{"id":4422,"date":"2024-12-12T18:35:31","date_gmt":"2024-12-12T18:35:31","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/index.php\/contagion-securitaire-au-sahel-rejeter-les-solutions-violentes-aux-problemes-violents\/"},"modified":"2024-12-13T05:22:44","modified_gmt":"2024-12-13T05:22:44","slug":"contagion-securitaire-au-sahel-rejeter-les-solutions-violentes-aux-problemes-violents","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/contagion-securitaire-au-sahel-rejeter-les-solutions-violentes-aux-problemes-violents\/","title":{"rendered":"Contagion s\u00e9curitaire au Sahel : rejeter les solutions violentes aux probl\u00e8mes violents"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>L&rsquo;Afrique continue d&rsquo;\u00eatre confront\u00e9e \u00e0 une myriade de d\u00e9fis en mati\u00e8re de gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Cette \u00e9volution a en partie contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 la crise de d\u00e9veloppement du continent (Raga, Lemma &amp; Keane, 2023 ; Adedoyin, 2014 ; B\u00f8\u00e5s, 2019). Malgr\u00e9 les efforts concert\u00e9s de certains pays africains \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, il est d\u00e9courageant de constater que, m\u00eame au XXIe si\u00e8cle, les modestes progr\u00e8s r\u00e9alis\u00e9s au fil des ans pour am\u00e9liorer la gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique n&rsquo;ont gu\u00e8re \u00e9t\u00e9 maintenus. Le r\u00e9seau de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 du continent est rest\u00e9 controvers\u00e9 pour diverses raisons, ce qui a conduit \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionaux et nationaux poreux et faibles. La gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 en Afrique reste une question cruciale en raison des carnages, des brutalit\u00e9s, des pogroms et des actes de g\u00e9nocide g\u00e9n\u00e9ralis\u00e9s qui d\u00e9coulent des guerres civiles persistantes, des affrontements communautaires et des conflits religieux (Nnoli, 2006).    <\/p>\n\n<p>Entre les ann\u00e9es 1980 et 2000, l&rsquo;Afrique a enregistr\u00e9 une violence sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent, notamment des ex\u00e9cutions extrajudiciaires, une oppression et une r\u00e9pression politiques, des massacres ethniques et d&rsquo;autres formes de violence (Nwizu &amp; Alozie, 2018).<\/p>\n\n<p>L&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 croissante au Sahel et dans les r\u00e9gions avoisinantes constitue une menace s\u00e9rieuse non seulement pour les gouvernements locaux, mais aussi pour la stabilit\u00e9 des \u00c9tats voisins et du continent africain dans son ensemble. La contagion s\u00e9curitaire, exacerb\u00e9e par des structures \u00e9tatiques peu solides, des fronti\u00e8res fragiles et des conditions socio-\u00e9conomiques difficiles, est un probl\u00e8me omnipr\u00e9sent dans toute l&rsquo;Afrique (Nwizu &amp; Alozie, 2018 ; Nnoli, 2006). De nombreux cas de conflits et de menaces pour la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 se propageant d&rsquo;une nation \u00e0 des \u00c9tats voisins ont d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 des r\u00e9gions enti\u00e8res. Par exemple, l&rsquo;insurrection de Boko Haram au Nig\u00e9ria a eu un impact significatif sur le Tchad, le Niger et le Cameroun (Awosusi, 2017). De m\u00eame, l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9sultant des conflits au Sahel &#8211; en particulier au Mali et au Burkina Faso &#8211; s&rsquo;est propag\u00e9e \u00e0 d&rsquo;autres parties de l&rsquo;Afrique de l&rsquo;Ouest (Yabi, 2024). Les groupes terroristes, les mercenaires \u00e9trangers et les conflits r\u00e9gionaux d\u00e9bordent des fronti\u00e8res nationales, exacerbant l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9 et affaiblissant davantage des \u00c9tats d\u00e9j\u00e0 fragiles (Andrews &amp; Obi, 2024 ; Acemoglu, Malekian, &amp; Ozdaglar, 2016).     <\/p>\n\n<p>Il existe globalement deux \u00e9coles de pens\u00e9e pour lutter contre la contagion s\u00e9curitaire, en particulier celle provoqu\u00e9e par le terrorisme et les menaces transnationales. La premi\u00e8re se concentre sur les interventions violentes &#8211; frappes militaires, op\u00e9rations antiterroristes et recours \u00e0 la force pour neutraliser les menaces imm\u00e9diates. La seconde implique des approches non violentes \u00e0 orientation syst\u00e9matique, qui mettent l&rsquo;accent sur la diplomatie, la r\u00e9forme de la gouvernance et la lutte contre les causes profondes de l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9, telles que la pauvret\u00e9 et l&rsquo;in\u00e9galit\u00e9. Si la premi\u00e8re offre une solution fonctionnelle \u00e0 court terme, elle cr\u00e9e souvent des dysfonctionnements \u00e0 long terme en d\u00e9stabilisant les communaut\u00e9s et en perp\u00e9tuant les cycles de violence.   <\/p>\n\n<p>Ce document postule que si les r\u00e9ponses violentes peuvent \u00eatre n\u00e9cessaires, elles doivent \u00eatre abord\u00e9es avec prudence en raison de leur capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 perturber le tissu social et politique des r\u00e9gions touch\u00e9es. En utilisant le fonctionnalisme comme cadre th\u00e9orique, cet article examine comment les interventions violentes peuvent \u00eatre initialement fonctionnelles pour r\u00e9pondre aux menaces imm\u00e9diates, mais se r\u00e9v\u00e8lent souvent dysfonctionnelles en raison de l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 long terme. L&rsquo;article fait r\u00e9f\u00e9rence au film Eye in the Sky (2015), dans lequel une mission militaire se transforme en un dilemme moral aux cons\u00e9quences inattendues, pour souligner la complexit\u00e9 et les dangers d&rsquo;un recours exclusif \u00e0 la force. Il pr\u00e9conise une approche multilat\u00e9rale ax\u00e9e sur la diplomatie, la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale et le d\u00e9veloppement durable pour s&rsquo;attaquer aux causes profondes de l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 au Sahel. Il soutient qu&rsquo;\u00e0 travers une analyse fonctionnelle, les syst\u00e8mes sociaux tels que les gouvernements, les institutions internationales et les organisations r\u00e9gionales doivent collaborer pour parvenir \u00e0 une paix et une s\u00e9curit\u00e9 durables dans la r\u00e9gion.    <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>Cadre th\u00e9orique : Le fonctionnalisme structurel et son application \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au Sahel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Le fonctionnalisme structurel, une th\u00e9orie sociologique, examine comment divers aspects de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 fonctionnent ensemble pour maintenir la stabilit\u00e9 et le contr\u00f4le social (Smith, 2014 ; Pope, 1975). Il cherche \u00e0 comprendre le r\u00f4le des institutions, des syst\u00e8mes et des normes dans le fonctionnement d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me social plus large (Ormerod, 2019 ; Kronenfeld, 2005). <\/p>\n\n<p>Du point de vue du fonctionnalisme structurel, les interventions violentes peuvent servir des objectifs de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 imm\u00e9diats mais perturbent souvent l&rsquo;\u00e9quilibre d\u00e9licat des structures sociales, entra\u00eenant des cons\u00e9quences n\u00e9gatives \u00e0 long terme (Merton, 1976). Si la violence peut temporairement rem\u00e9dier \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sence de terroristes ou d&rsquo;insurg\u00e9s, elle cause souvent des dommages involontaires aux populations civiles, sape la gouvernance et entra\u00eene une plus grande instabilit\u00e9 (Wahab, 2024 ; Choudhury &amp; Fenwick, 2011). Ce dysfonctionnement se produit lorsque l&rsquo;intervention militaire renforce les causes profondes de l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 en aggravant la m\u00e9fiance, en d\u00e9stabilisant les gouvernements et en encourageant le ressentiment et la r\u00e9sistance parmi les populations locales.  <\/p>\n\n<p>Le fonctionnalisme structurel encourage une compr\u00e9hension plus large de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 &#8211; non seulement comme la d\u00e9faite imm\u00e9diate des acteurs violents, mais aussi comme la restauration et le maintien de l&rsquo;ordre social. Pour ce faire, il faut aborder des questions sous-jacentes telles que la pauvret\u00e9, la gouvernance et la coop\u00e9ration r\u00e9gionale. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>Le film : L&rsquo;\u0153il dans le ciel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Le film Eye in the Sky met en lumi\u00e8re les complexit\u00e9s de la guerre moderne, o\u00f9 les avanc\u00e9es technologiques, telles que les frappes de drones, ont conduit \u00e0 une escalade rapide et \u00e0 des cons\u00e9quences impr\u00e9vues. Il constitue un rappel poignant des r\u00e9sultats impr\u00e9visibles des solutions violentes, en particulier lorsque des vies innocentes sont en jeu et que les tensions g\u00e9opolitiques sont fortes. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>Les dangers des solutions violentes et la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une coop\u00e9ration multilat\u00e9rale<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Le film souligne les risques des op\u00e9rations militaires qui s&rsquo;intensifient sans tenir compte des cons\u00e9quences plus larges. De m\u00eame, au Sahel, les interventions violentes peuvent temporairement neutraliser les menaces mais conduisent souvent \u00e0 des dysfonctionnements involontaires et \u00e0 long terme. Les r\u00e9ponses militaires &#8211; qu&rsquo;elles soient le fait de forces locales ou de mercenaires \u00e9trangers &#8211; nuisent souvent aux civils, alimentent le ressentiment et affaiblissent la stabilit\u00e9 r\u00e9gionale (Seneviratne, Abbey, &amp; Onishi, 2023 ; Macharia, 2016 ; Sauvet et al., 2009).  <\/p>\n\n<p>La violence apporte un semblant d&rsquo;ordre temporaire, mais ne s&rsquo;attaque pas aux moteurs structurels du conflit, tels que la pauvret\u00e9, le manque de gouvernance et l&rsquo;in\u00e9galit\u00e9. Elle exacerbe l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9 en alimentant les cycles de vengeance et en sapant les efforts de r\u00e9conciliation, cr\u00e9ant ainsi des cicatrices durables sur les syst\u00e8mes sociaux r\u00e9gionaux. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>La n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;une approche multilat\u00e9rale et fonctionnelle<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Les fronti\u00e8res poreuses du Sahel, notamment entre le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger, facilitent la propagation des activit\u00e9s terroristes. L&rsquo;intensification de l&rsquo;action militaire dans un pays pousse souvent les groupes militants vers les territoires voisins, propageant ainsi l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9. <\/p>\n\n<p>Plut\u00f4t que d&rsquo;intensifier la violence, les gouvernements d&rsquo;Afrique de l&rsquo;Ouest devraient privil\u00e9gier les approches multilat\u00e9rales qui favorisent la stabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 long terme. Des organisations r\u00e9gionales actives, telles que la Communaut\u00e9 \u00e9conomique des \u00c9tats de l&rsquo;Afrique de l&rsquo;Ouest (CEDEAO), l&rsquo;Union africaine et les Nations unies, peuvent servir de m\u00e9diateurs et faciliter les n\u00e9gociations entre les parties en conflit. Ces organisations jouent un r\u00f4le crucial dans le maintien de l&rsquo;ordre social et de la stabilit\u00e9 en assurant l&rsquo;harmonie entre les syst\u00e8mes sociaux de la r\u00e9gion.  <\/p>\n\n<p>Les efforts multilat\u00e9raux ax\u00e9s sur la diplomatie, le d\u00e9veloppement et la gouvernance peuvent s&rsquo;attaquer \u00e0 la fois aux sympt\u00f4mes et aux causes profondes de l&rsquo;ins\u00e9curit\u00e9. Ces approches renforcent les syst\u00e8mes sociaux r\u00e9gionaux et fournissent un cadre durable pour une paix durable. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Le film Eye in the Sky rappelle de mani\u00e8re convaincante les risques des solutions militaires \u00e0 des probl\u00e8mes complexes. Au Sahel, les interventions violentes peuvent sembler fonctionnelles \u00e0 court terme, mais elles conduisent souvent \u00e0 des dysfonctionnements et \u00e0 une instabilit\u00e9 plus importants \u00e0 long terme. <\/p>\n\n<p>La communaut\u00e9 internationale doit \u00e9viter les r\u00e9ponses simplistes et violentes et adopter une coop\u00e9ration multilat\u00e9rale qui respecte la souverainet\u00e9, favorise le dialogue diplomatique et s&rsquo;attaque aux causes profondes de l&rsquo;instabilit\u00e9. La collaboration, le multilat\u00e9ralisme et la reconnaissance des limites de la violence sont essentiels pour briser le cycle de la contagion s\u00e9curitaire et construire un avenir pacifique pour le Sahel et l&rsquo;Afrique dans son ensemble. <\/p>\n\n<p><strong>R\u00e9f\u00e9rence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n<p>Acemoglu, D., Malekian, A. et Ozdaglar, A. (2016). Network security and contagion. <em>Journal of Economic Theory<\/em>, 166, 536-585. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jet.2016.09.009\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.jet.2016.09.009<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Adedoyin, A. (2014). Peace, security and development studies, global system in search of social security and improvement, Ibadan : John Archers Publishers <\/p>\n\n<p>Ammara, U., Rasheed, K., Mansoor, A., Al-Fuqaha, A. et Qadir, J. (2022). Smart Cities from the Perspective of Systems. <em>Systems<\/em>, <em>10<\/em>(3), 77. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/systems10030077\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.3390\/systems10030077<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Andrews, N. et Obi, C. (2024). Une nouvelle \u00e8re pour la <em>s\u00e9curit\u00e9 africaine<\/em>: Sustaining and Expanding Opportunities for Sustained Scholarship and Inclusive Excellence. <em>African Security<\/em>, <em>17<\/em>(1-2), 1-9. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/19392206.2024.2386815\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/19392206.2024.2386815<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Awosusi, A. E. (2017). Les s\u00e9quelles des violences de Boko Haram dans le bassin du lac Tchad : Une menace n\u00e9glig\u00e9e pour la sant\u00e9 mondiale. <em>BMJ Global Health<\/em>, 1-2. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/https:\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmjgh-2016-000193\">https:\/\/doi.org\/https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1136\/bmjgh-2016-000193<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Bai, X., Surveyer, A., Elmqvist, T., Gatzweiler, F. W., G\u00fcneralp, B., Parnell, S., Prieur-Richard, A.-H., Shrivastava, P., Siri, J. G., Stafford-Smith, M., Toussaint, J.-P., &amp; Webb, R. (2016). Defining and advancing a systems approach for sustainable cities (D\u00e9finir et promouvoir une approche syst\u00e9mique pour des villes durables). <em>Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability<\/em>, 23, 69-78. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cosust.2016.11.010\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cosust.2016.11.010<\/a><\/p>\n\n<p>B\u00f8\u00e5s, M. (2019). <em>La crise du Sahel et la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un soutien international<\/em>. Institut nordique d&rsquo;Afrique. <\/p>\n\n<p>Choudhury, T. et Fenwick, H. (2011). <em>L&rsquo;impact des mesures antiterroristes sur les communaut\u00e9s musulmanes<\/em>. Universit\u00e9 de Durham. <\/p>\n\n<p>Kingsbury, N. et Scanzoni, J. (2009). Structural-Functionalism. <em>Sourcebook of Family Theories and Methods<\/em>, 195-221. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-0-387-85764-0_9\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-0-387-85764-0_9<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Kronenfeld, D. B. (2005). Mod\u00e8les structurels en anthropologie. <em>Encyclop\u00e9die des mesures sociales<\/em>, 705-714. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/b0-12-369398-5\/00413-8\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/b0-12-369398-5\/00413-8<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Macharia, H. M. (2016). L&rsquo;impact des exercices et op\u00e9rations militaires sur l&rsquo;environnement local. <em>JOURNAL OF LANGUAGE, TECHNOLOGY &amp; ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN AFRICA<\/em>, 7(2), 140-152. <\/p>\n\n<p>Merton, R. K. (1968). Social Theory and Social Structure (Enlarged ed.). New York, NY : The Free Press.  <\/p>\n\n<p>Milton, D. (2007). Th\u00e9orie sociologique : une introduction au fonctionnalisme. N\/A. (Non publi\u00e9). R\u00e9cup\u00e9r\u00e9 de https:\/\/kar.kent.ac.uk\/62739\/. Le d\u00e9p\u00f4t acad\u00e9mique de l&rsquo;Universit\u00e9 de Kent KAR    <\/p>\n\n<p>Nnoli, O. (2006). <em>La s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale en Afrique : Une perspective radicale. <\/em>. Enugu : PACREP publishers. <\/p>\n\n<p>Nwizu, G. C., &amp; Alozie , C. (2018). L&rsquo;Afrique et les d\u00e9fis de la gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 au 21e si\u00e8cle . <em>African Journal of Politics and Administrative Studies <\/em>, 11(1), 46-59. <\/p>\n\n<p>Ormerod, R. (2019). L&rsquo;histoire et les id\u00e9es du fonctionnalisme sociologique : Talcott Parsons, la th\u00e9orie sociologique moderne et la pertinence pour la RO. <em>Journal of the Operational Research Society<\/em>, 71(12), 1873-1899. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01605682.2019.1640590\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/01605682.2019.1640590<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>O&rsquo;Farrell , R., &amp; Weiss, C. (2023). Russia, Wagner, and the Future of Counterterrorism in Africa (Russie, Wagner et l&rsquo;avenir de la lutte contre le terrorisme en Afrique). Consult\u00e9 le 4 d\u00e9cembre 2024 sur <a href=\"https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/2023\/05\/15\/russia-wagner-and-the-future-of-counterterrorism-in-africa\/\">https:\/\/gjia.georgetown.edu\/2023\/05\/15\/russia-wagner-and-the-future-of-counterterrorism-in-africa\/<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n<p>Pope, W. (1975). Durkheim as a Functionalist. <em>The Sociological Quarterly<\/em>, <em>16<\/em>(3), 361-379. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/4105747\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/4105747<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>  Raga, S., Lemma, A. &amp; Keane, J. (2023) Spillover effects of the Sahel conflict on selected West African countries. Analyse \u00e9mergente de l&rsquo;ODI. Londres : ODI<a href=\"https:\/\/odi.org\/en\/publications\/the-sahel-conflicteconomic-security-spillovers-on-west-africa\">(https:\/\/odi.org\/en\/publications\/the-sahel-conflicteconomic-security-spillovers-on-west-africa)<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n<p>Sauvet, F., Lebeau, C., Foucher, S., Flusain, O., Jouanin, J. C., &amp; Debonne, J.-M. (2009). Impact op\u00e9rationnel des probl\u00e8mes de sant\u00e9 observ\u00e9s lors d&rsquo;un d\u00e9ploiement militaire de quatre mois en C\u00f4te d&rsquo;Ivoire. <em>Military Medicine<\/em>, 174(9), 921-928. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.7205\/milmed-d-05-1008\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.7205\/milmed-d-05-1008<\/a><\/p>\n\n<p>Seneviratne, L., Abbey, Z. et Onishi, K. (2023). R\u00e9duire le co\u00fbt humain des op\u00e9rations militaires \u00e0 grande \u00e9chelle . Consult\u00e9 le 4 d\u00e9cembre 2024 sur <a href=\"https:\/\/lieber.westpoint.edu\/reducing-human-cost-large-scale-military-operations\/\">https:\/\/lieber.westpoint.edu\/reducing-human-cost-large-scale-military-operations\/<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n<p>Smith, K. (2014). <em>\u00c9mile Durkheim et la conscience collective de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 : A Study in Criminology<\/em>. Anthem Press.   <a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/j.ctt1gxp6jw\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/j.ctt1gxp6jw<\/a><\/p>\n\n<p>Stronski, P. (2023). L&#8217;empreinte croissante de la Russie dans la r\u00e9gion du Sahel en Afrique. Consult\u00e9 le 4 d\u00e9cembre 2024 sur <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2023\/02\/28\/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135\">https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/2023\/02\/28\/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135<\/a>  <\/p>\n\n<p>Wahab, F. (2024). The consequences of Pakistan&rsquo;s counterterrorism policies : socio-cultural and political transformation in tribal districts. <em>Critical Studies on Terrorism<\/em>, <em>17<\/em>(3), 581-605. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/17539153.2024.2360271\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/17539153.2024.2360271<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Xiaoming, F., Qinglong, L., Lichang, Y., Fu, B. et Yongzhe, C. (2018). Relier la recherche sur l&rsquo;eau \u00e0 la durabilit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me humain-naturel. <em>Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability<\/em>, 33, 99-103. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cosust.2018.05.012\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1016\/j.cosust.2018.05.012<\/a> <\/p>\n\n<p>Yabi, G. (2023). Les d\u00e9fis imbriqu\u00e9s du Sahel. Consult\u00e9 le 4 d\u00e9cembre 2024 sur le site https:\/\/www.imf.org\/en\/Publications\/fandd\/issues\/2024\/09\/the-sahels-intertwined-challenges-yabi <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Introduction L&rsquo;Afrique continue d&rsquo;\u00eatre confront\u00e9e \u00e0 une myriade de d\u00e9fis en mati\u00e8re de gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. Cette \u00e9volution a en partie contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 la crise de d\u00e9veloppement du continent (Raga, Lemma &amp; Keane, 2023 ; Adedoyin, 2014 ; B\u00f8\u00e5s, 2019). Malgr\u00e9 les efforts concert\u00e9s de certains pays africains \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, il est d\u00e9courageant [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":4352,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"content-type":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_uf_show_specific_survey":0,"_uf_disable_surveys":false,"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":[],"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_review":[],"enable_review":"","type":"","name":"","summary":"","brand":"","sku":"","good":[],"bad":[],"score_override":"","override_value":"","rating":[],"price":[],"jnews_override_counter":[],"jnews_post_split":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[187],"tags":[224],"class_list":["post-4422","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-analyse","tag-13eme-edition-2024"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Contagion s\u00e9curitaire au Sahel : rejeter les solutions violentes aux probl\u00e8mes violents - CISA NEWSLETTER<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cisanewsletter.com\/fr\/index.php\/contagion-securitaire-au-sahel-rejeter-les-solutions-violentes-aux-problemes-violents\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"fr_FR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Contagion s\u00e9curitaire au Sahel : rejeter les solutions violentes aux probl\u00e8mes violents - CISA NEWSLETTER\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Introduction L&rsquo;Afrique continue d&rsquo;\u00eatre confront\u00e9e \u00e0 une myriade de d\u00e9fis en mati\u00e8re de gouvernance de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9. 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