les forces arm\u00e9es soudanaises et les forces de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 soudanaises inondent les m\u00e9dias d&rsquo;affirmations contradictoires, tandis que des groupes extr\u00e9mistes comme Al Shabaab exploitent les r\u00e9cits \u00e0 des fins de radicalisation. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Afrique centrale (21 campagnes) :<\/strong> Les missions de maintien de la paix sont des cibles fr\u00e9quentes. L&rsquo;influence russe est bien ancr\u00e9e en RCA et en RDC. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Afrique australe (25 campagnes) :<\/strong> La Chine domine au Zimbabwe, tandis que la Russie cible l&rsquo;Afrique du Sud, utilisant la d\u00e9sinformation pour soutenir les r\u00e9gimes en place.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><strong>Afrique du Nord (15 campagnes) :<\/strong> Les efforts russes dominent, en particulier \u00e0 travers les m\u00e9dias \u00e9gyptiens et arabes RT, soutenant l&rsquo;autoritarisme en Libye et en Tunisie.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n<p>Cet article se concentre sur les cons\u00e9quences uniques de la d\u00e9sinformation parrain\u00e9e par l&rsquo;\u00e9tranger au Sahel.<\/p>\n\n<p><strong>D\u00e9sinformation et instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>La r\u00e9gion du Sahel &#8211; en particulier le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger &#8211; est devenue le th\u00e9\u00e2tre non seulement d&rsquo;un conflit arm\u00e9, mais aussi d&rsquo;une guerre narrative. Avec l&rsquo;escalade des coups d&rsquo;\u00c9tat et des conflits, la d\u00e9sinformation fonctionne \u00e0 la fois comme un catalyseur et une cons\u00e9quence de l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9 politique (ACSS, 2024). <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>L&rsquo;arme du mensonge<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation au Sahel sont d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9es et sophistiqu\u00e9es. Au Mali et en R\u00e9publique centrafricaine (RCA), ces efforts ont co\u00efncid\u00e9 avec l&rsquo;arriv\u00e9e de mercenaires russes, principalement du groupe Wagner. Les campagnes ont faussement accus\u00e9 les missions de l&rsquo;ONU comme la MINUSMA et la MINUSCA de collusion avec les terroristes et de vol de ressources (UN News, 2023). Ces r\u00e9cits se sont r\u00e9pandus par le biais de messages coordonn\u00e9s sur Facebook, de faux documents et d&rsquo;images trafiqu\u00e9es, amplifiant le ressentiment du public \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9gard de la pr\u00e9sence \u00e9trang\u00e8re &#8211; en particulier de la France &#8211; et encourageant le nationalisme pro-russe (BBC Monitoring, 2023).   <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>La d\u00e9sinformation, catalyseur de coup d&rsquo;\u00c9tat<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Dans les trois r\u00e9cents coups d&rsquo;\u00c9tat sah\u00e9liens &#8211; au Mali (2020), au Burkina Faso (2022) et au Niger (2023) &#8211; la d\u00e9sinformation a contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 d\u00e9l\u00e9gitimer les dirigeants \u00e9lus. Des r\u00e9seaux soutenus par la Russie ont cultiv\u00e9 des influenceurs locaux et des pages pour propager des messages qui pr\u00e9sentaient la d\u00e9mocratie comme un outil occidental et le r\u00e9gime militaire comme une lib\u00e9ration (ACSS, 2024). Au Niger, les activit\u00e9s de d\u00e9sinformation ont augment\u00e9 de plus de 6 000 % apr\u00e8s le coup d&rsquo;\u00c9tat, ciblant la CEDEAO et les efforts d&rsquo;intervention de la France (Al Jazeera, 2023).  <\/p>\n\n<p>Ce d\u00e9luge d&rsquo;informations contradictoires a des effets concrets. De nombreux citoyens se retirent compl\u00e8tement du discours public, ne sachant pas quoi ou qui croire. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>R\u00e9duire au silence les dissidents et r\u00e9tr\u00e9cir l&rsquo;espace civique<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Les efforts visant \u00e0 contrer la d\u00e9sinformation ou \u00e0 critiquer les r\u00e9cits du gouvernement sont de plus en plus p\u00e9rilleux. L&rsquo;espace civique en ligne du Mali, autrefois florissant, est devenu r\u00e9pressif. Les blogueurs et les journalistes font d\u00e9sormais l&rsquo;objet de menaces, de harc\u00e8lement en ligne et de poursuites p\u00e9nales pour s&rsquo;\u00eatre exprim\u00e9s (DoniBlog, 2024). M\u00eame les discussions sur la justice sociale, comme celles sur l&rsquo;esclavage fond\u00e9 sur l&rsquo;ascendance ou les droits des femmes, sont rejet\u00e9es comme une ing\u00e9rence occidentale, ce qui r\u00e9duit le discours public et renforce l&rsquo;autoritarisme (Human Rights Watch, 2023).   <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Au Sahel, la d\u00e9sinformation est une arme d\u00e9ploy\u00e9e pour justifier les coups d&rsquo;\u00c9tat militaires, discr\u00e9diter le maintien de la paix internationale, r\u00e9primer la dissidence et r\u00e9aligner les loyaut\u00e9s r\u00e9gionales. Pour y rem\u00e9dier, il faut plus qu&rsquo;une simple v\u00e9rification r\u00e9active des faits. Une r\u00e9ponse significative doit inclure des programmes d&rsquo;\u00e9ducation aux m\u00e9dias, un soutien institutionnel au journalisme, des garanties pour les libert\u00e9s civiques et la responsabilisation des puissances \u00e9trang\u00e8res \u00e0 l&rsquo;origine de ces op\u00e9rations.  <\/p>\n\n<p>La d\u00e9sinformation se d\u00e9veloppe dans les \u00c9tats fragiles. Tant que les causes profondes telles que la pauvret\u00e9, l&rsquo;exclusion et l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 ne seront pas trait\u00e9es, le Sahel restera vuln\u00e9rable, non seulement aux balles, mais aussi aux campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>R\u00e9f\u00e9rences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Centre africain d&rsquo;\u00e9tudes strat\u00e9giques. (2024). <em>Campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation en Afrique<\/em>. Extrait de <a href=\"https:\/\/africacenter.org\/\">africacenter.org<\/a>  <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>BBC. (2023). <em>Disinformation in Nigeria&rsquo;s and Kenya&rsquo;s Elections<\/em>. Extrait de <a href=\"https:\/\/bbc.com\/\">bbc.com<\/a>  <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>DoniBlog. (2024). <em>La r\u00e9pression num\u00e9rique au Mali<\/em>. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Freedom House (2023). <em>La libert\u00e9 sur le net 2023<\/em>. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>France 24. (2023). <em>La strat\u00e9gie africaine de la Russie apr\u00e8s Prigojine<\/em>. Extrait de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/\">france24.com<\/a>  <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Human Rights Watch. (2023). <em>L&rsquo;espace civique du Mali se r\u00e9tr\u00e9cit<\/em>. <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Le Guardian. (2023). <em>Team Jorge and Election Meddling in Africa (L&rsquo;\u00e9quipe Jorge et l&rsquo;ing\u00e9rence dans les \u00e9lections en Afrique<\/em>). Tir\u00e9 de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/\">theguardian.com<\/a>  <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Nouvelles de l&rsquo;ONU. (2023). <em>Les missions de l&rsquo;ONU cibl\u00e9es par la d\u00e9sinformation<\/em>. Extrait de <a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/\">news.un.org<\/a>  <\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Al Jazeera. (2023). <em>Coup d&rsquo;\u00c9tat au Niger et d\u00e9sinformation sur les m\u00e9dias sociaux<\/em>. Tir\u00e9 de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/\">aljazeera.com<\/a> <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction Les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation &#8211; d\u00e9finies comme la diffusion d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e de fausses informations dans le but de manipuler, d&rsquo;induire en erreur ou de d\u00e9stabiliser &#8211; ont touch\u00e9 toutes les r\u00e9gions d&rsquo;Afrique, avec au moins 39 pays cibl\u00e9s (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Ces campagnes se sont concentr\u00e9es : en 2024, 20 pays africains [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":5209,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_review":[],"enable_review":"","type":"","name":"","summary":"","brand":"","sku":"","good":[],"bad":[],"score_override":"","override_value":"","rating":[],"price":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[187,92],"tags":[226,237],"class_list":["post-5291","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyse","category-non-classifiee","tag-2025-fr","tag-5eme-edition-2025"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Introduction Les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation &#8211; d\u00e9finies comme la diffusion d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e de fausses informations dans le but de manipuler, d&rsquo;induire en erreur ou de d\u00e9stabiliser &#8211; ont touch\u00e9 toutes les r\u00e9gions d&rsquo;Afrique, avec au moins 39 pays cibl\u00e9s (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Ces campagnes se sont concentr\u00e9es : en 2024, 20 pays africains [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"CISA NEWSLETTER\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=61558173539135\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"850\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"850\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"CISA EDITORIAL\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@CisaSocial\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@CisaSocial\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"\u00c9crit par\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"CISA EDITORIAL\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"6 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"CISA EDITORIAL\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/a0e04c9eece75fa21ae2273867968b01\"},\"headline\":\"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/\"},\"wordCount\":1318,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/04\\\/fakenewsmedia.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"2025\",\"5\u00e8me \u00e9dition 2025\"],\"articleSection\":[\"ANALYSE\",\"Non classifi\u00e9(e)\"],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/\",\"name\":\"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/04\\\/fakenewsmedia.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/04\\\/fakenewsmedia.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2025\\\/04\\\/fakenewsmedia.jpg\",\"width\":850,\"height\":850},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\\\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Accueil\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/index.php\\\/home\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/\",\"name\":\"CISA NEWSLETTER\",\"description\":\"Headlining West African News\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Centre for Intelligence & Security Analysis Ghana\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/08\\\/cisaghana.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2024\\\/08\\\/cisaghana.png\",\"width\":1055,\"height\":1063,\"caption\":\"Centre for Intelligence & Security Analysis Ghana\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/profile.php?id=61558173539135\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/CisaSocial\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/a0e04c9eece75fa21ae2273867968b01\",\"name\":\"CISA EDITORIAL\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"fr-FR\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"CISA EDITORIAL\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cisanewsletter.com\\\/fr\\\/index.php\\\/author\\\/cisa-editorial\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/","og_locale":"fr_FR","og_type":"article","og_title":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER","og_description":"Introduction Les campagnes de d\u00e9sinformation &#8211; d\u00e9finies comme la diffusion d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e de fausses informations dans le but de manipuler, d&rsquo;induire en erreur ou de d\u00e9stabiliser &#8211; ont touch\u00e9 toutes les r\u00e9gions d&rsquo;Afrique, avec au moins 39 pays cibl\u00e9s (African Center for Strategic Studies, 2024). Ces campagnes se sont concentr\u00e9es : en 2024, 20 pays africains [&hellip;]","og_url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/","og_site_name":"CISA NEWSLETTER","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=61558173539135","article_published_time":"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00","article_modified_time":"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00","og_image":[{"width":850,"height":850,"url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"CISA EDITORIAL","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@CisaSocial","twitter_site":"@CisaSocial","twitter_misc":{"\u00c9crit par":"CISA EDITORIAL","Dur\u00e9e de lecture estim\u00e9e":"6 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/"},"author":{"name":"CISA EDITORIAL","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#\/schema\/person\/a0e04c9eece75fa21ae2273867968b01"},"headline":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation","datePublished":"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00","dateModified":"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/"},"wordCount":1318,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#organization"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg","keywords":["2025","5\u00e8me \u00e9dition 2025"],"articleSection":["ANALYSE","Non classifi\u00e9(e)"],"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/","url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/","name":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation - CISA NEWSLETTER","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg","datePublished":"2025-05-17T00:00:20+00:00","dateModified":"2025-05-17T00:38:44+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"fr-FR","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/04\/fakenewsmedia.jpg","width":850,"height":850},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/instabilite-au-sahel-role-de-la-desinformation\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Accueil","item":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/home\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Instabilit\u00e9 au Sahel : R\u00f4le de la d\u00e9sinformation"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#website","url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/","name":"CISA NEWSLETTER","description":"Headlining West African News","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"fr-FR"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#organization","name":"Centre for Intelligence & Security Analysis Ghana","url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/cisaghana.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/08\/cisaghana.png","width":1055,"height":1063,"caption":"Centre for Intelligence & Security Analysis Ghana"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=61558173539135","https:\/\/x.com\/CisaSocial"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/#\/schema\/person\/a0e04c9eece75fa21ae2273867968b01","name":"CISA EDITORIAL","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"fr-FR","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/d5b5396e9e972117bf9689978858ad932691d8aea505d34cd928f27f4a3d94d0?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"CISA EDITORIAL"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/cisanewsletter.com"],"url":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/author\/cisa-editorial\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5291","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5291"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5291\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5292,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5291\/revisions\/5292"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5209"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5291"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5291"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5291"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}